FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER 1965

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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE SCRIBBLERS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Charles Frankel

THE large-scale entrance of the United States Government into the field of international cultural relations is a relatively recent phenomenon, dating only from World War II. Much has been said in this brief period about the importance of cultural relations for the resolution of international conflicts and the achievement of American foreign-policy objectives. However, there has been relatively little discussion of cultural relations that has attempted to cut beneath the widely accepted conventions that it is good for people in different countries to know one another personally, and good for the United States if other nations realize that we do indeed have a culture. In particular, one special purpose of cultural relations, and one peculiar and troublesome set of problems which they present, have been given less attention than they merit. These have to do with the role of intellectuals in international affairs, and with some of the special characteristics of the relation between American intellectuals and intellectuals elsewhere.

It would hopelessly simplify the harsh complexity of most international conflicts, and it would ascribe more influence to intellectuals than they have, to say that international conflict has its source in the quarrels of intellectuals. Nevertheless, there is a kind of devious truth in this statement. The influence over international affairs of "the scribbling set," as the Duke of Wellington once called the intellectuals with less than complete affection, is greater than is commonly thought—greater, certainly, than one would suppose from the frequent complaints of intellectuals themselves that people in power are suspicious of them and averse to listening to them.

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There are a number of ways in which this influence is exercized. One of the most obvious is the relation of intellectuals to the language of international conflict and accommodation. International affairs are peculiarly susceptible to galloping abstractions—"Communism," "Africa," "Imperialism," "the Free World." Nowhere else do massive stereotypes and personified ideas play a larger role; nowhere do they do more to rigidify disagreement, to give it a quality of necessity and higher nobility, and to turn otherwise manageable conflicts into unmanageable ones. And intellectuals, more than most other groups, have the power to create, dignify, inflate, criticize, moderate or puncture these abstractions. The character of international life is influenced by the language that comes to be used in public to explain what is going on, to justify the positions that are taken, or to negotiate disputes. The quality of this language is something which intellectuals do much to affect.

There are some other even more apparent ways in which intellectuals exercise influence over international affairs. The pivotal audiences abroad to whom United States educational and cultural programs are addressed, for example, are composed of intellectuals.[1] The effect which these programs have on our relations with other countries depends decisively on the reactions of intellectuals to them. This is true even when educational and cultural programs have other audiences in mind. The target for an educational project of the Agency for International Develop-

[1] It would take us far afield to define the phrase "the intellectuals" with the thoroughness it deserves. Briefly, however, it refers to a social category. As I am using it here, it says nothing about the inner capacities (or incapacities) of mind of the people who belong to this category. First of all, an intellectual is simply a man whose principal occupation involves dealing with words or symbols at a fairly high level of complexity. He is, in this broad sense, a "scribbler." (Of course, the idea of what is "complex" is a relative matter. It depends on the surrounding educational and cultural context. In countries where educational levels are low, the notions of "complexity" are naturally more relaxed. Merely being a university student, or even a high-school graduate, can be enough to qualify an individual as an intellectual—a significant factor that affects the political influence of students in countries marked by low literacy.) Secondly, an intellectual is a man who, in addition to his specialized knowledge or with the help of such knowledge, concerns himself with issues of general public importance, and addresses himself to people outside his own professional field. Specialized knowledge in itself is not enough to make a man an intellectual. The late Norbert Wiener, for example, was an intellectual, in this meaning of the term, not because he made technical contributions to cybernetics but because he also discussed "the human use of human beings." Finally, it should be noted that to be an intellectual is not entirely a matter of self-election. In every society, there are associations, clubs, cliques, cafés and periodicals that are identified as "intellectual." Admission to them may be a wholly informal affair, but the fact that an individual has been admitted to them is part of what is meant by calling him an "intellectual." In this sense, intellectuals compose a reasonably definite social category, even though, just as in the case of businessmen, doctors or criminals, there are a fairly large number of borderline cases that cannot be classified one way or the other.

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ment may be primary- or secondary-school students, but without the understanding and coöperation of local teachers, school administrators and officials of education ministries, it is not likely to succeed. Some of the State Department's cultural presentations—for example, a jazz band or a touring movie star—may be aimed at a mass audience, but their reception depends to a considerable extent on the amount and kind of attention they receive from editors, critics and broadcasters. Of all United States agencies conducting large educational programs abroad, probably only the Peace Corps can achieve its purposes without major reliance on the good will of foreign intellectuals; and even its programs can be compromised by these groups if they wish to do so.

These aspects of the influence of intellectuals are reflections of a deeper role that intellectuals play in contemporary societies. As a consequence of the growing practical importance of such fields as law, medicine, science, economics, education and journalism, and, to a larger extent, as a consequence of the secularization of society, an outstanding feature of modern history has been the rise of intellectuals to positions of pivotal importance in society. Indeed, as the role played by intellectuals in most of the emerging nations illustrates, this trend is an essential part of what we mean by the "modernization" of a society. And the role of intellectuals has not been simply that of giving practical counsel or supplying technical know-how. It has been that of serving as a "censor-class" for the community. Located in the universities, the press, the theatre and the arts, the intellectuals in almost all societies are a major group from whom members of the educated and semi-educated publics draw their opinions about the character and moral quality of their society.

The attitudes which the individual members of a society hold toward its reigning institutions do not depend simply on their judgment of the efficiency of these institutions. Such attitudes depend also on whether individuals find these institutions congruent with their general *Weltanschauung,* and can justify them in a language which they regard as appropriate for discussing such matters. Thus, relatively few Americans or foreigners find fault with American institutions on the ground of their inefficiency. The more usual denunciation is that America is "materialistic." In other words, the stability and strength of social and political institutions depend not only on their practical

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performance but on their symbolic *legitimacy*. And to a considerable extent, the secular intellectuals of modern nations have supplanted the clergy as the principal suppliers and endorsers of the symbols of legitimacy. "Capitalism," "socialism," "freedom," "justice," "exploitation," "alienation," etc., with the special reverberations they now carry, are intellectuals' terms.

The significance of this for foreign policy is as great as it is for domestic affairs. Over the long run, a major nation's foreign policy is unlikely to succeed, or will, at any rate, become more costly and more completely dependent on violence and the threat of violence, if it loses the understanding and sympathy of intellectuals in other countries and at home. It is against this background that we may turn to consider certain curious features of the relation between American and foreign intellectuals. For the attitudes of intellectual groups abroad are peculiarly relevant to an understanding of the nature and difficulties of the tasks that are somewhat loosely and happily lumped together under the heading of "cultural relations."

II

It is tempting, and only too common, when describing the attitudes of foreign intellectuals, to label them with the generic term, "anti-American." But this is almost certainly misleading. The attitudes to which this label is applied are not infrequently accompanied by great courtesy and friendship toward individual Americans, by avid interest in American intellectual, literary and artistic achievements, and even by basic sympathy with the long-range objectives of American foreign policy. "Anti-Americanism," so-called, is in fact a complex and elusive phenomenon composed of many separate strands, a good number of which have little to do intrinsically with American culture as such. Instead of concentrating on anti-Americanism, which begs many questions, it is preferable to try to unravel these strands and to see what they imply with regard to the problem of communication between articulate representatives of American and foreign cultures.

Obviously, there are grave dangers of oversimplification in any attempt to characterize the intellectuals of the United States or of other countries in a few broad strokes. The ethnic, social and political differences between the intellectuals of different countries are frequently very great, and, within individual countries,

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intellectual groups are commonly divided into sub-groups and factions that are in sharp disagreement with one another. So far as the remarks that are about to be made are concerned, it should be borne in mind that they describe, on the whole, the attitudes of the most vocal and visible members of intellectual groups, and that they apply with least force to the English-speaking and Scandinavian countries, and probably with greatest force to the intellectuals of the emerging countries. It should also be stressed that we are discussing differences between American intellectuals and others that are differences in degree, and not absolute, categorical contrasts. Within the framework of such reservations, however, a number of generalizations may be hazarded.

To begin with, the basic intellectual perspective of the dominant groups in the intellectual circles of most foreign countries tends to be different from that which prevails among most leading representatives of American scholarship and intellectual life. Setting specialists in the physical sciences aside, the education and mental formation of most foreign intellectuals is literary in character, and their approach to social issues is marked by a high degree of reliance on broad and abstract theories and ideals. In contrast, American scholars, particularly those in the social sciences, tend to be more empirical, more concerned with refined problems of methodology, and more anti-ideological. Where foreign intellectuals enjoy using comprehensive intellectual schemes, often carrying heavy philosophical and metaphysical overtones, to explain and interpret specific trends, American scholars and social observers tend to be skeptical, perhaps overly skeptical, of broad generalizations and value-judgments.

This difference in basic intellectual outlook leads to other differences, sometimes more apparent than real, but important none the less because they are felt to be real. Thus, to a considerable extent, intellectuals abroad are likely to be leftist in their political sentiments. In contrast, American scholars and intellectuals, although in fact they may be anything but conservative, are nevertheless frequently perceived by their foreign colleagues as adherents of the status quo. The reason has less to do with their explicit political sentiments than with their intellectual style. By and large, they tend to be "problem-oriented." That is to say, they generally shun sweeping verdicts on the state of society, and prefer, by training and inclination, to break down large issues into their smaller parts, formulating these as limited problems

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which manageable programs of inquiry or reform may reasonably be expected to solve. Accordingly, to others with different traditions, American scholars are likely to seem at best mildly reformist or meliorist. Their concern to deal with limited problems one by one suggests that they are merely tinkering with a social system with whose fundamental aspects they are in sympathy.

Moreover, this impression which foreign intellectuals have of American intellectual culture is complemented and complicated by another impression which they are also likely to have. Leftist though they may be in their political sentiments, many foreign intellectuals also tend to be aristocratic in their educational, esthetic and cultural ideals. Although American intellectuals may often share the foreigner's disdain for "leveling-downwards" and "mass culture," they are less often as stringent and uncompromising in their declarations of principle. They are likely to be more tolerant of the theory and practice of American mass education. They are less prone to see inherent conflicts between "democracy" and "excellence," or "industrial society" and "individual freedom." And while they may recognize a conflict between "the sciences" and "the humanities," they do not so often draw the absolute line between these two spheres that intellectuals in other parts of the world do. In sum, although an antagonism between "the two cultures" exists in the United States, it is probably less pronounced in this country than in any other. In consequence, if American intellectuals strike others as too conservative from one point of view, they often seem too modernist, too supinely afloat on the wave of the future, from another point of view.[2]

[2] Although we are not discussing established facts about American intellectuals, but only the views which intellectuals elsewhere tend to hold of them, some apparently important exceptions to these generalizations may nevertheless come to mind. Men like Robert Oppenheimer or Linus Pauling are obviously not perceived either as conservatives or as apologists for technocracy by intellectuals abroad. Again, the activities of many American professors with regard to civil rights or Viet Nam would seem to fall into the pattern of political activity characteristic of the most visible and vocal intellectual circles abroad. And there are, of course, well-known intellectual journals of opinion in the United States, usually literary in their focus, whose tone of alienation from contemporary American culture resembles the tone of similar journals abroad.

Nevertheless, while these examples indicate that the contrast we are drawing must be carefully shaded, they also underscore its basic truth. Dr. Pauling, for example, has been a radical critic of American military policy, and Dr. Oppenheimer has gained fame not only as a physicist but as a social philosopher concerned about the relation of science to humanistic civilization. Yet neither can be identified as the spokesman of a general political position that can be given systematic formulation. Again, there is no evidence that the great majority of professors who have taken part in Viet Nam demonstrations are critics of the American political or social system in general, or even that they are opposed to the major aspects of American foreign policy such as NATO or foreign aid. And when we turn to literary journals of opinion, we find in them not only ideology, but also a high content of anti-ideology. To many foreign intellectuals, all this is likely to suggest that American intellectuals are strangely indifferent, or perhaps even hostile, to questions of first principles.

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The issue is practical, indeed economic and political, as well as moral and theoretical. In the United States itself, the introduction of new intellectual materials that require new intellectual skills if they are to be mastered, and particularly the introduction of methods of social inquiry marked by indifference to traditional ideological positions, have encountered resistance on many occasions and in many places. This resistance is likely to be all the greater when, in a given country, such materials and methods appear to be an import from abroad. A revision of secondary-school curricula, the return of students trained in the United States in American methods of empirical social inquiry, the introduction by visiting American scholars of the American style in sociology and political science, can all imply or seem to imply the upsetting of established learning in a host country. Without intending to do so, American programs of educational and cultural exchange can thus threaten the established system of status and prestige in academic and intellectual circles abroad.

To this must be added other sources of potential misunderstanding. The labels that American and foreign intellectuals use to discuss social systems are different. Discussions by most foreign intellectuals still turn on words like "socialism" and "capitalism," the former being almost invariably a eulogistic term, the latter almost invariably pejorative. It is difficult for foreign intellectuals to join issue with intellectuals like those from the United States, who seem so often to be indifferent to the distinction intended by these words, and who tend to suggest, indeed, that the words are misleading.

There are allied difficulties in connection with attitudes toward religion. In many countries, the intellectuals, particularly the younger ones, are predominantly not religious or are militantly anti-religious. At the very least, they are not usually Protestant Christians, and are therefore likely to be puzzled or put off by the special religious rhetoric that characterizes many American political statements. And even if American scholars and intellectuals do not echo this rhetoric, they may still puzzle their foreign counterparts. For there is little in the experience of the latter to prepare them to understand attitudes toward religion—ranging from ingenious reconstructions of traditional religious thought through cheerful tolerance of all religion to indifference to the question—which are likely to characterize intellectuals who have grown up in a society where religious pluralism is well established.

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Such differences in outlook are sharpened by differences in the history and in the social position and function of intellectual groups in the United States and other countries. Students, scholars, writers and artists abroad tend to be discriminable and visible groups in their society. Often they have relatively little active contact with other social groups. Indeed, they often perceive themselves, and are perceived, as a separate social *class*, with a distinct outlook and a special social mission. They are the vanguard of the forces of enlightenment, the spokesmen for modernization or freedom or the emerging national culture, the keepers of the national conscience. American intellectuals, in comparison, have less ambitious conceptions of their role, and less consciousness of themselves as a class, just as American businessmen, workers and government functionaries also tend to have less class-consciousness.

This difference between American intellectuals and intellectuals abroad runs parallel to another. By and large, foreign intellectuals think of themselves as performing their special functions precisely when they keep their distance from the centers of power governing their society. They are prepared to identify themselves with the powers-that-be only when, in turn, they can identify these powers-that-be with themselves—only when they believe, that is to say, that government, the economy and the social structure are being systematically rebuilt in accordance with the principles which they hold. From such a point of view, it is one thing to take and use power for "revolutionary" purposes; it is quite another thing to serve those who have power, and who use it merely to keep things going or to patch things up. Accordingly, for many foreign intellectuals, to advise government, to counsel industry, to bring technical expertise to bear on specific social problems, seems to be equivalent to the renunciation of one's status as an intellectual. American scholars, in contrast, are less inclined to regard a close identification with power as inherently contaminating. They find it easier to think of practical service to government, industry or the community in neutral, non-political terms.

It is worth saying again that we are speaking here only of differences in degree. There are a number of American scholars and intellectuals who regard any form of close association with government or industry as an abandonment of their intellectual independence. And there are many scholars and intellectuals not

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only in Western Europe, but in Asia, Africa and Latin America, who have undertaken practical tasks of leadership and counseling, and have moved back and forth between the universities, the professions and government service. But to some extent this reflects the tempo of development and the shortage of manpower in the emerging countries; and to some extent it reflects the congruence of the official revolutionary ideologies of these countries with the principles of the scholars and intellectuals concerned. Broadly speaking, even though the difference between American and foreign intellectuals may be a matter of degree, it remains a significant difference. Fewer American scholars and students think of themselves as generalized intellectuals; they think of their social role simply as that of men possessing special knowledge, like doctors or engineers. More foreign scholars and students are self-consciously intellectuals, and think of their social role as that of secular priests—general guides, critics and judges of their society.

Behind these different attitudes towards identification with power there are often, of course, objective differences in the social situation and political realities of different countries. In some countries in Latin America, for example, the people who hold power in government or the economy are deeply hostile both to intellectuals and to social reform. It is not a mistake or a dogmatic ideological illusion for an intellectual in such circumstances to view an alliance with power as a defection from principle. But behind such attitudes toward identification with power there are also certain pervasive attitudes towards power itself. The notion that political practice inescapably involves moral compromise goes back to Plato, pervades Western philosophy and Western common sense, and has become part of the heritage of intellectuals in most countries in the world. In the West, it is reinforced by traditional suspicions of worldly pomp and power inherited from Prophetic and Christian teachings. In many other civilizations, it is reinforced by religious and philosophical ideas that condemn the material world as the scene of illusion and temptation. And just as in the West, people may hold these views and yet proclaim themselves philosophical materialists. The obvious fact should perhaps also be mentioned that the objective experience of most human beings in relation to the wielders of political power has been a bitter one. This is easily forgotten by many Americans, including intellectuals, but it separates American history from the history of most other nations in the world.

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In any case, whatever the sources of such views, they are widespread, and they have considerable influence in many parts of the world on intellectual attitudes toward power, and, indeed, toward the very nature of politics, government and social authority. And given such inherited attitudes toward power and identification with it, it should not be surprising that intellectual groups abroad —or, at any rate, some of the most articulate and influential elements among them—should be negatively predisposed toward American society and American policy. To be critical of power almost automatically entails that one be critical of the country that, above all others, possesses and epitomizes worldly success, wealth and influence. Needless to say, actual American deeds and pronouncements also have much to do with the attitudes toward the United States of intellectuals abroad. But it is naïve to imagine, so long as the United States occupies the position in the world that it does, and so long as the intellectuals of most other societies retain their traditional cast of mind with regard to their social mission and their relation to power, that American policy will not have to contend with an undertow of suspicion against it on the part of intellectuals in other countries.

Finally, major historical trends affect and complicate the relationship of American culture to other cultures. In the emerging societies, intellectuals are usually deeply committed to the modernization of their society, and resent any implication that they are less "progressive" in their thinking than their fellow intellectuals in the West. In practical terms, this means that they are eager to show themselves to be, in significant respects, westernized. At the same time, they cannot help but associate Western culture with a memory of injustice and of the subordination of their own native culture. In consequence, they very often have equivocal feelings toward Western culture, including its American version. This is one reason for the appeal of Marxism, a philosophy which, at one and the same time, offers both a convenient synthesis of Western tradition and a radical critique of that tradition. Marxism allows the intellectual of non-Western societies to feel that he is taking advantage of Western thought without being taken in by it. In contrast, any United States program of educational or cultural exchange with a developing country, much as it may be to the interest of both sides, almost inevitably raises the spectre of "cultural imperialism."

In the emerging nations, Americans may hear their country ac-

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cused of playing a devious and self-interested game. In the more developed nations, they may hear American policy condemned for its innocence and optimism. Nevertheless, while the difficulties that appear in relations with the intellectuals of the developed countries are not quite the same as those that affect relations with the underdeveloped countries, they are in certain respects analogous. Feelings of national pride, American and foreign, play a role in the process of cultural communication between the United States and other economically advanced societies, and the events of the last quarter-century have exacerbated these feelings. In Japan it cannot help but be difficult for intellectuals to separate their response to American culture from their memory of defeat, occupation and tutelage by the Americans. In Western Europe the American presence is a standing reminder of a war in which everybody in the West but the Americans suffered a major loss of status. Under the circumstances, an emphasis on America's unfitness for leadership—on the incongruence between America's economic and military power and her cultural immaturity—is perhaps to be expected.

Moreover, underneath these feelings there is a deeper one, akin to the feelings of those in the emerging countries who fear "cultural imperialism." It is anger at the destruction of hereditary standards and amenities by the advance of technology and the mass market. The jukebox, the snack bar, the traffic jam, the supermarket, and the patterns of aspiration and emulation they symbolize, have become universal phenomena in developed nations. They suggest the coming of an homogenized international civilization which people who like their own native idiosyncrasies are bound to resent and resist. When they do so, there is a natural tendency for them to resent and resist American culture. For these phenomena have been carried to their most extreme form in the United States, and are associated with a process known around the world as "Americanization."

The association is in fact largely adventitious. The United States is undoubtedly the most conspicuous example of a country that has plunged heavily into the process variously known as "modernization" or "industrialization." But other countries have now also plunged heavily into this process, and their changing style of life reflects the changed opportunities and aspirations of their own populations rather than American pressure or propaganda. As has often been observed, there are no laws forcing peo-

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ple elsewhere to queue up to see Hollywood movies, to leave domestic service for work in factories, to import American slang into their language, or to strive to obtain the products of mass-production, American style. They seem to have made such choices of their own free will. Nevertheless, even though the United States may simply be a convenient scapegoat on whom these revolutionary changes can be blamed, the fact remains that there are special overtones in the relationship of foreign intellectuals to American culture. For American culture, or what is thought to be American culture, is a lively and painful domestic issue in their own societies —not a piece of exotica, or simply another country's way of life, but a living example and option for their own country in which they must acquiesce or against which they must struggle.

III

Is the moral of this tale that there are insurmountable obstacles in the path of good cultural relations between the United States and other nations? Under any circumstances, communication between members of different cultures is a difficult and delicate affair. This question can be answered only if we are clear about what we mean by "good cultural relations" and what the functions of such relations are. If we think that it is a function of such relations to effect a grand international ideological merger, the problems that have been mentioned are very probably insuperable. And if we think that it is an object of cultural relations to "sell" a point of view, we are probably asking for what is equally impossible, and for what destroys the power of exchange programs to do what they are peculiarly capable of doing. On the other hand, the problems that have been mentioned help us to focus more precisely on some of the central and proper functions of such programs. And when these functions are fixed clearly in mind, these problems are not necessarily barriers to communication. On the contrary, they are potential ties, if approached with realistic objectives in mind, between articulate Americans and the articulate citizens of other countries.

The overhanging problem of using technological progress to enhance rather than destroy humane values and the aesthetic quality of life is only one among many examples that might be given. With regard to this problem, Americans are certainly in no position to give instruction to others; but neither are others in a position to point the finger of scorn at us. It is a problem for all

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industrial civilizations, and for all societies moving toward industrialization, and it invites not the exchange of invidious comparisons but joint concern and inquiry. A sense of community can be developed not only by the announcement of common values but by the discovery of problems that are shared. And it is against this background that we can understand why the emergence of habits of disciplined and responsive discourse between the intellectuals of different nations can have much to do with the chances for the rational resolution of international conflicts.

What, then, are the functions of programs for improving and intensifying the process of communication between intellectuals of different countries? There are many, but among them is the tempering and subverting of stereotypes, and the creation of opportunities for discourse that will encourage intellectuals in different countries to speak to each other rather than past each other. For stereotypes, and the habit of talking about different things at different levels of discourse, block the process of locating and defining the problems around which a sense of intellectual community might be developed.

Needless to say, personal and continuing contact between intellectuals from different nations may not lead to agreement among them or even to sympathy. But the evidence is considerable that such contact tends to undermine the organized fantasies that grow up, and that intellectuals themselves often nurture, when close and personal contacts are missing. Cultural exchange encourages the qualifying of rigid generalizations and the tempering of stereotypes about people in other nations, and it exercises a countervailing pressure against both intellectual and political inertia. As the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union over the last decade illustrate, there is a notable tendency in international affairs to persist in analyses and policies that do not fit new facts or fit them only inexactly. Vested interests, intellectual and practical, which have piled up around the old analyses, conspire to produce this result. A vigorous program to facilitate communication, particularly personal communication, between the intellectuals of different countries is a way of preventing the hardening of the arteries of international communication in general. It can discipline international discourse in the simple sense that it can help bring it closer to the complex and changing facts.

More than this, cultural exchange, if it is conducted with such

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a purpose in mind, can help at once to limit and enlarge the process of international intellectual communication. On one side, it can lead to the discovery and localization of questions that provide promising themes for joint discussion and study outside a context of political negotiation or competing national interests. City planning, the relation of the mass media to education or to inherited cultural traditions, the advantages and the limits of new methods of social inquiry, are only a few examples. This localization of issues by intellectuals can help in the gradual development of a vocabulary for international communication that avoids the great conflicts of ideologies, and that paves the way for more effective forms of international communication.

But the process of international communication among intellectuals also needs to be enlarged. The character and moral significance of the radical changes taking place in twentieth-century civilizations are any civilized man's concern. Given a reasonable effort on the part of intellectuals to listen to each other and to try to make sense to each other, direct intellectual confrontations may contribute to a kind of international discourse that exists now only fitfully and precariously. If there is a point in avoiding angry forms of high ideological recrimination, there is no point in avoiding the discussion of high intellectual themes. It is particularly important for American intellectuals, with their sophisticated methodologies, their love of concrete problems and their suspicion of broad abstractions, to remember this. What the much used and much abused word "democracy" means, what the relation is between individual freedom and the emergence of massive forms of social organization, what the function of intellect itself is in a technical and specialized society—these are questions with roots that go far back in the history of intellectual discussion. It is clear that even men of thorough reasonableness and good will will not come to the same conclusions about them. But it is equally clear that if men do not talk to each other about such questions at all, they are not likely to understand each other very well. And this causes trouble when they turn to the more practical matters on which international accommodation depends.

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GERMANY LOOKS AT EASTERN EUROPE

By Gerhard Schröder

IT was only a few years ago that the East European countries moved back into the field of vision of Western policy. For a decade they were kept outside the scope of our active policy, though not out of our thoughts. Most of the paths we trod toward the East led through a frosty and monotonous political landscape, past a hundred million East Europeans and their capital cities directly to Moscow. These peoples and, as we can now see, their governments, did not voluntarily remain in the background nor renounce their right to shape their own future and their relations with the rest of the world. But as long as only the voice of Moscow was heard in reply to questions asked of them, the countries of the West had no choice but to speak with those whose voice alone mattered.

Today this situation is changed. Beginning with the events in Poland and the uprising in Hungary in 1956, important and perhaps decisive things happened in the East European countries which increasingly influenced their relationship with the Soviet Union, with each other and with the Western world. Their individuality again became noticeable. We saw that national interests were a more permanent political force than ideological maxims, and that even the long practice of "proletarian internationalism" had not suppressed the desire for international relations as we understand them. Hence it made sense to regard the East European countries once again as active participants in international politics.

Occasionally the accusation has been leveled against German policy that it was slow to recognize these developments and then hesitated to draw the necessary conclusions and make decisions based on them. I feel that this charge is unjustified. In 1960 and 1961, a parliamentary subcommittee examined thoroughly the prerequisites for, and the possibilities of, Germany's pursuing an East European policy. In the course of its inquiries, it sought the advice of scientific and political experts as well as recommendations from the various ministries. Although at that time the tendencies toward change were only barely discernible, the committee arrived at conclusions that have since become guide-lines of German policy. On that committee's recommenda-

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tion, the German Bundestag on June 14, 1961, unanimously adopted a resolution which reads: "The Federal Government is called upon to pursue with its allies an Eastern policy aiming at the restoration of a free and all-German state that maintains friendly and prosperous relations with the Soviet Union and all East European countries. To this end, the Federal Government should grasp every opportunity to bring about a normalization of relations between the Federal Republic and the East European countries without abandoning vital German interests."

The changes that have taken place within the Communist-ruled area have literally rendered us speechless. We can no longer speak of the "Eastern bloc" or the "Soviet bloc," nor as yet of a "commonwealth of socialist countries." We have not yet found a new name for the "East European satellites," and make do with the term "East European countries," realizing that it does not adequately indicate the specific links that exist between those countries and the Soviet Union.

The lack of precision in our vocabulary corresponds with the blurriness of the political scenery and the diversity of developments in Eastern Europe. The tendencies toward liberalization in internal affairs as well as the aspirations to greater independence in foreign affairs differ from one country to another. Yet their principal features are the same. They are beginning to show a moderate but none the less significant measure of independence. Their first moves were in the field of foreign trade, but now they are already feeling their way in foreign policy. Once again they appear to us as nations. The emergence of national characteristics is nothing new; the individual character of each nation remained alive even during the era of severest Soviet control. What is new is that the governments are beginning to incorporate these characteristics and interests in their deliberations and to take them into account when making decisions on internal and external affairs, even if these interests deviate from, or possibly clash with, those of the Soviet Union. Gradually, their relations to each other, to the Soviet Union and to the countries of the West are assuming new and more appropriate forms.

It is important to note that these tendencies are perceptible only in the East European countries and not in the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany. This is understandable, since the motive power for the changes is a sense of national consciousness growing out of history. Without this motive power no independent policy

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is possible. If the Ulbricht régime wanted to pursue a German policy in line with the will of the German people on both sides of the Iron Curtain, it would have to open the way for reunification; and this would remove the base of its own existence. The régime in the Soviet Zone is evidently neither prepared nor able to steer a political course based on national interest. In contrast to the general trend, it must continue to seek the closest possible attachment to Moscow. This is shown by the so-called treaty of friendship signed by East Berlin and the Soviet Union on June 12, 1964. Whereas the East European countries are today freer and more self-assured in their actions, the Soviet Zone régime remains as always entirely dependent on Soviet power politics.

The development I have been describing in Eastern Europe is often referred to as a process of disintegration. I consider this term inappropriate. Changes need not lead to disintegration and relaxation need not lead to a break. Apart from Soviet Russia's continuing and credible threat to use all means to prevent these countries from openly deserting her, their national interests require them to maintain close relations with their big neighbor, in both the economic and the military field. They will also keep their common ideological outlook, if only because it conforms to their leaders' urge for self-preservation. The danger for Western policy today lies not so much in the fact that we might overlook but rather that we might overrate the changes in Eastern Europe and their significance. We must not forget that the governments are Communist governments, that they have not altered their ultimate aims in domestic and foreign policy, and that except to the extent that they pursue a recognizable national policy, they lack the support of the majority of the population. We must also realize that the changes we observe and welcome do not necessarily facilitate our own policy; nor is the solution of a given problem simplified by the fact that variable factors have taken the place of constant factors. We should not dismiss offhand the argument put forward by champions of polycentrism that diversity means strength, not weakness.

II

Hence the West is faced with new tasks. The German Government recognizes them and is prepared to help find a way to accomplish them. But though many possibilities are open to German policy in this connection, we must not overlook the obstacles

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that stand particularly in the way of a German commitment in Eastern Europe.

In spite of the long-standing and close relations between Germany and Eastern Europe—not always happy, certainly, but if viewed over the centuries, nevertheless fruitful for both sides—and in spite of the contacts established since the last war through trade and cultural exchanges, the area is still almost *terra incognita* for German policy. The Second World War left an intellectual and political gap in relations between divided Germany and the countries to the east.

The first official mission of the Federal Republic of Germany in Eastern Europe, the trade representation in Warsaw, was not established until September 1963. This was followed last year by similar missions in Bucharest, Budapest and Sofia. In contrast to this, Bonn had been able to establish its first permanent missions in several Western countries as early as 1950.

It is not surprising, therefore, that we frequently find an outdated image of Germany in Eastern Europe—one which may also have existed in the West 15 or 20 years ago. That image is characterized by mistrust and fear, based on recollections of the era when the National Socialist megalomania raged with particular brutality in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the countries of this area tend to make the same error that the Germans themselves frequently made and of which they have been cured by two catastrophes—namely, the mistake of overestimating Germany's resources. Ignorance of the changes that have taken place in Germany since 1945 has so far prevented this distorted image from being corrected. It is hard to know how deeply mistrust and fear of Germany are rooted in the minds of the leadership groups in Eastern Europe; but unjustified as they are today, they certainly represent a very considerable political factor. On the other hand, fear and mistrust aside, there also still exists, though not to the same degree everywhere, a healthy interest in Germany and indeed here and there a latent or even open affection. Nearly everywhere people want to resume old relations.

Of even greater importance is the fact that the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany, whose ambassadors have been active for many years in the capitals of Eastern Europe, has not succeeded in establishing itself in the minds of either peoples or governments as the "real Germany to which the future belongs." Despite the agitation against us, in which the Soviet Zone has played

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a large part, the Federal Republic has not lost ground in the eyes of East Europeans. On the contrary, we repeatedly find that they regard it as the representative of the national interest of all Germans.

Our first task must be to see to it that the East European countries approach the Germany which we represent without mistrust or apprehension. We must also win back confidence and understanding there to the same degree that we have managed to do in the West. This is a difficult proposition that cannot succeed quickly. Deep-rooted memories and prejudices are systematically nourished and preserved; for the frightful image of a militarist and revanchist Germany is a cheap and useful means of binding the East European countries to the Soviet Union and also of winning some degree of public support for the local governments. Nevertheless, I feel that if we are patient we will be able to demonstrate that present-day Germany, as part of a new Europe, is a good neighbor, seeking understanding, not revenge, and security for all, not tension.

We shall not spare efforts to dispel mistrust and fear and thus to relax tension in Europe, but we cannot achieve this by practicing self-denial. Nothing would be easier, in order to earn short-lived Soviet applause and the good will of Eastern governments, than to accept the status quo in Europe and to renounce the right of self-determination for all Germans and the restoration of German unity. But the common interest forbids us to take such a deceptive path.

From time to time it is suggested that we regard German reunification less as a basic requirement of our policy than as an historical process which should be left to the healing hand of time. This view seems to me unrealistic. Such a policy of resignation would dash the hopes of the Germans living on the other side of the Iron Curtain; would help to consolidate the unnatural and unjust partition of our country without bringing peace and security to Europe; and would perpetuate a dangerous source of tension in Central Europe indefinitely.

The growing impatience of the German people with the continued partition of Germany is finding increasing political expression. No German government, constitutionally sworn as it is to act on behalf of all Germans and to restore German unity, could abandon the policy of reunification. It could not fulfill this assignment merely by leaving it to the healing hand of time, any more

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than an American administration could relieve itself indefinitely of the constitutional obligation "to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Nor can we be expected at this juncture, before hearing the opinion of all Germans, to express an opinion on territorial questions; they can be settled only in a peace treaty for the whole of Germany. We have repeatedly given solemn assurances that we want the question of Germany's eastern boundary to be settled in peace and not by force.

If there is to be a real relaxation of tension, Germans throughout the whole of Germany must be able, as again stated in the joint declaration of the three Western Powers, June 26, 1964, to exercise the right of self-determination. To achieve this elementary human right, our policy must be, not to arouse false hopes, but to establish relations between East and West based on mutual trust and thus enable us to remove, first of all, the minor sources of tension, but subsequently the major ones as well.

There is no short cut to this objective. A good beginning might be made if the East European countries were to realize that the German problem is a national one and not—as the Soviet leaders have repeatedly declared—a social one; and if they were to recognize that no struggle between two different social systems is going on in Germany, but simply that the nation wants to regain its unity. There are signs today that more understanding for the national character of the German problem can be found in some East European capitals than in Moscow. What will require more effort will be to convince the East European countries and the Soviet Union itself that a united Germany would serve their national interests better than the maintenance of a permanent source of tension in the heart of Europe, that Germany does not represent a danger to their security but on the contrary is willing to join forces with the peoples of Eastern Europe for the future development of the whole Continent.

I do not expect that reunification will fall into our lap if we regain the confidence of the Eastern countries. The slogan, "The way to reunification is via Warsaw," is a half-truth, even more misleading than the view that reunification can be reached only via Moscow. However, as regards our demand for self-determination, we are hoping for understanding and sympathy from all countries that feel affected by the partition of Germany and the restoration of its unity.

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Our policy toward the countries of Eastern Europe is not directed against Moscow, nor does it aim—as Soviet propaganda sometimes has it—at sowing dissension among them or driving a wedge between them and the Soviet Union. Not only would such an attempt presumably fail, but also no German government would show so little sense as to add stress to German-Soviet relations, tense as they are already, by seeking to agitate the East European countries against their dominant neighbor.

III

We realize, of course, that it is far beyond our own means to achieve the peace settlement we desire in Central Europe. Germany cannot by itself determine developments in East-West relations and in Europe; it can only contribute its share, which will be the more effective if fitted into the overall pattern of a common Western policy. There already exists far-reaching agreement in the Western world on the problems of our relations with the East European countries. This is a sound foundation, but it can be broadened still further once it is agreed that the interests of individual Western countries are the common interest of the West and should be upheld as such. If we fail in this, the endeavors of individual countries will be ineffectual. This does not mean that the Western allies should always proceed in step; they should, however, be unanimous about the direction and pace of their movement.

The countries with which we want to improve relations lie in the east of Europe. Moscow, too, has a European heritage to preserve. In some Eastern capitals we can already see a growing European consciousness that is even being formulated in public, though still with hesitation and for the time being merely in relation to economic affairs. Here, possibilities begin to emerge which we should seek to pursue and exploit.

At present the German Government can best make a specific contribution toward improved relations with the Eastern states in the economic and cultural spheres, in which they are greatly interested. Our first step in this direction was the establishment of trade missions in the East European capitals. We had declared our readiness to initiate that step as early as 1961. The reason that our first trade mission, in Warsaw, did not open until September 1963 was because for a time the Polish Government considered that normalization of German-Polish relations could

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begin only with the immediate establishment of full diplomatic relations, accompanied by a German recognition of the Polish view of the boundary question. The Polish conditions thus went beyond those which the Soviet Union demanded in 1955; for the agreement with the Federal Republic to establish diplomatic relations had taken cognizance of the German reservation concerning, among other points, the boundary question. Long-drawn-out negotiations arrived at last at a German-Polish agreement to exchange trade missions; and similar agreements followed with Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria. With Jugoslavia, which may be included here among the East European countries for a number of reasons apart from those of geography, we have maintained consular relations after diplomatic relations were broken off. We are represented neither in Czechoslovakia nor in Albania; the talks with Czechoslovakia in recent months have so far, unfortunately, been without result.

Our trade missions have not been operating long enough to provide extensive experience as to their success. Moreover, the framework within which they are able to act varies in the different countries. In their proper sphere of work—the promotion of economic relations—they have already developed considerable activity. For some East European countries the Federal Republic is the chief Western trade partner, while for the others it is one of the more important. Our trade missions have a dual task: looking into possibilities of expanding German exports, and giving assistance on problems related to the opening up of new markets in Germany. Because of their state-controlled economies, East European countries often find it difficult to deal with foreign countries having different marketing conditions—such, for instance, as those evolved through the progressive development of the Common Market. Continuous contact with our trade missions can help them overcome such difficulties.

Most of our cultural and scientific exchanges with Eastern Europe are carried on privately. In cultural relations, the government should lend a hand only if necessary and desired. Even here, however, trade missions find a number of tasks which they can properly perform—for instance, help in transferring the earnings of a German theatre company in Eastern Europe. If desired, we are prepared to enter into talks with East Europeans on cultural arrangements, either through our official representatives in their capitals or with their trade missions in the Federal

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Republic; and we have made concrete proposals to that effect.

The necessary basis for improvement in cultural and scientific relations is reciprocity, not in the narrow mechanical sense, but in such a way that both sides will derive advantage from the opportunities afforded. It would be a mistake to set off student against student, or artist against artist. Exchanges can lead to closer contacts only if both the Germans and the peoples of Eastern Europe are given comparable opportunities to introduce themselves to each other and learn something about each other. That goal is, unfortunately, still remote.

Members of our trade missions are increasingly playing a useful role as "people to talk to," simply by reason of being right there on the spot. They can give advice to the growing number of German visitors to Eastern Europe, to industrial representatives, journalists or scientists, and can provide them with contacts. Above all, in their daily dealings with the local authorities, they can help rectify false ideas about the Federal Republic. It is still too early to gauge the success of such unobtrusive work, but the conditions for doing useful things appear to be present. It is worth mentioning that, unlike the Soviet Union, all of the East European governments to which we sent written requests for assistance in clearing up Nazi war crimes answered in a civil manner.

Our relations with Eastern Europe are still in their infancy; the major tasks lie ahead. We want to extend the present exchanges, but not for themselves alone; we want to come closer to one another. The accent of our policy toward individual countries will continue to vary, for it is not only our own good will that counts; there must also be willingness on the other side. We shall not rush forward with spectacular proposals but wait patiently and attentively for suitable opportunities.

An improvement in relations should also be sought in the narrower political sphere. I say "narrower" because in my opinion closer economic and cultural relations also come under the heading of politics. Our Western way of thinking permits us to separate economic and cultural affairs from politics, but the Marxist-Leninist doctrine does not, and in this it is not entirely wrong.

Political discussion between Germany and the East European countries must develop organically. There could be no greater mistake than precipitate action. To begin with, it will be incumbent on both sides to create a favorable atmosphere for talks;

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we for our part wish to contribute to this as best we can. The East European countries, too, could help. An amicable agreement on humanitarian questions, for instance, would be a considerable step forward. Many people of German stock still living in Eastern Europe want to rejoin relatives in Germany. The German Government feels obliged to help these people fulfill their wish —the more so as they often have to suffer from mistrust felt by East Europeans for anything German—a relic of National Socialist times. As confidence grows as a result of mutually demonstrated good will, a basis will develop for political talks.

There are of course limits to political concessions. We cannot afford to jeopardize long-term objectives for the sake of some short-lived progress toward a rapprochement with Eastern Europe.

The question often asked is whether the establishment of diplomatic relations with all or some East European countries would open up new prospects. The theoretical objections occasionally raised do not hold water. Under the statement of the Federal Government of June 28, 1956, we could establish diplomatic relations with the East European countries in the same way we did with the Soviet Union. We must, however, constantly see to it that our right to be the sole representative of Germany in international affairs is neither impaired nor even endangered.

Great caution should be shown in making any prognoses of developments in Eastern Europe. We cannot foresee or influence many or perhaps most of the forces operating there. Although we may assume the desire of governments in the region for greater independence and their peoples' wish for more freedom as permanent factors in our political calculations, we must (as the past decade has shown) reckon with events that will hamper our efforts. Of course, such setbacks do not constitute a complete reversal; freedoms once granted or acquired cannot be completely withdrawn. It also is possible (and here again the past few years have offered examples) that developments will proceed more rapidly than we now expect.

We must be prepared for all such contingencies, which means that we should not plan our policy in these matters on rigid lines, with all the details firmly fixed; rather must we remain sufficiently flexible to adapt ourselves to any change in the East European countries and in their readiness (or perhaps reluctance) to establish or maintain contact with the Western world.

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We should neither make advance concessions for an uncertain future, nor, influenced by the present situation, establish principles that might bar us from following new roads tomorrow.

Any policy with regard to Eastern Europe requires caution and circumspection, tact and discretion. Often it will be best to wait for one of the countries to take the initiative rather than to come forward with premature proposals of our own. These considerations apply primarily to German policy. But they can also be taken into account generally if there is agreement in the West on the aims and conditions of a purposeful policy toward Eastern Europe and a readiness to put the ways and means of such a policy into operation.

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FRANCE AND GERMANY: DIVERGENT OUTLOOKS

By Alfred Grosser

FRANCO-GERMAN relations are at once much better and much worse than is generally imagined in the United States. Better, because the frigid atmosphere and tensions of 1964–1965 obscure the solidity of the links forged between France and the Federal Republic. Worse, because these tensions are not solely attributable to General de Gaulle but are the expression of a profound divergence in perspective.

Who could have foreseen, at the moment of France's liberation, that 20 years later, to the question "What is your opinion in regard to West Germany?", the responses would be: "good opinion," 52 percent; "neither good nor bad," 29 percent; "bad opinion," 9 percent; no response, 9 percent—putting Germany ahead of all other countries in French sympathies? To explain this evolution thoroughly would require a book. Let us note simply that the amelioration began in 1945. At the end of the war, there were some Frenchmen who believed that the future could not be built on aversion and fear. Most of them were products of the Resistance. Often they had just returned from German prisons and concentration camps. They did not believe in collective guilt and wanted to help the German minority who were trying to build a new Germany. It was the organizers and the participants of the Franco-German meetings of the years 1945–1950 who constituted what might be called the human infrastructure of the present political relationship. Independent of daily politics, there exist today—in embassies, in ministries, on the staffs of newspapers, in the leadership of unions, political parties and professional organizations of both countries—men who have known each other for many years and have acquired the habit of working together.

When in 1963 the other European countries complained about the exclusive character of the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship, they were doubtless right, politically speaking. But were Belgium, Holland and even Great Britain prepared, as France was, for such intimacy? From actual joint cabinet meetings to the success of the Franco-German Office for Youth, created in July 1963 and contributing last year alone to the meeting of 180,000

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youths of both countries at 6,500 gatherings, seminars and study trips, that intimacy has been based on a network of contacts and prior exchanges—a network denser between France and Germany than between either of the two countries and any other.

The transformation of the French economic psychology also helps to explain the rapprochement. General de Gaulle was right when he said to the workers at Duisburg in September 1962, "Today, what is accomplished in the Ruhr . . . evokes only sympathy and satisfaction in my country." The new faith in development has done its work, as has, in the political sphere, the European idea of which Robert Schuman was both apostle and creator. Although the Federal Republic is approximately the same size as France, that would not be the case with a unified Germany. Yet it is interesting today to see that 55 percent of Frenchmen polled replied affirmatively to the question, "In your estimation, is the reunification of Germany desirable or undesirable?"; only 26 percent replied in the negative. Contrary to what is generally thought outside France, especially in Germany, Frenchmen interested in political problems do not place the question of German reunification in the context of "Germany" but of "East-West relations"—a fact which has to do with attitudes to be examined in a moment.

Following his return to power, General de Gaulle contributed powerfully—sometimes reversing the attitude he had taken prior to 1958—to the improvement of Franco-German relations. Since 1963, he has caused them to deteriorate, although this year they seem to have recovered slightly. Without doubt he has brought a mass of Frenchmen who were still holding back at the end of the Fourth Republic to accept the idea of an understanding with Germany. But in the Federal Republic, his style (at first seductive), his anti-Americanism, his recent flirtation with Moscow, have seriously chilled the climate. And his nationalism is feared by those Germans most attached to a democracy which is still poorly insured against some unfortunate contagion. The treaty of January 22, 1963, will decidedly not be an electoral weapon for the Christian Democratic Union.

But the essential does not lie there. If de Gaulle should disappear, if a "European" like M. Maurice Faure should succeed M. Couve de Murville at the Quai d'Orsay, the climate will certainly change and some sharp conflicts over Europe and the Atlantic Alliance will be alleviated; but French and Germans,

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though closely united, would continue to have different points of view on some central questions. Between France and the Federal Republic a marriage has been performed. Divorce is highly improbable, but the spouses do not belong to the same denomination.

II

Their positions were different from the beginning. The division of the world and the cold war did not have the same significance for France as for Germany. From 1947, French policy was forced to renounce little by little its own objectives (at that time they were to diminish and decentralize Germany) in order to gain an American guarantee of security. Significantly, the fusion of the French zone of occupation occurred simultaneously with the signing of the Atlantic Pact. Even then the French were not going to give up the idea of an East-West détente, because depolarization would ease the internal division between Communists and non-Communists as well as improve France's power status.

In periods of tension, however, the military potential of a thoroughly anti-Communist West Germany assumed greater importance. Indeed, the German return to sovereignty, to an international role, was effected largely because of the cold war. In 1949 the Federal Republic and the Atlantic Alliance were born almost like twins of the East-West conflict. Since 1948, the Berlin crisis had transformed the vanquished enemy into an ally and the capital of Prussianism and Hitler's Reich into a symbol of freedom. The tension was undoubtedly going to aggravate the division of Germany, but it would also, and especially, permit the Federal Republic to attain the foremost goal of its foreign policy—that is, the right to have a foreign policy, something originally forbidden by the Statute of Occupation.

In March 1951 the Bonn government was authorized to create a ministry of foreign affairs in order to be able to sign the treaty for the European Coal and Steel Community and to be in a better position to take part in the preparations for German rearmament. The creation of Europe represented progress toward equal rights. For the Federal Republic, supranationality meant at the very most renouncing the acquisition of something it did not yet have; while for France it meant abandoning a sovereignty already solidly in its possession. This explains in part why for

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15 years, from Bidault's veiled refusal in 1953 to the thundering "*Nons*" of General de Gaulle, the French attitude toward political integration has always been more reserved than that of the Germans. In the same way, the status of inequality within NATO is much more unacceptable to France, for whom the Big Four once had meaning, than to the Federal Republic, which finds the Atlantic Alliance under American domination an egalitarian paradise compared with the situation of 1945 and even 1949. In taking the initiative in rearmament, Konrad Adenauer understood perfectly how much it would improve the young state's position.

The desire to normalize the exercise of sovereignty is limited in Germany, however, by the given factors of the essential national problem—the defense of Berlin and reunification. The Paris agreements which took effect in May 1955 state expressly that "The Three Powers reserve the rights and responsibilities previously exercised or reserved by them concerning Berlin and matters involving all Germany, including the reunification of Germany and a final peace settlement." No German politician speaks of revising this clause, though it constitutes an enormous restriction on full sovereignty. That is because the restriction is also a guarantee that the Federal Republic will not be left alone to face the Soviet Union or Ulbricht's Germany. It prolongs the quadripartite system of 1945, founded, indeed, on the sovereignty of the conquering powers, but also on the unity of Germany. To let the three Western powers abandon their responsibilities would be to justify the Russians in doing the same. In this matter the Soviet Union has always been very prudent. In spite of six years of declarations by Khrushchev about the outdated character of the 1945 agreements, the "Treaty of Friendship, Assistance and Coöperation" signed at Moscow on June 12, 1964, between the Soviet Union and the D.D.R. states precisely, in article 9, that the rights and obligations set forth in the Potsdam Agreement remain intact.

Under these conditions, de Gaulle's statement in his press conference of February 4, 1965, that German reunification should be negotiated between East and West Europe, was bound to upset the Germans. The sensible statement that the German problem cannot be settled without the agreement of Poland and Czechoslovakia is not very pleasing to the Germans, and they were shocked by the absence of any reference to quadripartite-

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ism *i.e.* to American responsibility. Paris issued many statements in an effort to smooth things over; but an essential point was demonstrated: although the Federal Republic is more disposed than France to accept European supranationality, it nevertheless sets limits in advance on the authority to be exercised by a unified Europe. For Germans, the German problem does not lie within European jurisdiction—the more so since the problem is not one of unification only, but also, and primarily, of the defense of the free parts of divided Germany, the Federal Republic and West Berlin, menaced by a Communist Germany supported by the U.S.S.R.

The notion of security constitutes a fundamental element in the Franco-German divergence of outlook. A curious turnabout has taken place since the prewar period. After 1918, France was obsessed with security. The Maginot Line was the sign of fear, born in large part from an awareness of terrible weakness due to the frightful massacres of the war and aggravated by a demographically aging population. Since 1948, it has been Germany that is obsessed with security, and here again it is due to the awareness of weakness—this time in regard to the Soviet Union. The French, on the other hand, have perhaps never felt so secure as in the last few years. There was certainly fear in 1947–1949. When General de Gaulle reëntered political life in the spring of 1947, it was because he believed a third world war was impending. When French diplomacy sought so diligently the following year to obtain an American guarantee, it was because the Communist takeover in Prague led France to believe that a new Soviet advance was imminent and that precautionary measures must be taken. But little by little these fears were placated. Today no one believes at all in the possibility of a war in Europe, in part because the U.S.S.R. is judged to be pacific (why would it jeopardize its internal development?), in part because of implicit confidence in "the balance of terror."

Since there is no danger, and (or) since the United States cannot let the balance be destroyed, there is less need for the army or the national atomic force as instruments of security; they are to be used as diplomatic weapons, notably within the Western world. The Germans believe there is a risk that the United States might not defend Europe and draw the conclusion that the Americans should not be offended or discouraged. General de Gaulle can go so far as to provoke them because he really

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believes neither in the Soviet threat nor in American abandonment. In principle, the French atomic force was conceived as a political detonator. Since the Soviet Union is capable of destroying the United States, Europeans could not be sure that the Russians would believe in the American counter-threat, connected as it is with the risk of suicide; some means was therefore needed to convince the U.S.S.R. that the conflict could, by the decision of France, become atomic. But even the detonator theory carries the inference that the physical retreat of the Americans from Europe will not create insecurity.

For the Germans the contrary is true. The sole means of assuring the security of Europe in a period when counter-threat and the risk of suicide are bound together is to see that the largest possible American force is stationed near the line which separates the two camps; then any violation of the line will cause immediate American losses and oblige the United States to retaliate, thus beginning the "escalation" which is so much feared and by that fact constitutes the best way of preventing the violation from occurring in the first place. The weakness of the French position rests principally in the fact that even General de Gaulle has until now accepted the German reasoning with regard to Berlin; this reasoning is accepted by all the Western governments and explains why they have always rejected any proposal to internationalize or neutralize the city. If there were no Western soldiers (and especially Americans) in West Berlin, an attack from the East would carry no risk; no president of the United States could credibly brandish the nuclear threat to reverse a *fait accompli*. On the other hand, the death of American soldiers would compel any American president to take counter-measures which would constitute the beginning of escalation, thus posing a considerable risk to the East. Why, ask the Germans, should what is true for Berlin not also be true for Europe as a whole?

Without pushing the paradox too far, and contrary to appearances, it can be stated that the question of confidence in the United States scarcely presents itself to the French, while for the Germans it is at the center of their foreign-policy preoccupations. Germans make innumerable approaches to the White House or the State Department to obtain assurances. They must convince themselves over and over again that they can safely have confidence in the United States, that it continues to support them in their confrontation with the great power which holds 17

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million Germans prisoner and menaces the liberty of the others. And to have confidence, one must be certain of inspiring confidence. France can permit itself to go to the very verge of outright offense to the United States. Even the distrust which General de Gaulle inspires does not reach the bedrock of the collective American psychology; whereas the Federal Republic, heir to the heavy German past, multiplies its acts of allegiance without causing American opinion to ask itself any the less often what confidence is to be placed in the Germans.

The position which the United States occupies in German election campaigns is significant in this respect. In 1953 and 1957 the Social Democratic Party lost the elections partly because many voters thought that if the S.P.D. came to power it would shake American confidence in the Federal Republic and, consequently, lessen the confidence which Germany could have in the protection and support of the United States. In 1961 the S.P.D. sought to overcome this liability, and in 1964–1965 has made a complete about-face. Confronting the sometimes divided Christian Democrats, the S.P.D. has firmly played the card of fidelity to the United States. Not for an instant has its approbation of American policy faltered either with regard to Viet Nam or Santo Domingo. In France, on the contrary, the quarrel between Gaullists and anti-Gaullists is not about whether to criticize the United States, but in what terms. Gaston Defferre's last statement before he withdrew his candidacy for President spoke of "the serious political error" of Santo Domingo and reproached General de Gaulle for contenting himself with "saying a few disagreeable things to the Americans" when "it would be better to place ourselves in a state of resistance to the invasion of American capital and American enterprises."

III

The Franco-German divergence on defense and in the matter of confidence is in some ways symbolized by the military realities of NATO, which also brings out another difference—that between German "Europocentrism" and French "globalism." The shortfall in the French contribution to NATO forces is almost as old as the organization itself. In the Fifth Republic it is due to disengagement, the refusal to integrate. In the Fourth Republic the French army was in Indochina, then in Algeria, not in Europe. Common defense against the East in Europe was and

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remains only one French national interest among other interests.

Inversely, ten years after the initiation of German rearmament there is, properly speaking, no German army. Apart from a few divisions of frontier guards, all the divisions brought into being by the Federal Republic are integrated into the Atlantic organization. This total integration originates in the first place from distrust. The subordination of the German army corresponds to the need of Germany's partners for security in view of the possibility of renewed German aggression, toward the East even more than toward the West. The second origin lies in the German desire to maintain the physical presence of the United States, and an integrated structure assures this more effectively than national armies would. Finally, the absence of any German equivalent of "interventionary forces," the key element of the French military organization, results from the fact that the Federal Republic has no obligations and ambitions outside the defensive field covered by NATO.

Understandably enough, German foreign policy is overly preoccupied with the "German problem." In addition to the desire to please, the absence of any criticism of American policies in Viet Nam or Santo Domingo is evidence of a lack of interest. The great industrial power which is the Federal Republic has no desire whatsoever to be a great political power. In Brazil, India or elsewhere, German capital and German steel mills have no political purpose, except in so far as the German question is concerned; an African or Asian government is "good" or "bad" according as it does or does not recognize the D.D.R. Germans feel that in aiding Berlin, in rearming and in being firmly anti-Communist on the Elbe, they contribute enough to the common cause to be able to leave world-wide responsibilities to others.

This attitude conforms to the highest hopes of the victors of 1945, who sought to uproot all will-to-power from the German soul. Nevertheless it poses problems, particularly as regards the future of Europe. The "European" adversaries of General de Gaulle in France delude themselves about the possibility that a united Europe would play an important role in world politics: a common foreign policy would necessarily be influenced by the German reluctance to see Europe assume such a role. It would also have to take account of the priority which Germans give the German problem. Here the German haste in demanding European political integration is a bit confused. For example, what

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German government in the foreseeable future could accept seeing the majority decide against it on such issues as the Polish borders or the status of the D.D.R.? Responsible Germans dodge the question, taking it for granted that a united Europe would adopt the policy toward the East which they desire.

This could well be an illusion, like the argument of the French "Europeans" that their five partners also believe in the idea of Europe as a Third Force. For the only country which might have global preoccupations of the same order as France does not belong to the Europe of the Six: Great Britain. One could cite any number of parallel quotations from the British and French leaders, and from the opposition in both countries, about the necessity of retaining military forces to intervene outside Europe and to influence world politics—above all the policies of the United States. Alone in the West, Great Britain and France must ask themselves the terrible question: How to retain world influence after ceasing to be a world power? The joint failure of Suez was a symbol. Both countries were searching for a new basis of influence. Did not Britain's desire to enter Europe spring largely from its hope that through Europe it might retrieve the influence which, even joined with the Commonwealth, it no longer had? Similarly, General de Gaulle looks on Europe largely as a means to extend French influence. And not only de Gaulle. His Socialist or M.R.P. adversaries, who, like him, defend the solidarity of France with the young African states, are not really more disposed than he is to allow Europe to take the place of the linguistic, cultural and intellectual "presence" of France.

IV

There exists still another Franco-German divergence of view with regard to the Third World, having its source in a difference of ideological orientation. The consequences are felt in a variety of directions, from relations with the East to the aims of labor unions. If the Right and the Left are defined as in one case a defense of the established order and in the other as the effort to establish a new order, France would find herself (on the basis of ideas more than a political or technical realization of them) clearly further to the left than the Federal Republic. Anti-Americanism is not enough by itself to explain a certain French "Castroism" and the animated criticism of the landing in Santo Domingo. There must be added the sympathy felt for those who

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revolt in the name of liberty and equality against those who possess wealth and power. And if progress must come through socialism, then go for socialism. Authoritarianism which transforms old structures for the benefit of the disinherited is excused where liberalism which benefits only the privileged is not. Germans, dominated as they are by anti-Communist ideology, are satisfied more easily with American explanations—yesterday about Guatemala, today about Santo Domingo—which tend to identify as Communism what in most French eyes is an attempt to establish more political, economic and social justice.

This ideological difference also plays an important role in European affairs. The French attachment to the idea of planning stems in part from the conviction that the economic and social order must be changed, while Germans, who are satisfied to let "the laws of the market" work, consider Western society more satisfactory. As a result, economic integration, the creation of a true economic community in Europe, has more supporters in France than in Germany, while the reverse is true for the political community. If it were only to maintain the French system of "flexible planning," the European Economic Community would be something quite different from a simple common market. But it is precisely this "planned Europe" which Professor Erhard dreads, simply because of the risks it would entail for the *Marktwirtschaft* in the Federal Republic.

The opposing ideologies have even more important repercussions on the views taken of the Soviet East. The chances are that every change there toward a relaxation of totalitarianism will be underestimated in Germany and overestimated in France. On the German side, the idea of a Western civilization which is essentially good is opposed to the idea of a Communist world which is essentially bad. France has a worse conscience about the disorders, failures and injustices of Western civilization than has Germany, and the Eastern régimes appear less universally reprehensible. Moreover, the French have learned in school that terror and oppression may be only passing phenomena in a general movement toward progress: the French Revolution advanced humanity in spite of the blood it spilled. As a result, many Frenchmen—and not only those on the Left—have a double standard when it comes to violence. One student imprisoned under Franco elicits more emotion than ten students imprisoned by Ulbricht: "reactionary" oppression is somehow of another

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sort than oppression carried out in the name of progress. At the same time, the French are much more apt than the Germans to view the evolution of the East serenely and especially not to require the complete "Westernization" of the People's Democracies.

When some years ago Walter Hallstein, then Secretary of State in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, spoke of a Europe stretching to the Urals, what he meant was not very different from the "rollback" of John Foster Dulles. When General de Gaulle uses the phrase "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals," he means the reunification of the Continent after liberalization (but without complete "Westernization") of the countries to the East. Some purely French considerations certainly come into play here, if only the old ties with Poland or Czechoslovakia. But the ideological aspect is probably more important: between Gomulka and Salazar, the majority of French would choose the first, the majority of Germans the second.

This oversimplified outline needs to be shaded in, of course, especially when Rolf Lahr, one of the two Secretaries of State in the Foreign Ministry at Bonn, speaks in Bucharest of the "European solidarity" which links the Federal Republic to Rumania, and when *Die Zeit* and *Der Spiegel* adopt "French" attitudes toward Eastern Europe. Moreover, everyday politics will continue to be dominated by attitudes peculiar to General de Gaulle, with their contradictory and corrosive aspects in German matters. In order to escape from being obsessed with its own problem, the Federal Republic needed and continues to need a task which is more than simply national. Until now, there have been two: one negative—defense against Communism; the other positive—building Europe. But French policy toward the Federal Republic presently consists in reproaching it for being restricted to the first, while refusing to allow it to accomplish the second.

But the more profound and permanent differences analyzed here are no less real. The American press and American leaders have a tendency to underestimate them—at the same time that they underestimate, in a reverse way, the number and strength of the links which today bind France and Germany together.

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THE CARIBBEAN: INTERVENTION, WHEN AND HOW

By John N. Plank

BY conventionally accepted criteria the Dominican Republic has had a dismal career as an independent state. Wretchedly poor, politically and socially primitive, intellectually and culturally undistinguished, it has been flotsam on the great tides of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an object not a subject on the international scene.

Late last April public order collapsed in the capital. Rapidly more than 20,000 United States troops were put into the city to ensure the safety of foreigners, halt the bloodshed and quell the violence, restore order—and forestall what President Johnson believed was the imminent takeover of the Republic by Communist-dominated elements and the establishment of a "second Cuba."

The President's decision to intervene, applauded by most North Americans, caused consternation in other parts of the hemisphere. Many Dominicans were offended by this latest affront to their national dignity, seeing in it a dramatic demonstration that the United States had no confidence in their ability to resolve their own problems and little respect for their position as citizens of a sovereign and independent state, juridically the equal of the United States itself. Many other Latin Americans were deeply disturbed, both because of the massive breach of the non-intervention principle and because of the way in which the United States took to itself responsibility for defining the character of the developing Dominican situation and responding to it.

The Organization of American States, profoundly shocked, its pride in tatters, came reluctantly to the support of the United States, assuming responsibility for helping the Dominicans end their strife and make a new start on the long, unfamiliar road toward political democracy, economic well-being and social justice. Subsequently a small number of hemispheric states sent military contingents to serve with U.S. personnel as part of an Inter-American Force stationed in the Dominican Republic.

All of this is now history. But it is history that could repeat itself—with appropriate local variations—in other countries of Central America and the Caribbean. In Haiti, for instance, or in

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Guatemala or in Honduras. These are countries that lie within a sphere the United States regards as being of vital importance: under no circumstances will their capture by Communist régimes be permitted. The device of preventive intervention, employed by the United States in the Dominican case, could be employed again. Whether it will be employed, or should be, is another matter.

II

Three facts are to be kept in mind in thinking about United States policy toward countries in the Caribbean region. The first fact is that the societies of the Caribbean, like societies everywhere in the developing world, are caught up in the confused but rapid process of change which we are accustomed to call generically the nationalist revolution. The second is that the United States is member and leader of the Inter-American System, the institutionalized embodiment of the Western Hemisphere idea, known since 1948 as the Organization of American States. The old label better conveys the nature of the congeries of institutions through which the states of the hemisphere conduct much of their public business. The third fact is that the Caribbean is the focus of the cold war in this hemisphere.

In abstract formulation, a major purpose of United States policy in the Caribbean is to promote harmonious links between Caribbean nationalism and hemispheric inter-Americanism in pursuit of cold-war objectives. In practice this is extraordinarily difficult, as the Dominican crisis vividly illustrates. Why it is difficult is worth exploring; how the difficulties might be lessened is worth considering.

Let us look first at the societies of the Caribbean. For our purposes they include eight small states—El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Haiti and the Dominican Republic—and a larger one, Venezuela.[1] All of them are Communist targets; in all of them there are cadres of dedicated Communists, some of whom have spent time in Cuba and have travelled behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains.

[1] On geographic grounds, politically explosive British Guiana could be included in this survey, as could Puerto Rico, the independent states of Jamaica and Trinidad, Tobago and the several British, French and Dutch dependencies in the region. Their histories, however, have been very different from those of the traditionally "Latin American" countries; and their present relationships to the cold war are also very different. Despite its important Caribbean littoral, Colombia is generally regarded as a South American, not a Caribbean, country.

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More important than Communist interest and presence, however, are Communist opportunity and capability. These are functions not only of the number and skill of the Communists but of the social and political contexts within which they operate, and in respect of these latter the countries differ widely among themselves.

Guatemala, for instance, is a dual society. Its Indian majority is still largely unincorporated into national life; the minority of *ladinos* and whites who control the country's political and economic destinies are the inheritors of a social system marked by exploitation, brutality, corruption and absence of distributive justice. Political skill and imaginative statesmanship are notoriously lacking; the country's institutions are quite inadequate to channel and accommodate growing demands for modernization in economic, political or social respects. It is to be recalled that in 1954, a Communist-dominated government was overthrown in Guatemala; today the country is a prime Communist objective.

El Salvador, an overwhelmingly *mestizo* society, stands in contrast to Guatemala in having a bold, modernizing élite, alert and able political leadership, increasingly strong and resilient political and social institutions and an exceptionally hard-working and adaptable population. There is a serious agrarian problem, traceable both to growing population pressures on the land and concentration of land ownership in a few hands; this problem has nearly intractable elements. But while the Communists are doing their best to exploit peasant grievances, their prospects for sparking large-scale violence and taking over the machinery of state are very poor.

Honduras—poor, sparsely populated, ineptly governed by a self-seeking military figure, lacking internal structure and coherence—is a restless country that offers important opportunity to the Communists. On the other hand, Nicaragua, long the fief of the Somoza family, is comparatively stable, most of its population living in somnolent unawareness of the revolutionary temper abroad in today's world and little disposed to adventure.

Costa Rica, a happy aberrant on the Central American political scene, has been for many years a vigorously functioning constitutional democracy: there is no evidence that the nation intends to depart from that course. The population, which includes an exceptionally high proportion of small-holders, is cul-

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turally homogeneous and shares overwhelmingly a constructive commitment to the values of the West. The country's political leadership, alert through hard personal experience to Communist wiles and ways, will not countenance subversion.

Panama, of course, owes its existence as an independent state to the Canal, and no understanding of the country can be obtained without constant reference to the Canal. There is the heavy economic dependence of the country upon the Canal and, related to it, the comparative underdevelopment of the resources of the interior of the country. There is the social unrest engendered, first, by awareness of Panamanians living near the Zone of how poorly served they are by their society in comparison with Americans in the Zone and, second, by awareness of Panamanians in the interior of how poorly served they are in comparison with Panamanians near the Zone. There is the scapegoating mentality: the problems of Panama are caused by the United States, and it is the responsibility of the United States to ameliorate them—but to do so without infringing Panama's status as a sovereign and independent state. There is above all deep psychological and political frustration that occasionally manifests itself in aggressive violence. Who are we Panamanians? Where are we going? What do we stand for? What can we *do*? What will the United States permit us to do? Always and always the reference back to the Canal and the United States. In an age of nationalism, the situation of the Panamanians is tragic. In cold-war terms the situation is also precarious: the Communists have identified themselves with every grievance, real or fancied, the Panamanians express. The country is a tinderbox.

Haiti's situation is even more precarious but for very different reasons. Of all states in the hemisphere, this is the least well structured. Politically, despite the seeming invulnerability of President Duvalier, it is extremely fragile and brittle: when Duvalier goes the political "system"—such as it is—will collapse. Duvalier's successors will inherit administrative chaos and a disarticulated society. Desperately poor, largely rural, living isolated lives, the population asks little of its central government but to be left alone. Into this administrative, political, ideological void the Communists could step easily.

The remaining state, excepting the Dominican Republic itself, is Venezuela. Venezuela belongs in this group because it abuts on the Caribbean and because it has been singled out by Castro's

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Cuba as a top-priority target. In other respects, however, Venezuela differs markedly from the rest of the countries at which we have glanced. It is much larger; it is much better endowed with resources; it is much more highly developed and its development is proceeding at a rapid pace. Moreover, no state in the group, with the noteworthy exception of Costa Rica, can begin to approach Venezuela in respect of the quality of its political leadership: a political miracle is in the way of being wrought in Venezuela, a process that began in 1958 and that continues. Not only is the present government directed by men who are able and responsible, but alternative leadership, also able and responsible, is available in the wings. The Venezuelan public has achieved in a remarkably short time a high degree of political sophistication and a sense of civic responsibility.

It is not surprising that Castro should direct his principal energies against Venezuela, for Venezuela daily demonstrates the falsity of his claim that rapid social and economic development within a constitutionally democratic political framework is impossible and that close coöperative ties with the United States mean stultification, sacrifice of national dignity and perpetual colonial status. Castro's fanatical followers in Venezuela—who are to be numbered in the scant thousands—can identify exploitable grievances. They can point, for instance, to serious unemployment and to a housing situation that for many Venezuelans is altogether deplorable. But the Communists have been unable to secure their objective of provoking a military coup, nor have they been able to enlist much public support for their cause. They are reduced to conducting a running campaign of violence. There is no reason to suppose that their activities cannot be dealt with effectively by the Venezuelan authorities without serious prejudice to the institutional stability of the country.

Of the Dominican Republic little need be said here, for its plight has been comprehensively described by many commentators during recent months. It should be noted, however, that President Johnson's intervention course was decided upon, not because of a judgment that the Communists in the Dominican Republic were strong, but rather because of a conclusion that non-Communist elements were too weak, too lacking in political sophistication, and too little skilled in the arts of governance, to withstand Communist infiltration and subsequent control.

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III

What conclusions can we derive from this rapid survey? First, the obvious one: this is a highly heterogeneous collection of states, each with its idiosyncratic features, its special problems. No blanket approach to the Caribbean can be very useful.

Second, really significant Communist opportunity is present in a number of these states, but the nature of the opportunity differs from country to country. At an extreme there is Haiti, which if left to itself could be effectively, if not formally, under Communist control within hours or days of Duvalier's demise. The Communist opportunity in Panama is of another kind: here it is that of fanning the futile fires of Panamanian nationalism, exacerbating anti-American feeling, railing against the established Panamanian social and political order and its leadership, and infiltrating the press, the unions, the university and the bureaucracy. The Panamanian Communists know, as do their mentors in Havana, Moscow and Peking, that they will never be permitted to come at all close to seizure of the Panamanian state; the most they can hope for is to provoke intervention by the United States. But that would be no small thing.

In Guatemala and Honduras, the opportunity is of still a different variety. It is that of enticing military leaders whom the Communists take to be politically unlettered and unimaginative into a campaign of brutal and indiscriminate repression, of savage reprisal against "the Communists" and, more broadly, against "Communism." The Communists themselves will continue to maintain their identification with popular, reformist causes. This is in the generic pattern that led to Castro's success in overthrowing Batista.

There is a third and more reassuring conclusion that emerges from this review. It is that democratic values and practice can root and hold in Central American and Caribbean soil, that with responsible, effective and responsive political leadership, with constructive government programs, with appropriate emphasis on distributive justice, with decent respect for basic human rights, the Communist threat can be diminished and dealt with. Costa Rica abundantly demonstrates this; so does Venezuela; so, at a remove, does El Salvador.

But if the picture is not all dark, it is still very far from bright. How is the United States to meet effectively situations like those in Haiti, Panama, Guatemala and Honduras? Duvalier will not

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live forever. Late or soon, mass violence will erupt again in Panama. No one would want firmly to predict that the Castro-Guevara technique will fail in Guatemala and Honduras. What is to be the United States response when and if these contingencies materialize?

The dilemma is a cruel one, for in a sense the Communists win if we intervene and they win if we fail to intervene. If we intervene we suffer the slings and arrows of outraged public opinion around the world. Moreover, and more important, we are an alien force in the land we enter, thereafter chargeable by the nationals of that country with responsibility for the country's destiny. Perhaps we have forgotten, but the Dominicans have not, that Trujillo made rapid progress in his ascent to power during the United States occupation of 1916–24.

On the other hand, if we fail to intervene, not only will the Communists have secured additional territory in this hemisphere, with corresponding strategic loss to us; not only will a totalitarian mousetrap have closed on a subject population, with consequent foreclosing of political and social options; but also the Communists will have proved empty our repeated assertion that another Communist régime would not be tolerated in this area, with resultant damage to our prestige.

So long as our foreign policy is keyed to cold-war concerns, so long as we are engaged in armed conflict with Communists in Asia, there can be no question about which of the alternatives is to be chosen. Intervention is clearly preferable to non-intervention.

IV

Having said so much, important questions remain. Intervention, yes, but intervention under what auspices? Intervention at what time? Intervention in what guise?

In the sequel to the Dominican crisis of last spring, thought has been given to the establishment of a permanent Inter-American Force under O.A.S. control that would be available to respond to situations like those we have been considering. The assumption is, of course, that a multilateral, inter-American intervention would be less repugnant to world opinion and more acceptable to the public of the state intervened than would be unilateral action by the United States. It would demonstrate to the world that the judgment of Communist takeover was widely

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shared; it would put into the intervened country troops from other Latin American countries as well as troops from the United States.

Now it is a highly dubious assumption that the world would not think of such a force as a United States creature; and there is even less reason to suppose that the Guatemalan public, for instance, would respond more warmly to troops from General Stroessner's Paraguay than to troops from the United States. Thus there is little likelihood that the creation of a force of this kind would be authorized by the O.A.S.

The reasons why this is so go to the nature of the Inter-American System. Generations of us have been brought up to believe that the Western Hemisphere comprises a special kind of family of nations, linked not only by geography but also by a community of interests, values and aspirations. Myths have astonishing survival capacity, but it is not infinite. This particular myth can survive only so long as the demands placed upon the Inter-American System are not too great.

Actually, the states of the hemisphere are united by very little. They differ among themselves in most important ways; as we have seen, even the geographically contiguous states of Central America, among which some significant transnational forces are at work, diverge from one another in crucial political, economic, social and even racial respects. Moreover, as the states of the hemisphere acquire more firmly defined national identities, as they develop their internal economies, as they move to assert themselves as independent and autonomous entities on the broader world scene, the incompatibilities among their interests will emerge ever more sharply.

Few states of the hemisphere would see it as being in their interest to coöperate in the creation of a permanent military force, staffed largely by Latin American troops but armed and financed largely by the United States. Not only are the states of Latin America selfish—as are all states in the sense of putting their own interests first; also they would entertain the gravest doubts about the purpose for which the force was to be created. They would not be greatly reassured to be told that the force was to handle cases of "indirect aggression." The term is much too vague, and the subjective element involved in determining when "indirect aggression" has occurred is much too prominent.

There is another point, and it is well to be honest: the Latin

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Americans would assume that the force really was being created to serve the interests of the United States, that control of the force would vest ultimately in the United States, and that it would be our judgment that would determine where and when the force was to be employed. Because, rightly or wrongly, most Latin Americans question the ability of the United States to understand or sympathize with movements of radical reform, even of non-Communist varieties, and because they sometimes doubt the accuracy and adequacy of the information upon which our policy decisions are based (the Dominican case is very much in point) they would be reluctant to commit themselves beforehand—for so they would see it—to questionable actions.

Finally, of course, the Latin Americans dread the very notion of intervention, however defined, for whatever purpose. We in the United States find this fear, almost pathological in its intensity, difficult to understand. The fear is expressed up and down the hemisphere, just as fervently by spokesmen whose countries have never suffered intervention as by those of countries which have. Moreover, we find it hard to comprehend that the Latin Americans do not seem to appreciate that it is fully as much in their interest as in ours not to permit further Communist expansion in this hemisphere. Our understanding of the Latin American attitude may be facilitated if we bear in mind that we have been a puissant actor on the world stage for the better part of a century, that we have never thought of ourselves as an object at the mercy of alien forces, and that the last time we were "intervened" was in 1812.

If there is to be no stand-by, O.A.S.-sanctioned, multilateral force available for interventions, must we therefore resign ourselves to undertaking by ourselves this unpleasant role? The answer is probably yes if we intend to utilize the device of preventive intervention as we did in the Dominican Republic. For almost by definition an intervention of this kind must be mounted with great speed, its purpose being precisely to preempt the crisis situation before the Communists have an opportunity fully to exploit its possibilities. In such a case full consultation with the member states of the O.A.S. may well turn out to be impossible—so it appeared, at least, in the Dominican situation—and summary notification is all that can be achieved.

There is no need to talk about this question in the abstract, however. Our area of concern is geographically strictly delimited,

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and we have identified four states in that area in which intervention might be necessary. Of these Haiti is the one whose situation corresponds most closely to that found by President Johnson and his advisers in the Dominican Republic. Preventive intervention in Haiti, therefore, may be appropriate and necessary.

It is out of the question to ask the O.A.S. to give the United States discretionary authority to intervene in Haiti at a time we deem proper; it is also out of the question to expect the O.A.S. formally to commit itself in advance to multilateral intervention in that country. But if the United States is persuaded that only the Communists can profit from Duvalier's death, it should begin at once to inform O.A.S. member governments of Haitian realities and of its own posture with respect to those realities. It would thereby avoid some of the bitterness and misunderstanding that followed upon our Dominican action and that continue to plague inter-American relations.

There is much to be said, however, for abandoning the device of preventive intervention altogether. Certainly its use would be not only unnecessary but extremely unwise in the other three countries—Guatemala, Honduras, Panama—and its use is not enjoined upon us even in Haiti. This gets us to the question of timing of interventions.

Let us assume that the immediate post-Duvalier period in Haiti is precisely as posited here, *i.e.* that the political void is nearly complete and that only the Communists in the country have the skill, agility and coherence of purpose to exploit the opportunity thus afforded. Why should we not let the Communists take over the country? Or at least let them move along so far in the process of takeover that there can be no doubt about their nature and intentions? What would be lost?

It will not do to say that the country would be lost. Given the nature of Haitian society and the political and administrative infrastructure there, the Communists could assert effective control over little more than Port-au-Prince and a handful of sorry Departmental capitals during the first stages of their sway. For months after their usurpation of the Haitian machinery of state they would be highly vulnerable, either to direct United States intervention or to a properly supported invasion of Haitian exiles.

At the time of the Dominican intervention we heard many references to the Cuban example. But if the Cuban case illustrates anything, it illustrates that precipitate haste in interven-

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tion is not necessary. Even in a country as comparatively highly developed as Cuba—with all that development entails in terms of the availability of instruments of coercion and control—Castro's power was not effectively consolidated for many months after his entry into Havana.

What is suggested here is not that the United States postpone its intervention until a Communist régime is firmly installed with the apparatus of a totalitarian state fully in operation; what is suggested is that the United States wait at least long enough before intervening to permit the other states of the hemisphere and of the world to see the contours of the emerging régime. In the Dominican case President Johnson and his advisers told the world that the forces opposing General Wessin y Wessin were Communist-dominated; but the world did not see persuasive evidence that this was in fact so.

When we turn from Haiti to Honduras and Guatemala, the case against precipitate preventive intervention is even stronger. For the constellation of forces in these countries is such that we could not automatically assume upon the outbreak of major strife that the Communists were in controlling positions or that in the outcome they would carry the day. The Communists are not the only ones in these countries who preach the need for radical reform and who, in desperation, will resort to violence to achieve it. Moreover, it would be a sorry kind of justice and of logic to which we would implicitly subscribe if we were to adopt as a working principle the notion that the arbitrary and illegitimate use of violence—the use of the armed forces of the state—by military officers in quest of power or plunder could be tolerated while the resort to violence by aggrieved, frustrated and frantic citizens represented a threat too great to our national security to be countenanced.

Again, all that is urged is that we be prudent, that we pay a decent respect to the opinions of mankind. If indeed a Communist régime emerges, we are emphatically on record that we will not permit its survival, and we can move strongly against it. If we cannot tell whether a régime is Communist or not, then let us act on the assumption that it is not; it will pose no threat to our security. Above all, let us not conclude automatically that because known Communists are associated with popular movements, even movements sired by violence out of desperation, that the movements are ineradicably tainted. Had our intelligence

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services been as ubiquitous and as susceptible to cold-war criteria in 1930 as they are today, Romulo Betancourt would never have reached the Venezuelan Presidency to put his country firmly on the march toward effective democracy.

V

In the preceding pages the emphasis has been heavily on the question of intervention in the Caribbean, its necessity, form and timing. This is an important theme, for the problem of "indirect aggression" is a real and serious one. The danger exists, though, that the problem can be magnified out of proper proportion and that perspective may be lost.

When one stops to think about it, one is struck by the slight success the Communists have achieved in the Caribbean. Cuba and the image that Castro projects may distort our vision; but the fact remains that the demonstrated capability of the Communists has not been great. Their fragile control in Guatemala collapsed like a house of cards in 1954 when subjected to challenge by a handful of exiles. Although the Communists have identified themselves with the full gamut of reform and revolutionary demands, they have failed to enlist many recruits to their banner. Although, as we have seen, opportunity in the form of exploitable grievances is abundantly available to them, they have been unable to utilize such opportunity with much effectiveness.

This situation could change. The prospects for Communist success could sharply improve. It would be truly tragic, however, if the United States should be an agency importantly responsible for those improved prospects. This could happen if we were to put inordinate stress upon Communist dangers in the region at the expense of due attention to the crying needs for political, economic and social reform. If the United States loses its identification with the concepts of political democracy, social justice, economic well-being and the dignity of the individual, it has lost its purchase in this hemisphere.

What it comes down to is this: Do we, or do we not, have confidence in the Latin Americans? Hard though the choice is, we cannot really have it both ways.

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AUSTRALIA AND THE DEFENSE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

By Shane Paltridge

AUSTRALIA, an island continent of about three million square miles, inhabited by eleven million people of predominantly West European descent, lies on the southern perimeter of Southeast Asia, which is heavily populated by peoples of diverse racial origins with traditions, cultures and political and economic outlooks differing radically both among themselves and from Australia's.

Until halfway through the Second World War, Australia's defense policy was very much a product of its early history. Although from 1862 Australia contributed financially to the maintenance of its own internal security and external defense forces, its defense thinking was nurtured within the overall pattern of British strategic defense. As a natural corollary, and because of its deep concern over developments in Europe, it supported the United Kingdom in two world wars. Although in 1914 there was no immediate threat to Australia, 330,000 volunteers were sent overseas from a population of 5,000,000; and 60,000 of them died in the war. In 1939, with the British declaration of war on Germany, the Australian Government immediately declared war also and began to build up forces as a contribution to the Allied effort. At their peak, Australian forces totaled 640,000 and in addition we made considerable supplies and services available to Allied forces. Support for the Allied effort in both these wars was based on traditional and emotional ties with the United Kingdom as well as logic.

The unhappy events following the entry of Japan into World War II shattered the old concept that strategic defense could be left to the Royal Navy (augmented by Australian ships and using the Singapore Naval Base) while Australia concentrated mainly on local defense. The "impregnable" naval base was easily breached and taken. Two battleships, the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse,* were sunk within minutes of each other, a Japanese invasion fleet penetrated as far south as the Coral Sea and Japanese soldiers were able to take over most of the settled part of New Guinea. Thus Australia's primary reliance on a protective power was destroyed. Australian and United States forces were able to

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hold and then turn the Japanese advance, and as American power developed, the attack was carried back through the islands of the Southwest Pacific to the Japanese mainland. By the end of the war, Australians had formed an appreciation of the immense strength that the United States was able to exert in Australia's area of primary strategic interest.

II

In a broad sense, Australian defense objectives may be described as: 1, to establish the security of Australia and its island territories; 2, to pursue close friendship and coöperation with non-Communist Asian countries; 3, to seek the support of at least the United States and the United Kingdom for promoting coöperative arrangements with Southeast Asian countries for collective security purposes in this area and for the defense and security of Australia; 4, to counter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia; and 5, to support the development of the United Nations as an effective instrument of collective security.

The range of Australian defense policy must be world-wide because our security is threatened by any blow at the United Kingdom, the United States or any other of the countries in the defensive alliances that have been formed in the free world. In the same way our security would be jeopardized by any severe deterioration in the political and economic conditions in the countries of Southeast Asia, particularly if there should be an eruption of Communist power in these areas. Viewed against such a background, Australian defense interests would be best served by a sound system of collective security on a universal basis such as is envisaged in the United Nations. In present circumstances, however, the role of the United Nations in that regard is severely restricted, and this has made it essential for Australia to maintain its capacity for self-defense in association with like-minded states.

The close ties which bound the United States and Australia in the Second World War have been considerably strengthened in the postwar period. Australia was among the first countries to contribute forces in support of the United Nations action to resist aggression in Korea, and Australian units served from the outset with United States forces in that theater. The mutuality of interest and high degree of confidence and friendship which exist between the two governments and peoples are further reflected in the ANZUS and SEATO treaties to which both countries are

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parties and in their partnership in the struggle against Communist forces in South Viet Nam.

In addition, Australia continues to have a wide identity of basic interests and outlook with the United Kingdom. Both countries are opposed to policies of aggression and retain the deep sense of the right of independent peoples to retain their freedom, territorial independence and political integrity. Hence Australia has committed itself along with the United Kingdom and New Zealand to the defense of Malaysia as a young Commonwealth country against the Indonesian menace. In all these respects, we maintain the closest ties with New Zealand, our neighbor across the Tasman Sea, with which Australia shares a common outlook and a near identity of strategic interest.

Australian defense planners have for many years seen clearly—perhaps more clearly than most—the need for a sustained and coordinated allied effort, involving the major powers as well as indigenous forces, if stability is to be promoted in Southeast Asia. This appreciation has stemmed from two main considerations. In the first place, Australia's geographical position on the perimeter of Southeast Asia has made us acutely aware of the relative weakness and imbalance of the indigenous military resources in the area. Our growing contact with the area and our increased understanding of its basic conditions have served to emphasize the enormous difficulty of expanding these military resources rapidly, given the need and desire of the local peoples for economic advancement and social welfare. The complexity and scale of the developmental problems in a diverse and often divided society have made it easy to predict that the growth of indigenous resources will be subject to severe limiting conditions for a considerable time to come, despite the large military aid provided predominantly by the United States.

In the second place, Australia's defense thinking is conditioned by the obvious war potential and influence of Communist China. The development of Communist China with its present population of over 700,000,000 into a modern industrial state is and will continue to be a matter of primary significance to Australia. The absence so far of overt conventional war does not mean that military danger from that direction has decreased. The military potential of Communist China is increasing rapidly with the modernization of the Army and the development of strategic airfields, roads and railways and of air and naval power. In addi-

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tion, and in defiance of efforts to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons, China has persisted with a program of developing nuclear weapons. Such a military effort, at a stage when the Chinese economy is heavily burdened by expenditures for developing the industrial base and expanding agricultural output to feed the ever increasing population, cannot be dismissed by any other government as unimportant. It must be assumed that, if China diverts such a large proportion of its economic resources to a military effort, it looks on that effort as extremely important.

Another criterion which the Australian Government must apply in judging the Chinese Communist régime is its political ambition. There is considerable evidence that the Chinese Communists have an ambition to dominate the adjacent island and mainland positions which are still held by non-Communist forces. Although Communist China claims that it has no territorial ambitions, it has built roads into northern Laos, it obviously exercises considerable political influence in North Viet Nam and is able to bring pressure on South Viet Nam and Laos through insurgency and infiltration from North Viet Nam. Peking has published maps showing areas to which it has territorial claims and has given notice that those claims will have to be settled. And finally, China has brought considerable military pressure to bear on India. In the light of these political ambitions, it appears to Australia that the West must remain strong and vigilant.

There is no reason to suppose that at present China has particular interest in Australia, but if it were able to extend its political and military domination through Southeast Asia, Australia's position on the periphery would become very difficult indeed. For this reason, the containment of the Communist Chinese threat has become a primary Australian objective.

The policies of Indonesia have also caused increasing concern to Australia in recent years. Indonesia is our nearest neighbor, and we played a prominent and helpful part in the negotiations which led to its gaining national independence from the Dutch. Contacts between the peoples of Australia and Indonesia have been friendly, but in the last three years the two countries have been brought increasingly into conflicting positions as a result of the policy of "confrontation" which Indonesia seems determined to pursue against Malaysia.

Australia has given unhesitating support to Malaysia in de-

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fending its integrity against the unprovoked attacks from the south. Malaysia is a well-governed and friendly Commonwealth country with a sound and developing economy. It showed its determination to resist Communist domination in the long-drawn-out and successful struggle during the 1950s against domestic Communist terrorists.

But there are wider reasons why it is entitled to our support. If Indonesia's aggression against Malaysia were to go unchecked, President Sukarno would be encouraged to proceed on his course. One of the aims of confrontation is to bring about the elimination from the region of British or any other influence assessed by Indonesia as inimical to her interests. These aims lead Indonesia into closer and closer association with the Communist powers, particularly China, and away from friendship with the United States and the United Kingdom.

Australia has tried to graduate its response to Indonesian provocation in Malaysia and to isolate this aspect of our relations. We believe that Australia and Indonesia have vital interests in common which should be promoted. This is at present frustrated by the policy of confrontation, which has brought us to the point where Australian troops are now facing Indonesian troops across the Malaysian border in Borneo.

It is a matter of regret for Australia that it was not found possible to make a full success of the Federation of Malaysia as established in 1963. Nevertheless, Australia is glad to coöperate with both Malaysia and Singapore for their future security and welfare and in forwarding their common interests. Australia welcomed the arrangements for ensuring a common defense effort between the two governments in the combined defense of the region.

In addition to the SEATO and Malaysian problems, Australia has a responsibility on its own doorstep in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea. We had an interest in Papua even before it was annexed by the British in 1884 and in New Guinea (a former German territory) since the end of the First World War when Australia became the Mandatory power. During the Second World War, Australian troops were engaged in heavy fighting to wrest these territories back from the Japanese. The political and social development of the local people is now being advanced rapidly so that as soon as possible they may reach the point where they can determine their own future. Australia would react very sharply

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to any encroachment on these territories and defend them as if they were part of the Australian mainland itself.

Because of the clear need in Australian eyes for a sustained and coördinated allied defense effort in Southeast Asia, Australian governments have played a positive and active part in the development of regional collective security. The Commonwealth defense arrangements between Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, formed following the last war, were largely the result of Australian initiative. The value of this organization and the contribution made to it by the United Kingdom and New Zealand remain undiminished. Australia nevertheless has always been aware of the need to coördinate this Commonwealth defense effort with the military power of the United States.

This was to some extent achieved with the signing of the ANZUS pact in 1951 between the United States, Australia and New Zealand, under which each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area or on its own forces could be dangerous to peace and security and declares that it will act to meet the danger in accordance with constitutional processes. ANZUS provides an extremely valuable forum for free and frank discussion with the United States and for the coördination of defense policies. The establishment of the United States Naval Communications Station at North West Cape is seen as an expression of this coöperation under the aegis of ANZUS.

SEATO provided something that ANZUS could not provide—that is, a wider association of countries, including Asian countries within the area as well as major powers which could take part in planning for defense of Southeast Asia as a whole. It provided for action by the eight signatories in opposing aggression against any of the parties or against any state or territory designated by the Council. When the proposal for a collective defense system for Southeast Asia was being considered Australia hoped that it would include all the independent countries of the area. In the event, three Asian countries signed the pact—Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines—together with the United Kingdom, the United States, France, New Zealand and Australia. In spite of the diversity of the countries represented and differences in outlook which have developed since 1954, SEATO has been important in providing a means of defining problems and coördinating planning, and in arranging for military exercises and the development of infrastructure within the theater. Australia, in common

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with the United States, has indicated that it regards its obligations under the Treaty as individual as well as collective, and we see our present contributions in South Viet Nam and Thailand as flowing from our membership in SEATO.

Australia has steadily increased its contribution of forces in Southeast Asia in support of the regional security arrangements. As early as 1950, Air Force squadrons were stationed in Malaya to take part in the campaign against the Communist terrorists. In 1955 a battalion was deployed, together with escort ships of the Australian Navy, followed in 1958 by two fighter squadrons and a bomber squadron. The Australian forces, together with those contributed by the United Kingdom and New Zealand, were brought together in the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, to be used in the internal and external defense of Malaya against Communism and to form an initial contribution to SEATO. These forces acquired a new significance and new tasks with the initiation of Indonesia's policy of confrontation. Over the last 18 months Australian forces assisting in the defense of Malaysia have been augmented by minesweepers for patrol duties, helicopters, an Army S.A.S. squadron (a commando-type unit), engineers for construction work in Borneo, and a light antiaircraft battery. The infantry battalion and S.A.S. squadron have just completed a tour of operations in Borneo.

Australia has also committed forces to Southeast Asia in direct support of her SEATO obligations. In 1962 a fighter squadron was sent to Ubon, in Thailand, to help provide security against the external threat to that country, and has remained there since. In 1962 also, the first Army instructors were sent to help in South Viet Nam, and this group has since been expanded to a hundred instructors and combat advisers working with South Vietnamese units. Caribou aircraft have been provided for transport duties. In June of this year, concurrently with the buildup of United States combat forces, Australia committed a battalion of infantry in South Viet Nam. In reaching this decision the Government weighed the gravity of the situation in South Viet Nam resulting from the continued Viet Cong campaign of insurgency and violence; the increasing extent to which that campaign was dependent upon arms and men, including formed units, infiltrated from North Viet Nam; and the importance of preventing an externally directed Communist takeover of South Viet Nam, with the grave implications this would have for other areas. Consistent with our

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other commitments, we wished to play our part with the South Vietnamese and United States forces in checking aggression in this particular area of Southeast Asia.

As a result of our assessment of the situation, we have accepted obligations and committed forces in Thailand, in South Viet Nam and in Malaysia, as well as making the necessary preparations for the defense of our own territories. It will be apparent that Australia faces military problems of an unusual range and complexity for a country with our population and at our stage of development.

III

The composition and shape of Australian forces are determined by our appreciation of the broad strategic setting, the obligations flowing from collective security arrangements, the need for the protection of our own territory and interests, and the physical characteristics of the area in which Australian forces might be expected to operate.

Since it is unlikely that in the foreseeable future Australian forces will be committed outside the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, it has been possible to specialize military organization, training and equipment for this theater. While terrain differs widely, the whole area from South Viet Nam and Thailand through to the island territories and the northern approaches of Australia itself lies within the tropics. These lands are mostly underdeveloped, distances are great, roads and railways conspicuously lacking, and there are wide tracts of jungle.

Australian troops are taught to live and fight in this environment. Special attention is given to jungle training and to the development of initiative and the ability of small groups to operate resourcefully and independently. These are qualities suited to the Australian temperament.

Lightness of equipment and air portability are deliberately sought in the personal arms and clothing of the soldier and in weapons, communications and vehicles. Mobility is being steadily increased through the purchase of transport aircraft and helicopters; range and the ability to operate if necessary from rough airstrips are considered important factors in the selection of aircraft. After some experimentation with Army organization, a new structure has recently been adopted with battalions about 800 strong, specially suited to insurgency and limited-war roles in tropical conditions. This organization is compatible with that of

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our principal allies. Because Australia itself will never be an aggressor, and because of the nature of insurgent warfare, our forces are being developed with particular emphasis on speed of response, so that we will be able to make an adequate contribution in the various situations of strategic concern. This requires well-trained and well-equipped forces in being, able to move quickly to deal with threatening situations.

The continued pressure of Communist aggression in the SEATO area, and the Indonesian policy of confrontation, have in the last few years led to a steady deterioration of the strategic situation in the area of concern to Australia. As a result, the Government has approved defense programs providing for substantial increases in Australian forces, their arms and equipment, and their means for strategic and tactical mobility. In 1962–63, Australian defense expenditure was running at the rate of a little over £A200,000,000 (about $450,000,000) each year; by 1964–65, two years later, the figure had risen above £A300,000,000; while for the present financial year which began July 21, 1965, £A382,000,000 has been provided, and this will rise again to over £A420,000,000 (nearly $1 billion) next year. These are sharp and large increases at a time when there is no war in the sense in which that word used to be understood.

The most significant changes have taken place in the Army. To appreciate these fully it is necessary to know something of Australia's history. In the First World War, the 330,000 men who went overseas were all volunteers. In two national referenda at that time the Australian people rejected proposals for conscription for overseas service, although this had always been an obligation within Australia itself. In the Second World War, it was not until 1943 that Mr. Curtin, the Prime Minister of that day, was able to win support from his own Labor Party for extending the area of compulsory service to the Southwest Pacific area south of the equator. The Australian tradition, then, has been one of voluntary service by citizen-soldiers. In war they responded magnificently and rose to the highest commands, but in peace returned to their normal occupations. It was not until after the Second World War that the Australian Regular Army included combat infantry formations in peacetime.

In the last 15 months the Government has passed through the Federal Parliament a series of statutes of historic importance which have completely changed the basis of service in the Aus-

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tralian Army. The hard core of the Army consists of permanent soldiers enlisting voluntarily and available for service anywhere in the world. To supplement this force, a system of National Service has been introduced in which young men selected by ballot serve for two years, in Australia or overseas, and become in effect part of the Regular Army. By this means the strength of the full-time Army is being raised to 37,500. The immediate backing to the full-time force is provided by volunteer Emergency Reserves, composed generally of ex-servicemen, who maintain their proficiency with refresher training and are available for immediate call-up at any time for service in Australia or overseas. Finally, in time of war, the whole adult male population from 18 to 60 may be called upon to serve anywhere in the world.

The Navy and Air Force will continue to rely on voluntary enlistment, but their strengths are being substantially increased to about 17,000 for the Navy and 21,000 for the Air Force.

The best modern conventional equipment is being obtained for the Australian forces. In the case of the Army, much of this is built in Australia. New aircraft ordered or coming into service include Mirage fighters built in Australia, F111 for strike reconnaissance, Orion for maritime reconnaissance, additional Hercules, Caribou and Iroquois helicopters for the transport squadrons. The Army has its own light aircraft and helicopters. Navy strength centers around an antisubmarine carrier whose helicopters are now being augmented with tracker aircraft; three U.S.-built guided-missile destroyers, of which the first has recently been commissioned; antisubmarine destroyers and frigates built in Australia; four Oberon submarines being obtained from the United Kingdom; and various transport and supply vessels, minesweepers and patrol craft.

The strength of the indigenous forces in Papua and New Guinea is being increased, and a coastal security force is being formed. Australian-based forces are of course available for the defense of Papua and New Guinea, where considerable airfield building is in progress. Additional airfields are also being developed in northwestern Australia at Tindal, about 150 miles southeast of Darwin, and at Learmonth, near North West Cape.

Australia is not a nuclear power in the military sense and has no intention of becoming one, although this does not of course mean that in no circumstances in the future will Australia be armed with nuclear weapons. Australia has consistently sup-

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ported all genuine efforts aimed at comprehensive disarmament and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

IV

Having said something of current defense thinking and preparations in Australia, I should like now to refer, very briefly, to some considerations which I believe will have increasing significance over the next few decades.

The first of these is the very size of Australia. It covers an area almost as large as the United States, stretching from near the equator—a matter not unimportant in space technology—for some 2,000 miles to the south, and extending 2,500 miles from west to east. Mere size can be an asset. Britain conducted its first nuclear tests in the Monte Bello islands off the northwest coast of Australia, and later at Maralinga on the mainland. Woomera, the test site for all major British missiles, and for European space research, has a land range extending for 1,200 miles to the northwest coast, and may not yet have seen the full development of its potential.

Contrary to some earlier impressions, Australia is not just a dead center with settlement largely restricted to the southeast corner and fringes along the eastern, southern and southwestern coasts. True, it is not as well endowed as the United States, and above all is lacking in water, but it is rich in many resources. Our wool, wheat and other pastoral and agricultural products are too well known to need mention, except to say that productivity is increasing rapidly with the application of scientific research. Recent years have seen remarkable developments in minerals. Australia is one of the world's leading producers of lead and zinc. The bauxite deposit at Weipa in Queensland is one of the largest single deposits in the world and there are also large deposits in the Northern Territory and Western Australia. Iron ore deposits in Western Australia alone contain about 15 billion tons of medium to high-grade ore. There are large resources of coal and adequate supplies of uranium, and although we are still deficient in petroleum, we have made encouraging discoveries of oil and particularly of natural gas.

In a world beset by fears of increasing population expansion, Australia is one of a small group of nations which seeks rapid population growth. Since the last war it has followed a sustained policy of large-scale immigration, and in 20 years much has been

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achieved; the population of 1945 has been increased by more than half to the present level of 11,200,000, and more than half of the increase has come from migrants and from children born to migrant parents. The size and skill of the work-force has been greatly increased, aiding the expansion of industry and the general growth of the economy, and greatly increasing our ability to defend ourselves and to help others. The transfer of population to Australia, mainly from Western Europe, constitutes strategically important realignment of potential.

Since the last war there has been rapid development of secondary industry in Australia. There is now a thriving motor industry producing cars and trucks with almost entirely local content. We have sizeable industries in aluminum production and fabrication, oil refining and petro-chemicals, synthetic rubber, heavy and fine chemicals, precision engineering, shipbuilding, aircraft production, and many other branches of sophisticated manufacturing. Capital resources are growing fast, assisted by a high rate of overseas investment from the United Kingdom and the United States. Manufacturing now absorbs close to 30 percent of the work-force, half of which is in engineering and chemicals.

In defense science and industry there have been notable developments, such as the Ikara antisubmarine torpedo-carrying missile, designed and developed in Australia, which is being adopted by the Royal Navy. In space research programs, particularly those of the United States, facilities in Australia—in many cases the only suitable location technically—are playing an increasingly important part.

What I am suggesting in these paragraphs is that Australia, by virtue of its size and resources, the rapid expansion of its population, the vigorous growth of its industry and science, and above all its location on the periphery of Asia, can make a unique contribution to policies aimed at the security and stability of Southeast Asia. The very pace of our development does, of course, bring difficult problems for the Government in determining priorities in allocation of resources between current defense needs and the essential requirements for continued rapid growth.

For the future, Australia will continue to play its part in maintaining the security of Southeast Asia against Communist expansion or nationalist aggression. We believe that it is necessary to look at Southeast Asia as a whole and that the interrelation of events in South Viet Nam and Malaysia will become increasingly

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evident. The success of aggression in any part of Southeast Asia would gravely affect security throughout the region, and would have repercussions on the political and strategic balance in the Indian Ocean—an area whose strategic importance is likely to grow—and in the Pacific Ocean.

It will be essential that the power and support of countries outside the area, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, continue to be available to Southeast Asian countries in order to secure them from aggression while they strengthen their own political institutions and develop their national economies.

Australian policy recognizes the position of the United States in providing the leadership of the non-Communist world in political and security matters. This is not, of course, a situation which is peculiar to Southeast Asia. Europe likewise has relied on the protection of American power since the Second World War. At the same time, Australia retains strong traditional ties with the United Kingdom. There is no longer an assumption that the United Kingdom can ensure the security of Australia and New Zealand; but Britain's position in the Asian and Indian Ocean area is based on long historical association and is recognized as carrying considerable power. It follows that the continued alignment of policy in Asia between the United Kingdom and the United States is of very great importance to Australia.

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COMMUNISM IN WESTERN EUROPE

By Joseph R. Starobin

ANY appraisal of the Communist parties in Western Europe must begin with a distinction that may appear semantic but really touches on one of the most exposed nerves of this strange movement which claims a unique understanding of history, indeed the capacity to "make" history, and yet which contemporary history has so badly lacerated. Communism is a factor, sometimes serious, sometimes vestigial in Western Europe today; but "Western European Communism" does not exist. There is no historically evolved fraternity of parties accustomed to mutual exchange and fitting their national particularities into a common strategy, based on a joint analysis of the economic and social terrain that has, since the war, become increasingly integrated.

The Communists are a collection of forces, whose estrangement from one another has been concealed by a common ideology. Some parties are but sects under ambitious (and often picturesque) chieftains, as has been the case in Holland, Switzerland and Luxembourg. Others are the left wings of expiring or reviving nationalisms, as in Iceland or Cyprus and perhaps in Belgium. Some are the vestiges of movements whose followers have turned to left-wing Socialist parties en masse, as in Denmark and Norway. Certain parties may yet have a future, as in Spain and Portugal, whereas in Western Germany Communism is a ghost that broods over calamitous error and tragedy from which a once proud movement could not recover. Some parties, as in Sweden, strive desperately to achieve rejuvenation, rejecting even a formal solidarity with their ideological kinsmen. In France, Italy and Finland, where the Communists lead formidable electoral blocs, they cannot integrate themselves into their political communities with any real hope of influencing policy unless they undergo an inner transformation. This must call into question rather basic ideas and modes of behavior, not the least of which is their attitude toward Western Europe as an entity.

The gathering in mid-June of 19 Communist movements at Brussels was the first of its kind. Two years before, the Communist parties of the Six together with the British had met in the same city, whereas in Rome, in 1959, only the Six held their first

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meeting. The Dutch party this past June refused to sign any part of the common declaration, even that aspect which projects a European security system, including both East and West, to replace NATO. The Swedish party did not attend at all, because it "had just decided that no position can hereafter be adopted in its name, nor any declaration published, unless decided by its own elected organs."[1] This "isolationist" stand may in fact undo the regional, purely Nordic gatherings of Communists such as last took place at the end of 1962.

If, as Richard Lowenthal has observed, "international Communism no longer has a single world-wide organization, a single center of authority, or a single orthodox doctrine,"[2] it is also true that the "polycentrism" advocated by the late Italian leader, Palmiro Togliatti, has not taken hold. Part of the explanation lies in the curious relations between the two strongest movements, the French and the Italian. When, at the end of May, the new Italian General Secretary, Luigi Longo, met his French counterpart, Waldeck Rochet, for the first time since the passing a year ago of both Maurice Thorez and Togliatti, it was noticed that they chose Geneva for their meeting place. Geographical convenience? Perhaps. The neutral ground was, however, appropriate. The two parties have been in sharp disagreement, both as regards what each of them is doing on his own terrain and the impact which divergent policies plus differences in style and stance have on one another.

II

This disarray dates from the failure of the Communists in Western Europe to make the integration and unification of their part of the world their own basic policy initiative at a time when, 20 years ago, they stood at the peak of their strength. The "internationalism" of the Communists (so important an attraction to the survivors of war-torn Europe in the twenties) never really developed as a solidarity toward one another, except possibly during the struggle in Republican Spain and to some extent in the Resistance to Hitler. Their "internationalism" ran almost exclusively from each party toward the Soviet Union.

Western Europe was viewed essentially as a peninsula of the

[1] *Le Monde*, June 11, 1965.

[2] *The Prospects for Pluralistic Communism*, an essay in "Marxism in the Modern World," Stanford University Press, 1965, p. 225.

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Eurasian continent which the Soviet armies had been unable to reach in time. The Communist parties saw themselves not as architects of a new relationship with the Socialists and Catholics in the refashioning of this old center of Western civilization on some authentically autonomous basis, but as outposts to be held intact in terms of several calculations: the United States was assumed to face a postwar crisis on the scale of 1929–33 which would open the Western European economy to drastic socialization; to avert this crisis (or find a way out of it) the United States would launch an anti-Soviet war. In 1949, the Communists asserted that in case of war Western Europe would be turned into a guerrilla area and the Soviet armies welcomed to the English Channel. The Communists conceived of their task as holding fast to postwar positions (they were almost everywhere members of the government) until the Soviet Union's economic recovery could stalemate Anglo-American military power. The Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb appeared as a milestone in this strategy. The coming to power of the Chinese Communists gave it an intercontinental dimension. The Sino-Soviet alliance seemed to give Communism an Archimedean lever by which the earth itself could be moved.

The task of the Communist parties was thus to "tread water" politically in anticipation of a transformed relationship of forces, in which the struggle for world supremacy was the cold war itself. This required avoiding the seizure of power in any country where, as in Greece, it threatened to involve the weakened Soviet Union. It also required a rigorous Stalinization of each party, both to endure the historical interval and to communize Europe. As coördinates in this strategy the Communist parties were thus not simply Soviet agents, but supporters of the U.S.S.R. until such time as they could become its allies. The nuance is important because it helps explain the inner rationalizations of men who could claim that in facing the Axis they had been patriots.

But the Stalinization had to be unconditional. New leaders who had come to Communism in the Resistance and who proved hard to bureaucratize were everywhere shunted aside. In Norway, this took the form of a shabby conspiracy against the foremost Communist leader, Peder Furubotn. In France, it forced the retirement of Charles Tillon and the disgrace of the veteran André Marty. Everywhere the Communists were prey to their own version of McCarthyism, which grew endemically in the

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atmosphere of a beleaguered force making a difficult passage either toward Armageddon or Canaan.

The trauma of the past decade (it will be ten years this February since Khrushchev opened Pandora's box at the Soviet Party's Twentieth Congress) does not lie only in the successive detonations that have exploded the edifice of Stalinism. It lies in the realization that all the circumstances which underlay the Communist options have been proven wrong, a fact which is not assuaged by the many miscalculations of Communism's opponents.

Western Europe has undergone a remarkable economic and social transformation, at rates of growth which exceed those of the Communist world. The decline of petty agriculture as well as the small-merchant economy; swift urbanization and the new mobility of labor; the rise of truly large-scale industry on new technological foundations fostering differentiations within the working class and a new technocratic middle class—all of it with a measure of planning and supranational institutions—these had the double effect on the Communists of turning their ideology into an anachronistic dogma while reducing their own appeal to marginal exploitation of transitional dissatisfactions.

This rise of Western Europe has been contemporaneous with the decolonization of Africa and Asia. But far from collapsing when its colonial bulwarks were removed, as Lenin's essay on imperialism posits, Western Europe has flourished. In this entire process, the United States has come to have a relevance for European development far greater than is true of the Soviet Union and its disintegrating bloc. Quite apart from whether the United States has built a "great society," it serves, by the nature of the problems with which it has been grappling, as a mirror to Western Europe. The Old World faces on its own terms those changes through which the New World has been going, but to whose threshold the Soviet world has yet to come.

The Communists are able to derive some mileage by an oversimplified hostility to American imperialism; they capitalize on both the contempt and the jealousies characteristic of outmoded aristocratic and disintegrating lower-middle classes, the traditional ingredients of Europe's view of America. But the process of American life, its significance as the most advanced society in which socializing factors are at work within a democratic framework, has escaped the analysis of European radicals. Neither

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Europe's Socialists nor its Communists have ever seriously probed America's significance. They have always borrowed from a small fringe of American imitators who were permanent "expatriates in their own country" and viewed the United States through European lenses. It is striking to converse with the leading Communist theoretician in France, Roger Garaudy, and hear him admit, as though it did not much matter, that he really pays no attention to American life and knows little about it.

Confronted by an era of coexistence in which the Soviet Union can neither assist them nor serve as an example—and indeed must answer for the monstrous legacy of Stalinism—the Communists have also had to face the bewildering sequences of the Sino-Soviet schism. At the outset many felt an instinctive sympathy for the Chinese. They seemed to be calling for an honest analysis, and their stress on the autonomy and self-respect of each party promised to give the Russians their long overdue comeuppance. China's pristine Leninism evoked a certain nostalgia among those who harked back to the memory of the early twenties, before Stalin had conquered and, to paraphrase Swinburne, the Communist world had "grown grey with his breath."

But the tone of the quarrel has been repulsive, "reminiscent of village fights in bygone days and of soldiery on leave," as one Swedish Communist put it.[8] Russia and China seemed to be as much concerned about border regions in untracked deserts as about differences in world revolutionary strategy. If national antagonisms were products of capitalism in decline, as Leninists have insisted, how explain their survival and indeed their intensification as Communist power multiplied? More important, what the Chinese seemed to be demanding was that the Communists in Western Europe "tread water" and become outposts of China's ambitious project of encircling the West as though it were some sort of Kuomintang village to be undermined, surrounded and taken by a combined offensive from within and without. This was exactly the effort on which the Communists in Europe had just expended a quarter-century's accumulated political and human resources. It was an impossible task, especially for those Communists in Western Europe who want to achieve something with what they have, in this generation.

[8] C. H. Hermansson in *Ny Dag*, September 23, 1963, quoted in "Communism in the North," prepared by the Swedish Foreign Policy Institute and scheduled for publication in English this fall by M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies.

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As for the Soviet Party's counsel that national roads to socialism now lie open, the difficulty lies in the fact that it has been heard before, and twice abandoned, once in the late thirties and again in the mid-forties. If the Socialists and Catholics, whom the Communists want to persuade, are interested at all in the agonizing reappraisal now under way, they also place the burden of proof on the Communists. They are not at all sure (except in a few countries) that the Communists are needed. The situation is quite unlike the period of 1945–46 when their own wartime trauma drove Norwegian and French Socialists, for example, to consider fusion with the Communists.

Thus the question today is not whether the Communist parties side with the Soviet Union. Most of them do, while trying to keep their distance from the gyrations and imperatives of its policy toward China. As for the pro-Chinese trends, these exist as moods and tendencies, flourishing mainly where Communism has already been reduced to sects. Only in Belgium is there a significant pro-Chinese party (gaining perhaps a tenth of the vote of the official Belgian party) and exploiting mainly Walloon separatism and Flemish nationalism. The real distinction to be made among the Communist parties, as they confront an era for which their "previous condition of servitude" did not prepare them, is whether they can undergo that inner transformation which the new European reality demands. Yet the paradox is that where they seem prepared for this inner change—in Italy as distinct from France—the question arises whether they must not abandon what is distinctively Communist about them. They are compelled to reëxamine what, in fact, is meant by socialism in the first place, indeed, whether Western Europe needs it at all. Each stage of reappraisal opens up ideologically forbidden dilemmas.

III

In the Scandinavian countries, the chief trend is toward left-Socialist formations seeking a fraternal bond to the prevailing Social Democratic Parties. As long ago as 1958, the Danish Communists expelled their long-time and foremost leader, Aksel Larsen, on the grounds of "Titoism." Thereupon, he organized a Socialist People's Party, took most of the Communist intellectuals and trade unionists with him, and in the November 1960 elections gained five times as many votes as the official party and

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all its seats in the Folketing, the Danish parliament.[4] This reversal was confirmed in the September 1964 balloting. The official party is left with some trade union influence, and a daily newspaper, *Land og Folk,* once the leading paper of the Left and now a heavy burden. When Ib Norlund, the official party's chief theoretician, is asked about his party's prospects, he foresees a long period of "perserverance and endurance." As for relations with Larsen, they are so hostile as to impede the mobility of the orthodox Communists, such as there is of it.

In Norway, the left-Socialist trend originated in 1961 within the traditional Labor Party. The consequence has been that even as the Norwegian Communists have retired some older leaders and have striven to dovetail their electoral tactics with the reigning Laborites (the problem in the elections for the Storting this autumn is whether all sectors of the Left combined can gain a stable majority against the "bourgeois opposition"), they find the field preëmpted by the Socialist People's Party. Moreover, the Norwegian Party has been unable to rehabilitate its former leader, Furubotn, and his influential group; he was expelled as a "British spy" or worse in 1949, but in fact he was a Norwegian cross between Peer Gynt and Joseph Stalin—at least this is how the Swedish Communists put it.

Iceland and Finland are special cases. In the former, a country of 170,000 which has really been a "nation in formation"[5] and where almost everybody is related to everybody else, the Communists have been protagonists of Icelandic cultural revival. They have found a common ground with two successive divisions among the Social Democrats, and have for years enjoyed two posts in the Icelandic Government. Finland, with its tormented history in relation to both Tsarist and Soviet Russia, is more readily understood as an Eastern European country, except that a Communist attempt to seize power in 1947 *à la Prague* was thwarted, without reducing its important mass following. The Finnish Communist Party does not exert its electoral influence in its own name. It has for years dominated the S.K.D.L., the Democratic Union of the Finnish People, a front organization which embraces a variety of socialist-minded organizations and individuals. In the past three years, the intellectual weekly,

[4] The Socialistisk Folksparti gained 149,000 votes and 10 seats, compared with the official Danish party's 30,000 votes; in 1946, the latter had a quarter of a million votes and 18 deputies.

[5] Mary S. Olmsted, "Communism in Iceland," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1958.

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Tilanne, has brought the ferment of the European Left to a country where the Communists have been unusually rigid and cautious toward the changes within the Soviet Union. This has prepared the ground for a rather astonishing development—the breakdown of Communist control inside their own front. In February 1965, a non-Communist, Dr. Ele Alenius, was elected Secretary-General of the S.K.D.L., defeating the country's best known Communist, Hertta Kuusinen. Alenius has been calling for an end to the monopolistic influence of the Communists, and a fusion of all Finnish Socialists, independence toward the Soviet Union (within the limits of Finland's special position) and concentration on the new features of Finland's changing industrial-agrarian patterns to which the traditional verities have given little answer.

The Swedish Communist evolution has impressed close political observers as unusual, because it has been taking place without the splits such as envenomed Danish life, although the new leadership, under C.H. Hermansson, the former editor of *Ny Dag,* came to the helm at his party's twentieth congress in January 1964 after the most severe ideological reappraisal. Typical of the debate was the demand by Sven Landin, the former chairman of the parliamentary group and a leading "rebel," that the Communists "should endorse the democratic pattern of government that has evolved in our country and the consequences thereof should be reflected in its actions and standpoints."[6]

The Communist change happened to coincide with parliamentary elections in which the C.P.S. gained slightly.[7] More important, it achieved a balance of power in the Riksdag: the reigning Social Democrats lack an absolute majority. This has put the Communists in the limelight, and Hermansson and his aides have acquitted themselves well in the national TV debates, showing a certain frankness and modesty. It has already been noted that the Swedish Party simply did not attend the conference of the other parties in Brussels last June, an independence attuned to Swedish traditions. On the other hand, Hermansson

[6] Sven Landin, "Regeneration," *Ny Dag,* November 9, 1963. Also, December 21, 1963. Ake Sparring, in "Communism in the North," *ibid.,* believes "there is every sign that the C.P.S. is in the course of transforming itself from a Communist party of the traditional type into something that for want of a better description may be called a left-wing Socialist party."

[7] The vote increased from 4.5 percent to 5.2 percent, compared with the low of 3.8 percent in the 1962 local elections. The Communists have eight seats in the Riksdag but have managed only to restore the same percentage as they had in 1921. In 1946, they had 11.2 percent of the vote and 15 members in the parliament.

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has been sharing platforms in Copenhagen with the dissident, Aksel Larsen, and with the left-Socialists in Oslo, much to the distress of the official Communists, especially in Denmark.

The party's constitution is now being revised. A new category of membership has been created, making it possible for sympathizers to support the C.P.S. without the usual party discipline, which further dismantles the old Leninist conceptions. Some serious thought is being given to a change of name. This would not be unprecedented, since many Communist parties in Eastern Europe and Latin America have changed names without changing substance. But in the current Swedish atmosphere, the change would be more than nominal. The phrase "structural reforms" (taken from the Italian Communist lexicon) crops up in conversation with Hermansson. He maintains that the Communists "must never follow other than the democratic traditions of Sweden" and that "further measures of a socialist character" must be taken "in a normal way, via a majority." He does not blink at the crucial if hypothetical question that embarrasses the French—namely, whether in any government in which the Communists were a leading factor they would agree that socialist changes might be reversible. Hermansson grants that "we must follow the results of any vote against us." He speaks of a new relationship with the Social Democrats, from whom his party should not be separated by a "Chinese wall," or, he adds, "a Russian wall or a Berlin wall." Yet the new Communist leader is far less persuasive when explaining why Sweden needs a Communist movement at all, and what exactly a socialist Sweden would do that cannot be done by its welfare state. In speaking of the need for "clear socialist ideas" and concepts of "industrial democracy" or the insufficiencies of housing for all who need it, one wonders why any of this requires a Communist movement to bring it about.

No particular pattern emerges from a study of the minor parties except that, while some have fallen into a fossilization that preserves them intact, in other cases there are curious signs of stirring.

Holland offers an example of petrification. Its Communist movement had vigorous socialist antecedents, many of whose leaders were forerunners of Lenin. During the war it reached its peak of 12 percent of the vote, and its newspaper, *De Waarheid,* shot up from a circulation of 7,000 to a quarter of a million in

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1946. Its chief figure, Paul de Groot, has shown an uncanny capacity for personal as well as political survival and has strewn the landscape with groups and factions, expelled over the years on every conceivable charge; their chief failure, it seems, lay in their inability to oust him. De Groot has abstracted one guiding element from the Sino-Soviet cataclysm, namely, to remain independent of everyone else on the basis of a pure and simple Stalinism, nurtured in his own political hothouse.

In Austria, on the other hand, a party that came out of the war with 5 percent of the vote (despite the Soviet occupation, or perhaps because of it) has vegetated until recently. Last spring, however, this party took a swing toward full-scale "revisionism." After a deplorable incident in which an old rank-and-filer died after a beating by neo-Nazi thugs, a revulsion swept Austria and it brought the unprecedented sharing of a common platform between the Communists and the Social Democratic leaders of the country. Accident and circumstance often combine in Western Europe with such issues as the fear of neo-Nazism to place the Communists in a spotlight which nothing in their routine activity would warrant.

This consideration may also explain a certain electoral revival of the Belgian Communists, who seem to have begun a liberalization within their own ranks as early as 1954, prior to the general trend. Faced with the disintegrating effects of separatism and of nationalism, Belgium's unity as a nation is presently at stake. The Belgian Socialists have lost heavily by their unwillingness or inability to mirror either the demands for linguistic autonomy of the Walloons or the grievances of the Flemish, long the underdog in Belgian life. The Communists have championed a restructuring of the country on the basis of a federation of the two peoples and the three distinct regions (for Brussels has by now a cosmopolitan character of its own). In Belgium, the Communists derive a certain satisfaction in being "more Italian" than the French Communists to whom, of course, they are culturally very close. Perhaps this characteristic explains a slight increase of their vote in the May 1965 elections,[8] despite the defection of the pro-Chinese who have had the *insouciance* to take the identical name as the official Belgian Party and present themselves as the true believers.

[8] With 4.6 percent of the vote, the Belgian Communists now have a third of their 1946 vote, and have been outstripped by the Volksunie, the Flemish nationalist movement.

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IV

If the French and Italian Communist Parties were merely objects of study for political scientists, they would offer themes of uncommon fascination. For they have shown an unusual ability to withstand ideological vicissitudes. Their importance, however, transcends the academic, for in the major problems of public policy confronting these two ancient centers of Western civilization the Communists can either take part influentially or present serious obstacles to other political forces. Despite fluctuations from more than 2,000,000 to something over 1,600,000 members, the Italian Communist Party now has a quarter of the vote. It gained a full million in the November 1963 balloting. Its hold on local governments has declined since the Socialists joined in a national coalition with a wing of the Christian Democrats. But the Communists still share in governing 1,100 communes with 8.5 million people. They are also decisive—in uneasy alliance with the Socialists—in the largest labor federation, the *Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro*. The center-left government may at any time find its survival depending on Communist votes. Italy's new president, Giuseppe Saragat —the Social Democratic Party leader and longtime foe of the Communists—owes his election to them. When Palmiro Togliatti passed away a year ago, leaving a testament which rocked the international movement, Pope Paul considered it important to pay respects to a departed foe.

The French Communist influence is far less pervasive. The party's membership has declined from the postwar peak of 800,000 to perhaps 250,000, of whom a third are reliable cadres. But its vote, except in some Gaullist plebiscites on Algeria, has remained at some 25 percent of the total, giving the P.C.F. great political leverage. Since Gaston Defferre failed in his effort to create a Socialist-Democratic federation of the non-Communist parties, the field has been left open to a candidate the Communists can support. The paradox of the Communist position lies in the fact that they are trying to find some common ground with de Gaulle, and not without success and with a suave reciprocity on the General's part. They share a strong animosity to supranational tendencies in Western Europe plus a virulent anti-Americanism, even if the intellectual sources of both attitudes are quite different from those of de Gaulle. Maintained

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for twenty years as a party that could make its weight felt in the balance wheel of Soviet politics, the P.C.F.—even if its left-Socialist admirers and rivals are constantly bewailing its *immobilisme*—can use its strength to impede long overdue realignments within French life, justifying its evasion of inner change on grounds of foreign policy. Gunnar Myrdal has called the Italian Communist movement "a vast Tammany Hall," a metaphor which credits its common touch in Italian life, its capacity to wheel and deal, if not its principles. Annie Kriegel, in her massive two-volume study of the P.C.F.'s origins,[9] stresses that the French Communists achieved a "pseudo-solution" to the basic dilemma of inheriting both reformist and anarcho-syndicalist tendencies, by sublimating them in a revolutionary party which did not enjoy a revolutionary situation. What the P.C.F. became and what has enabled it to survive was the strategy of "turning itself into a sort of imaginary global society, on the model of the Soviet Russian universe."

The Italians, as their admirers in Western Europe like to point out, have formed a "modern movement." Most of its members are new and the largest body of its leaders came out of the Resistance to Fascism in 1943–45. These young men, in their late thirties and forties, who have taken over from the veterans that survived Mussolini, are anxious to achieve something more than to wait for a favorable turn of events in the Communist world, with which they are deeply disillusioned. By contrast with France, where the old guard has held on and the younger leaders were either bureaucratized or shunted aside, the Italian Communists give the impression of having created an "open society." They argue among each other, form groups and publish the vote count in their Central Committee meetings; they mingle easily with political opponents. One Italian Socialist leader who otherwise opposes them declares in private conversation that the P.C.I.'s top cadres "are cynical and strong, but men of a humanistic culture, not at all 'killers,' and far from Stalinism." Some have a relatively recent immersion in Communist thought. Some have a technocratic bent, and others (as their Socialist opponents like to remember) were schooled in the last days of Mussolini's "Social Republic." There is an agnostic quality in the Italians,

[9] Annie Kriegel, "Aux Origines du Communisme Francais, 1914–20," Mouton & Co., Paris and The Hague, 1964. *Cf.* the commentary of Eric Hobsbawn in *New Left Review*, London, May–June 1965.

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perhaps understandable in so Catholic a country, but also a profound admiration for the ability of the Catholic Church to adjust to new realities, as it had been doing with the late Pope John's ecumenical movement. Proud of the late Togliatti's heritage, the Italians have made a legendary figure out of their founder, Antonio Gramsci, who died in Mussolini's prisons in 1937. In France, Khrushchev's famous denunciation of Stalin in February 1956 has never received an official imprimatur, and it was left to an opposition journal, *Unir* (which circulates 20,000 copies), to publish it. But the Italians now know from Togliatti's own writings that the venerated Gramsci had the deepest reservations about Stalin's treatment of the Old Bolsheviks, and they have food for reflection in the thought that, had Gramsci escaped to Soviet exile, he might well have perished in Stalin's purges. Thus, in Italy the works of both Trotsky and Bukharin can now be found in party bookshops. In France, the P.C.F. tries hard to keep Italian Communist literature from the reach of its members. Indeed, while the Italians have tried to make their Istituto Gramsci a center for research and debate, with anyone and no holds barred, the French Party does not allow its own intellectuals to take part in the encounters in Rome, except by special dispensation and solely in their personal capacities.

Yet the vital dissimilarities of the two movements lie in something deeper: their divergent attitudes toward the problem of their own transformation. In France, the Communists have conducted desultory discussions with the Socialists and have begrudgingly granted that transitions to socialism would require a multiplicity of parties. The example of "the Prague experience," the Czechoslovak coup of February 1948, has been renounced. Yet the P.C.F. has much less difficulty making local alliances with Guy Mollet, the Socialist leader, throwing votes as bargains may require, than it has in reëxamining its own past. The Communists reëmphasize unity of action with the Socialists but they do not really respect them as allies. Self-hypnotized by its own image as France's leading party, the P.C.F. has great difficulty working with those on the Left who have different origins or nuances of view. One example is Emmanuel d'Astier, an original Gaullist, who sought common ground with Marxism, but whose fellow-travelling newspaper, *Libération,* was run to the ground when d'Astier, who had long served the Communists as head of the "peace movement," finally kicked over the traces.

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The French Communists now devote a great deal of attention to Catholic opinion, for a good deal of trade-union life and much that is new among French farmers stem from Catholic concerns. Roger Garaudy, who recently took part in a round table on "Christians and Marxists Speak of God," went further than his party ever has gone in recognizing the importance of "transcendence" in the human experience. He also went rather beyond the traditional P.C.F. policy of the "outstretched hand" toward the Catholics by urging Marxists "to understand, to integrate and to realize the human basis of Christianity," while calling on Catholics to admit the "purifying virtue" of Marxism. And he envisaged not so much a dialogue as a "perspective of mutual instruction and emulation."[10]

Italy, too, has seen a significant repercussion of both the changes in the Catholic world with *Pacem in Terris* and the acknowledgement by the Communists that separation of Church and State does not exhaust the problem. In preparation for the P.C.I.'s Tenth Congress at the end of 1962, the party declared that "today it is no longer a matter of overcoming the prejudices and sectarianism which constitute an obstacle to the collaboration of socialist and Catholic forces in obtaining immediate political and economic gains." The issue was much more profound, that is, "a matter of understanding how the aspirations toward a socialist society may find a stimulus in the religious conscience itself as it confronts the dramatic problems of the contemporary world. Herein the problem of religious rights in a new society presents itself in a new way."

Left-Catholic circles, especially those around the influential Florentine weekly, *Politica,* quickly recognized that something new was being said. Moreover, when the former Soviet ideological boss, Leonid Ilyitchev, came out with a famous pronunciamento, denying any common ground between Marxism and Christianity and renewing the Soviet anti-religious campaign, the Italian Communists gave this the cold shoulder. The upshot has been an unusual volume, "Dialogo alla Prova," in which Catholics and Communists have confronted each other's views and sought a meeting of minds. This volume has been circulating widely in both spheres of Italian life.

One year ago, the Italian leader, Giorgio Amendola, came for-

[10] Publication in the Catholic weekly, *Témoignage Chrétien,* of Garaudy's piece brought a rebuke to the journal from the archbishop of Paris, March 30, 1965.

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ward with the concept of a new, unified party of the Left, which he believes should embrace Socialists and left-Catholics. His proposal has become the major subject of the internal Communist debate, officially endorsed by Longo and the entire P.C.I. leadership. Amendola made what he called "a critical determination" —namely, that "neither of the two solutions proposed to the working classes of the capitalist countries of Western Europe over the past 50 years (the Social Democratic and the Communist solutions) has revealed itself able, as of today, to realize a socialist transformation of society. . . ." Continuing in this vein, Amendola declared, "I do not see how one will succeed in achieving today or tomorrow . . . what one has been unable to do in 50 years. A political organization which has not reached its objectives in half a century, with the coöperation of three generations of militants, must seek the reasons for this failure and must know how to transform itself."[11]

Thus, the issue of the self-transformation of Italian Communism is posed. Yet what it means, and whether the badly divided Italian Socialists will respond, and whether the left-Catholics will find common ground with them, remains very much to be seen. Amendola clearly wants to shake off the old baggage. Whether a large body of the rank-and-file, reared in another tradition, will allow the change that most of the P.C.I. leaders clearly see necessary is another matter. In a sense, the Italian Party is the victim of its own strength relative to those with which it hopes to unite. Many Socialists resent the P.C.I.'s hostility to the center-left experiment, just as many Communists feel that the road toward the P.C.I.'s participation in government lay through tacit support of the center-left and an effective pact of action with the Socialists, rather than a vague, if sensational, prospect of a unified party. In a land where socialism has been a byword and a banner for a very long time, it still requires precise definition. The Italians are probably the only Communists who have the courage and the incentive to make this effort. Yet the very popularity, indeed promiscuity, of the old language may inhibit it.

In the longer view what happens to the Communists in Western Europe does not depend on their own decision alone. They will be reacting, not only to events in their own world, but to the upholding of competitive coexistence. What they shall need

[11] *Rinascita*, November 24, 1964.

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is ideological confrontation, especially with American intellectual and political circles. This will be in our interest as well as theirs. If "peaceful engagement" with Communism is a sound basis for relations in Eastern Europe, then surely a vigorous engagement in debate and a much greater contact would assist in the process of change now gripping Communists in Western Europe. Most of them have yet to make a genuine and serious discovery of America, as indeed Americans have yet to meet them on their own intellectual terrain. The process of exchange as well as change may well be a reciprocal responsibility.

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ANTHONY EDEN AND THE CACOPHONY OF NATIONS

By Herbert Feis

NATIONS are inclined to be self-centered, quarrelsome and turbulent. Not all, but many; not always, but much of the time. They are easily carried away by fears, frustrations, presumed necessities or real or fancied offenses. While the resultant antagonisms could formerly be localized in scope and consequence, it has become harder to confine the area of conflict.

In no chronicle of our times are these baneful tendencies more apparent than in the one by Anthony Eden, now Lord Avon. The three volumes of his Memoirs are of impressive interest.[1] For they are not only an informative account of his own exertions but also a portrayal of the tippling course of diplomacy into war. Though animated by the natural wish to explain and justify his own actions, the narrative—which is carefully candid—transcends such a personal purpose. The incisive interpretations and conclusions are a stimulus to thought about the crucial problems of diplomacy today, since these are essentially the same as those which confronted Eden during his long career. How can nations be brought to conduct themselves so that they may live at peace? How can the unruly be constrained?

As youths, Eden's generation was flung into the First World War. Ever afterwards they lived in the gale of its dismal consequences. Too many of the most gifted young men were killed or disabled. The British and French people were worn down by the prolonged ordeal; their economic and financial resources were diminished and their empires were upset. The Germans blamed everyone but themselves. Resenting the terms imposed upon them, they soon began secretly to rebuild their armed strength and to plan to reverse their fortunes. Decadent Tsarist Russia collapsed and gave way to Bolshevism, through which surged an excited intent to bring about world-wide revolution.

The difficulties of peace-making surprised the American people. They were scared off by a chilling blast of recognition of how hard and dangerous it would be to act as one of the guardians

[1] The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon. "Full Circle," 1960; "Facing the Dictators," 1962; "The Reckoning," 1965. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin.

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of order and enforcers of peace. They repudiated the treaty which would have pledged the United States to come to the aid of France were it again attacked, and they refused membership in the League of Nations. Thereby they sought to avoid involvement in foreign quarrels and responsibility for their outcome and consequences.

During the First World War, Eden stood up under fire and fatigue most courageously. Wounded, he recovered to become a very young and well-regarded Adjutant-Major, decorated for valor. But his own experiences and the stroke of death of his brothers on the battlefield caused him to detest aggressors who brought on war. In his deep convictions about the prime principles of policy, the attitude of the soldier merged with the reflections of the diplomat.

Foremost among them was his ardent belief that nations must not provoke war by bad conduct and must act together to suppress any among them which did. The defiant violations of the League of Nations and its principles by Japan, Italy and Germany drove him to the conclusion that nations strongly bent on expansion and domination could not be placated by concessions to their desires without serious harm or danger to others. They might be caused to desist and, if need be, brought down only by superior power. Concordantly, that if Great Britain and the Commonwealth and Empire wished to be able to stand firm against threats and to play their part in maintaining international peace and order, they must be well armed and have the will to fight if peaceful means and methods failed.

In the attempt to quell the conflicts in the Far East, which in some form and measure had trailed through the whole past century, he was willing to let the United States take the lead, as it had since the Washington Conference of 1922 which eventuated in the pacts for the Pacific. The British Government, out of deference to American opinion and in order to have its policies in the region conform to American conceptions, had relinquished its Treaty of Alliance with Japan. But it had continued to regard prospects in China poorly and the intentions of China with mistrust.

Still, in 1931, when Japan invaded Manchuria and attacked China, Eden did what he could to induce his government, of which he was then only a junior minister, to be firm in its

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condemnation of Japan. He did not yet have enough confidence or influence to overcome the indecisiveness of Sir John Simon, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Moreover, he doubted whether the American Government was genuinely and firmly willing to resort to coercion.

During the next few years, as Eden was advancing in office, assertive thrusts and threats by Mussolini and Hitler stirred him more deeply. In only one of the crunches of this period—a cruel and crucial one—did his own judgment falter. He drew back from the danger that the Spanish civil war might expand into a general European conflict. Thus he bore, though with growing indignation, Mussolini's gross violations of his avowals not to aid Franco, and Hitler's use of Spain as a training exercise for his air force.

Against the clamor and shoving of the dictators—against Mussolini as he defied the League of Nations and conquered Ethiopia, against Hitler whose vicious nature and excited determination to extend Germany's dominion were expressed in and symbolized by the tramp of his enlarged, booted armies and the shrieking Nazi rallies—he found that all pleas and protocols were useless. His experience and observations confirmed his conviction that the word of the dictators was never to be trusted; and that any and all of them would show regard only for power which might hinder or defeat them.

The maturing Minister found out how wavering were the ruling authorities of Great Britain and France, and how loath were the British and French people to risk war until the danger to their own national life and independence was imminent and inescapable. He pleaded with his colleagues to hasten the rearmament of Britain—a purpose which Stanley Baldwin professed to share but which did not lift him out of his lethargy. He formed a scornful opinion of the Labor opposition which clamored for collective resistance to aggression but opposed all motions to increase British armed strength and all measures that might require recourse to arms.

By the winter of 1937–38 Eden became aware that Neville Chamberlain, Baldwin's successor, was so self-assured in his belief that by concessions which did not injure or imperil Britain he could soothe the dictators and arrive at a reliable understanding with them that no argument could move him. Convinced that

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the Prime Minister was disastrously wrong, Eden resigned. Out of office, during the next two years, he watched with consternation the coming of the war in which he foresaw Britain would be disadvantaged by its slackness and evasion. Munich did not surprise him. Nor did the languid way in which the British and French Governments in the summer of 1939 conducted negotiations for an alliance with the Soviet Union, nor the Hitler-Stalin pact.

II

When the dreaded and expected war broke out, Eden's impulse and wish was to rejoin the regiment in which he had fought in the First World War. This he forewent for office under Chamberlain out of a sense of obligation rather than of opportunity. But not until the power passed to Churchill did his energies surge to their peak, as he strove to assure the survival of Britain and the defeat of the dictators.

Quite possibly Eden's achievement during the crucial seven months in 1940–41 as Secretary of War—before he became Secretary for Foreign Affairs—will be remembered as the most notable of his long career. For under his direction England's army at home and abroad was improved and revived, so that it could stand sturdily behind those utterances of Churchill which defied Hitler. Even while the danger of invasion remained grave, he prevailed upon his colleagues to send a substantial portion of the scant supply of tanks, planes and other combat equipment to hold Libya and the Middle East, and he persuaded them to dispatch British forces to assist the Greeks when the Germans invaded their country, although he knew that the chances of battle were poor and the losses would be grievous.

It was in this period that he and Churchill—the warrior—drew close together and formed that affectionate bond which was at times hard tried but was never broken. Between the two there were upsetting disagreements, but never envy, rivalry or recrimination.

As the end of the war came into sight, Eden's efforts gradually turned back to the purposes of his earlier years—peace-making and the maintenance of peace by collective action. But in the way there stood Stalin's evident efforts to extend Soviet dominions and to bring the Communists into power throughout

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Europe. With Churchill he tried to persuade President Truman to keep American troops along the advanced lines in Europe which they had reached until the Russians constrained their ambitions. During the Potsdam Conference this same objective dominated his diplomacy. But by then he was tired and subordinated himself to an even more tired Churchill.

Thereafter, out of office for six years, he watched the Labor Government find out how unbending the Soviet Government could be, as by use of its veto power in the Security Council it devitalized the United Nations. His hopes were revived by the defense of South Korea and by the drawing together of the United States and the countries of Western Europe into a new alliance.

III

Upon resuming the office of Foreign Secretary in October 1951, circumstances seemed more auspicious than at any other time in his career; with the aid of the Marshall Plan the countries of Western Europe were progressing and becoming politically stable; the western segments of Germany were united; the NATO Alliance was becoming firm; a cease-fire in Korea was within sight. Thereafter he played a main and effective part in resolving other quarrels—those with the Soviet Union over the blockade of Berlin, between Jugoslavia and Italy over Trieste, with Iran over oil.

These developments confirmed his belief that if the Western democracies stood together they could foil Communist attempts to down them. They animated his conduct of affairs by sustaining the hope that by steadiness in pursuit of policies that were just and flexible, discontented nations and colonies clamoring for independence might come to trust in peaceful processes of change and the world's turbulence might subside.

In his Memoirs he tersely sums up the primary purpose he wished to accomplish when at long last, in 1955, he attained the office, the authority and the responsibility of Prime Minister. ". . . I foresaw a growing Communist ambition and wished the free world to find a closer unity to meet it." His experience gives the title chosen for that volume of his Memoirs in which he tells of crisis over Suez, and the divergence of British, French and American policy—Full Circle—a dual meaning. The same

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issue which, when only a junior diplomat he had concluded was crucial, determined his last momentous act in office.

Nasser's challenge seemed to him to be akin to and hardly less menacing than that of the other dictators—Mussolini and Hitler—whom England had once tried to appease. This judgment conjoined with his reckoning that it was imperative, as it had been in 1940, to protect the oil supplies which Britain procured from the Middle East as well as British connections with India. Deeming, as he did, that the reasons justified the action and that it would be craven and foolish to refrain from using coercion to supplement diplomacy because of fear of Russia, sure that the United Nations could not and would not face Nasser down and force him to "disgorge," he proceeded to concert with the French Government the measures he considered necessary. Nowhere does he admit or even hint that these were planned or taken in foreknowledge that Israel was going to invade Egypt.

When the American Government dissented and British opinion rebelled, he was once again frustrated and cast down. To him the experience seemed a repetition of his earlier ones. The predictive comment with which he ends his account of the denouement of the crisis over Suez has the same sombre import as those of 20 years before, when Chamberlain released him from office. "The Russian dream of access to the Persian Gulf draws nearer. These developments will not be checked by support for Nasser in the role of anti-Communist leader. To attempt this would be as useless as it was to seek to use Mussolini against Hitler and result in the domination of the friends of the West." The failure to check Nasser seemed to him to mark the destruction of the second effort to bring international political order into the world. "Look and see," he laments, "what has become of the United Nations since again, as between the two great wars, the great Western democracies could not agree upon resistance to the aggression of dictators."

Alas, in this row the considerations were many and complicated and the limits of tolerable misconduct arguable. Eisenhower and Dulles decided that all of Nasser's threats and measures did not warrant the outright use of armed forces to compel him to retract and to cease his efforts to extend his own influence over the Middle East. Ironically, and with no lack of legalistic citations, they based their American demand that Bri-

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tain and France evacuate the troops from Egypt on the ground that their action violated the Charter of the United Nations. How jangled and contrary to each other can the opinions of professed devotees of the same cause become, when it passes through different national prisms! But will we ever know whether Eden's course or the American was the more expedient, or should I say, sagacious? The answer, like the ancient monuments in Egypt, may be submerged by the turgid flow of history.

The problem of judgment presented by Nasser during this crisis is perennial. It has remained before the democratic nations of the West steadily since Eden retired from office; it is before them critically now: whether to allow leeway to a nation or group of nations which are striving to extend their realm and influence pushfully, or whether—and at what stage—to stand hard and fast, even though the quarrel might then eventuate in war. The historical parallels are neither complete nor clear enough to provide statesmen with standard guidance because of diversity and fluidity of circumstances and indeterminate character of some of the pertinent considerations.

Exceptionally the problem is simple and the only sound answer clear—as it was when North Korea, encouraged and armed by the Soviet Union and China, invaded South Korea. But the one posed by the revolutionary struggle in and over South Viet Nam is far harder and more mutable. The applicable principles may be discernible. But the facts are confusing and it is very hard to envisage an eventual outcome which will justify our interposition and stand up well in the political winds which blow over the region. The United States has acted in accordance with the same conviction and conclusion which determined Eden's career. Will we be able by use of armed force to balk Communist aggression in the region, not only temporarily but permanently? If we manage to bring Viet Nam and its neighbors under the aegis of the United Nations and improve the welfare of their peoples, we will have proven that we acted to uphold essential principles of peace and not because we are rigidly opposed to constructive change.

IV

Our reflections may be interrupted, but they will not be deflected, by recalling some phases of Eden's relations with the

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American authorities. American opposition in the Suez crisis hurt Eden all the more since he had earnestly pursued agreement with the American authorities and had tried hard to adapt his responses to our ways and views. But he never acted nor spoke as a dependent; not even in 1940, when Britain was standing alone.

He did not, and does not, complain of our former attempt to stay out of the quarrels in Europe. But he was ready to risk a deeper cleavage between Great Britain and the dictators if, in any guise and no matter how tentatively, the entry of the United States into the contest might be induced. This is shown by the eagerness with which in 1937 he grasped at Roosevelt's briefly entertained idea of convoking a conference of nations to agree upon a few vital principles. Lurking in the Presidential suggestion a greatly prized intent could be detected to compel the challenging dictators either to reveal their real purposes or renounce them. Eden wanted to respond quickly and warmly. Chamberlain's rejection of this advice, for fear of offending Mussolini and Hitler, steeped his conclusion that he could no longer serve under such a stubbornly mistaken leader.

As in 1939–40 England's deficiency of weapons became startlingly evident, Eden did his utmost to secure the means for continuing to fight the war from the United States. For what was provided, his official papers and Memoirs show him to have been pleased and appreciative, though he probably felt that what we did was the least we ought to be doing, even in our own behalf. A suggestion from Washington that Britain turn over to us its island colonies in the Caribbean for 50 old destroyers seemed to him exorbitant. It was quickly forgotten. The lease of bases in these islands Eden deemed to be adequate military and political compensation for these vessels, almost all of which, he recalls, needed so much repair and refitting that few were usable in battle during the period of England's greatest peril.

Even though Eden appreciated the skill and boldness with which Roosevelt found ways to support and aid Britain against Hitler, he never felt that he could rely on the President's approval of Britain's aims and actions, or trust in the steadiness of their association. During his several visits to Washington and encounters at conferences, Eden enjoyed Roosevelt's amiability and liveliness of spirit. But he did not make the same indulgent allowances for the restless roaming and probing forays of the

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President as he did for those of Churchill. As often as not, Roosevelt's thoughts seemed to him to be straggling and unsettled. For example, after several talks in 1943, the impressions as recorded in his Memoirs were that, while Roosevelt was familiarly informed about the history and geography of Europe, . . . "the academic yet sweeping opinions which he built upon it were alarming in their cheerful fecklessness. He seemed to see himself disposing of the fate of many lands, allied no less than enemy. He did this all with so much grace that it was not easy to dissent. Yet it was too like a conjurer, skillfully juggling with balls of dynamite, the nature of which he failed to understand."

Between the two men there were real differences of purpose. The most aggravating concerned the treatment of General de Gaulle. While Eden also thought de Gaulle unreasonable, excessively proud and critical, he perceived that stricken France needed such a figure at the time and he was sure that the French people would respond to his call for valor and visions of greatness. Roosevelt's obdurate attempt to debar de Gaulle from leadership Eden attributed to mistaken judgment of French sentiment and to a reluctance to have the French Colonial Empire reconstituted at the end of the war.

It was the issue of colonialism more than any other, Eden thought, that stood in the way of the conjunction of policy between Britain and the United States. In his judgment, Roosevelt and Truman, and Eisenhower after them, all failed to appreciate the benefits which Britain had brought to the many other members of the Commonwealth and Empire, and of its sincere wish to have these become self-governing when properly qualified, and of its efforts to qualify them. In almost every time of trouble and dispute between Britain and some segment of its Empire, he found the United States on the side of the separatists. This he resented all the more because Roosevelt, while standing aside from Britain (on the score that for the sake of peace they must not seem to be "ganging up"), clung to the belief that by being patient and fair with Stalin he could overcome Communist mistrust and wash out of the minds of devout Communists the determination to spread their faith throughout the world.

In his Memoirs, there are hints of liking and admiration for Truman as a man of direct and fearless nature who was ready to stand up for the causes in which Eden believed. Of Acheson

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there are explicit statements of admiration for his brilliance and decisive part in the formation of NATO; this supervened over the occasional spurts of irritation between the two men. Eisenhower, as Supreme Commander, Eden liked and esteemed for his ability to manage the huge combined combat forces harmoniously; he found him as President to be well-intentioned but vague, indecisive, and dominated by John Foster Dulles.

Dulles was Eden's Nemesis. Time and time again Eden was baffled and put out of his straightforward stride by Dulles's roundabout and shifting tactics. In the end he felt he had been misled and worn out by a legalistic sleight-of-mind man. With quiet satisfaction he notes that not long after the Suez episode Eisenhower and Dulles concluded that the United States had to deploy its armed force to prevent unfriendly elements from gaining control in Lebanon and Jordan.

V

Among the conclusions emerging from Eden's narrative, one dominates. It has two faces—one grim, one reassuring.

Most of the triumphs of the militant and turbulent nations have been more easily achieved because of the disarray and dissension among the three great Western democracies—Britain, France and the United States—and by the wavering of some of their smaller allies. Although the political leaders of all three have incessantly maintained that they wanted to coöperate with one another, their disagreements have been frequent and critical. Their failure to mesh their wills and share risks has been deplorable and sometimes disastrous. The dictators have gained great advantages from their differences; and other dictators are trying to do so now.

In contrast, the few great diplomatic and military triumphs of the West have been achieved when these three countries came together. The tardy American support of Britain's resistance to Hitler enabled that country to maintain the struggle until Russia was dragged into it by Hitler, and then, together with reviving French forces, to win it. When in unison they braved the risk of war, they managed to defeat the Russian blockade of Berlin and forced Stalin to acknowledge failure. They contained and defeated the Communist attempt to take over South Korea.

The lesson is plain: these three countries—now along with

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West Germany and Japan—must submerge their differences. Each must, in the necessary ways and measures, defer to the requirements of common policy in crucial situations. None can be willful nor believe it can save itself by remaining apart from the others. Otherwise sooner or later one and all will be further endangered and struck down, either in Europe, the Middle East, the Far East or everywhere.

Once upon a time, when Britannia ruled the waves, it could almost if not always by itself cause other nations to accept its terms and abstain from going to war against each other. Its ability to do so and the effectiveness of balance-of-power arrangements were broken in 1914. Briefly after the Second World War, the United States, undamaged, its productivity rising, and in sole possession of atomic weapons, was insuperable. Had it the will to do so, it could alone have controlled the behavior of nations. But now no one country—West or East—capitalist or Communist—has by itself the power to subdue turbulence and maintain order in the world.

Eden, as is his wont, downrightly acknowledges that effective coöperation will require comprehensive mutual engagements. At the terminal of his reflections stands the conclusion that "Alliances cannot be limited geographically in a cold war which is global. . . . The interests of Allies cannot be regarded as vital in one area and expendable in another, without danger to the whole structure of the alliance."

In this connection, the flail of history at the moment seems most confounding and curved. Eden supported de Gaulle as the preserver of France most steadfastly. The American statesmen who opposed him were succeeded by others who were contrite. But regrettably, in my view, when the General proposed that there should be a directorate of the United States, Britain and France within NATO, we held back. Now he is the great opponent of a close and comprehensive concert of policy and action among these three countries and their associates. Conceivably, by cultivating its relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union and by refusing to yield more of its independence of action to the European Economic Community and NATO, France may be able to act effectively as intermediary to bring the war in Viet Nam to an end and arrange an accord about the future of Germany. But this is improbable. It is more likely that if French

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intransigence continues it will contribute calamitous confusion.

Neither by itself nor by the compacts it may enter with smaller countries can France or any other single Western country convince the Communists that, whatever their methods and their faith and their readiness to sacrifice themselves and others, they cannot rule the world. Thus, the Western powers will either fail separately or prevail together. Their unity would, I believe, enable them to remain at peace with the Soviet Union, provided they abstain from attempts to line up a unified Germany against it. With or without Russian coöperation, they also will be able to prevent Communist China from bringing on the next great war. Thus, and only thus, may they still bring to realization the ideal of a community of nations which will allow peaceful procedures to rule over the turbulence of their nature and the rasp of history.

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POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN JAPAN

By Nobusuke Kishi

IN every country, the supreme task of politics is to guarantee the security and peace of that country. Japan is no exception. In its case, however, a fundamental difficulty is that the government and opposition parties are not able easily to find any point of agreement on how the guarantee is to be achieved. This has brought about a political situation peculiar to Japan.

The present Liberal Democratic government follows a national policy based on Japan's international position as a member of the free world, centered around the United States. This policy has remained unchanged ever since the signature of the Japanese Peace Treaty at San Francisco in 1951. In contrast, the Socialist Party, which is the No. 1 opposition party, advocates neutralism. It holds that Japan should disengage from the free world. If the Socialist Party's policy is realized, Japan will without doubt lean toward the Communist camp.

Such differences between the government and the opposition are the factors causing political disputes over the China problem, the talks between Japan and the Republic of Korea, the Viet Nam issue and the problem of revising the Constitution. The disturbances in 1960 over the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty were, on the surface, the most radical development of this situation. Such confrontations can be expected to reach a climax in 1970 when the decision must be made on whether to extend the present Security Treaty.

Foreigners may get the impression of such confusion in the politics of Japan that they conclude the country faces a crisis. I would like to say at once that such a view is mistaken. This is not to say that Japan has attained the ideal in politics. But, relatively speaking, I do believe that Japan has reached a certain political maturity. Of all the countries occupied by the Allied forces after the last war, or which became independent, Japan probably is the only one that has managed to achieve democracy, "rationed out" in our case by the United States. None the less, the course of Japanese politics causes dissatisfaction both within the country and elsewhere. In my opinion, there are three reasons for this.

First, Japan is probably the most highly educated country in the world. There is practically no illiteracy. In every household,

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the adults read at least one newspaper. The number of TV sets per capita is the highest in the world next to the United States. All this education and intellectual activity have generated a proportionately high interest in politics. Yet this is combined with an extraordinary insularity of view deriving from Japan's physical isolation, the homogeneity of the population, the difficulty of the language and the perhaps anachronistic but continued dependence on Chinese philosophy and traditions. These factors cause the Japanese to seek an impossible ideal in politics and lead to a confusion of purpose—hence the peculiar Japanese "self-reflection" of political leaders when things go wrong.

Secondly, the freedom of speech that was given Japan by the American Occupation has now run riot. The country's mass media, centered around national newspapers with circulations of from four to five million, have no ties whatsoever with the government. Indeed, the mass media seem to view it as their duty continually to assail the government rather than attempt to interpret, with responsibility, the government's policies. Members of the opposition in the Diet show a similar lack of responsibility in attacks on the government. Thus the political picture in Japan is distorted by the mass media and by opposition politicians. Charges of corruption in high places are widely exaggerated. Foreigners receive a certain impression of hysteria in Japanese politics that is fundamentally misleading.

Thirdly, it must never be forgotten that even if Japan is to continue as one of the chief countries of the free world, it also and emphatically is part of Asia. Further, it must not be forgotten that Japan, during the late nineteenth century, suffered from unequal treaties along with China and other Asian nations. I was interested, when visiting India as Prime Minister in 1957, to hear Prime Minister Nehru welcome me by saying that he had first heard of Japan at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. Nehru went on to say that he had assumed Russia would overwhelm Japan because no Asian power was a match for a European power. Japan's victory over Russia inspired him to work for India's independence.

But Japan's role in Asia became filled with contradictions when it tried to emulate the imperialism of the European powers. These adventures weigh on the conscience of many Japanese, while the feeling of belonging to Asia has returned. Among leftists, this feeling has found expression in opposition to the conservative

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government and to the United States. It goes along with the unrealistic view of international Communism held by people who have not yet really recovered from the shock of defeat. Thus left-wing scholars and critics long for an "Asia for the Asians," criticize the United States and apologize for the Communists. These elements are lending support to Communist designs; still, the reasons for their attitude must be understood and we must discover some means of establishing common ground between them and those who believe Japan's place is in the free world. If we fail in this, the result may be to force people who clearly are not our friends and at the same time not clearly our enemies toward the clearly enemy side. We must hope, then, that politics in Japan may aid her in developing as a member of the free world and as an active participant in the United Nations, while showing understanding and sympathy for what has happened to Asian nations during the past 300 years and for the present predicament of many of them. We can hope that such a development will enable Japan to act as a bridge between Asia and the Western world. We can hope that Japan will be able to contribute to protecting Asia from Communist aggression and also toward the achievement in Asia of democratic societies based on freedom and respect for the individual.

II

With the foregoing as background, let me get down to the facts of politics as revealed in the parties. Japan has three main political parties—the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the opposition Socialist Party and the Komeito Party, the political arm of the Soka Gakkai religious movement.

I am a member of the Liberal Democratic Party and I shall take it up first. The party was formed November 15, 1955. Before that the conservatives were divided into the Liberal Party and Democratic Party while the opposition was divided into left-wing and right-wing socialist parties. After my return to the political world in 1953, I felt most strongly the need to unite and stabilize the conservative forces and to give them long-range policies. At the same time, the opposition Socialists united into one party. It was our hope that the conservative and socialist parties could confront one another and debate issues along the lines of the two-party system in Britain and the United States. I also had hoped originally that the base of both these major parties could

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be broadened, that the leftist element of the conservative forces might be somewhat more radical than the rightist element of the Socialist Party. This would have enabled a transfer of power from one party to another as happens in the United States without any change in basic policies and without political disturbances. I shall explain later why my view was "a mistaken outlook based on good faith." I shall also explain why the Socialist Party has been unable to fulfill the true function of an opposition party.

This is the tenth year since the L.D.P. was formed and its tenth year in office. Whether this record is based on its real achievements or the errors of the opposition is debatable. However that may be, this decade in office has brought about many problems within the conservative forces and has resulted in the rise of powerful factions and factional struggles within the L.D.P. Perhaps it was inevitable that the absence of a real opposition party would result in this fragmentation. But, domestic politics aside, when we turn to foreign affairs we perceive the necessity for achieving unity inside the party. Warnings against an optimistic view of the international situation have been sounded by myself and Mr. Takeo Fukuda, the present Finance Minister. There is still need to drive this point home. For we must look ahead to the problems of Asia 10 years hence and of the world 20 years hence. When we envisage the role and the responsibility of Japan in this perspective we should not find it impossible to reconcile the internal party factions. The best method, it seems to me, is to find an issue on which all factions can unite in confronting the opposition parties. And I advocate that this issue should be the revision of the clause of the Constitution that bars Japan from formally maintaining armed forces. This issue should be taken up not only as a means of uniting the conservative forces, but also as a means of eradicating completely the consequences of Japan's defeat and of the American Occupation. It is necessary to enable Japan finally to move out of the postwar era and for the Japanese people to regain their self-confidence and pride as Japanese. The true rehabilitation of Japan will begin at this point. Japan cannot be said to have found itself as a nation just because everyone has a TV set, plenty to eat and a higher income.

The revision of the Constitution will be one of the two major issues in Japanese politics during the next few years. The other will be the renewal of the Security Treaty with the United States. This pact, which comes up for renewal in 1970, can be termi-

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nated by either side with one year's advance notice. Leftist groups will, of course, make a major effort to prevent its renewal and they will be supported by the U.S.S.R. and Red China. However, I feel that the majority of the people recognize the necessity of a treaty by which we can hope to keep world peace in the future as well as we have during the present term of the treaty. It must be the aim of the conservative forces to deepen this feeling among the people. We must organize a systematic campaign and counter-measures against the arguments and actions of the opposition. I am sure that we shall be able to do this.

A complicating factor is the question of Okinawa. We must face the fact that Japanese national sentiment demands the return of Okinawa, but it is difficult to see how this can materialize soon. We must somehow reconcile a reassertion of Japanese sovereignty in Okinawa with the maintenance of the island as a bastion in the world defensive system of the United States. The United States very naturally fears that the return of Okinawa to Japan would mean the beginning of the end of its usefulness as a military base. The only way to resolve this contradiction is to approach the problem step by step. This calls for restraint by the United States in ruling Okinawa so as not to give the left wing in Japan ammunition for charges that the island is a citadel of American imperialism. The conservative forces, for their part, must combat that impression and help the Japanese people realize that this vast military installation is one of the guarantees of world peace.

III

The Socialist Party has remained the main opposition group despite the breaking away in 1960 of the right-wing element to form the Democratic Socialist Party. The Socialists have the conventional aim of achieving a socialist society and advocate doing this through the working class and particularly the laboring class. The Socialists regard such a change as a revolution, but the party platform says such a revolution need not be carried out through violence or force. Instead, the Socialists hope to assume power by obtaining a majority in the Diet. The party thus claims that its basic difference with the Communist Party in Japan is that the latter advocates revolution through violence.

In advocating the unification of the conservative parties, I also hoped that the Socialists would unite along similar lines. I had

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believed that the two parties could then agree on the final objective of guaranteeing the peace and security of Japan and that there would be no important differences in the methods for attaining it. This expectation of mine, however, has been completely confounded by the form actually taken by the confrontation between the two major parties. For, as events have demonstrated, the Socialist Party has not developed the capability or the necessary preparation for taking over the reins of government. A political party exists to carry out its principles and policies and to do this by securing control of the government. If the party lacks this capability, its policies will be isolated from reality and it inevitably will lack a sense of responsibility to the people.

The fact is that in past general elections the Socialist Party has never put up enough candidates to gain a majority of the seats in the Lower House of the Diet even if all the Socialist candidates were elected. This is what I mean when I say that the Socialist Party lacks the capability of taking over the government and this is what leads to the irresponsible and unrealistic nature of the Socialist Party policies. Of these, the most irresponsible and dangerous is the party's argument for and conception of neutrality for Japan as a means of guaranteeing the country's security in place of the Security Treaty with the United States. The Socialist Party maintains the extraordinary illusion that an unarmed Japan can exist securely as a neighbor of Red China and Soviet Russia after renouncing the protective power of the United States and, indeed, as some Socialists put it, condemning the United States as the "common enemy" of Japan and the two Communist states. This policy is so close to fantasy that it has come to be recognized as such even among many intellectuals.

The Socialist Party platform draws a line between Socialism and Communism. But under the new leadership of Kozo Sasaki, the Socialists have vowed to coöperate with the Communists in opposing the peace treaty with the Republic of Korea. This cooperation certainly will be extended to the Security Treaty, and it must be remembered that the Japanese Communist Party has now come under the complete dominance of Peking. Moreover, most of the Socialist Party's present leaders are doctrinaire Marxists. They have maintained the myth that a Communist social structure represents man's highest development and that a democratic society and a Communist society are incompatible. The

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Socialist Party is probably the only such party in the world that still totally believes in the Marxism of a hundred years ago. The border war between Communist China and India, the Sino-Soviet dispute, the collapse of the second Afro-Asian Conference—these events have only strengthened the socialist faith in neutralism. Here, again, we see the characteristic Japanese tendency toward theoretical idealism and the lack of experience in international affairs.

Unless the Socialist Party makes great strides toward concrete policies and realistic thinking, it probably will not be able even in the future to put up a sufficient number of candidates to obtain a Diet majority. I expect the Socialist Party to continue floundering for the next ten years at least. The majority of eligible voters in Japan are wise enough to perceive instinctively that its principles and policies carry the danger ultimately of putting Japan into the Communist camp.

IV

Komeito (Clean Government Party) was set up in November 1964 as a political arm of Soka Gakkai, the aggressive religious organization that puts absolute faith in the teachings of eleventh-century St. Nichiren, the greatest Buddhist produced by Japan. My knowledge of the religious aspect of the movement is limited, although I was friendly with Josei Toda, one of its founders. (Toda and the main founder, Tsunesaburo Makiguchi, were both imprisoned by the militarists during the war, and Makiguchi died in Sugamo Prison). In my analysis, I shall rely on the platforms and policies proclaimed by Komeito.

The leading characteristic of Komeito is that its origins are purely Japanese, unlike the existing political parties and labor unions set up under the guidance of the United States Occupation. Komeito thus reflects the Japanese character of Soka Gakkai, which places faith in St. Nichiren as a Japanese prophet as well as in Buddha.

The second point to note is the astonishing expansion of Soka Gakkai. Five thousand households were members of the organization in 1951. This grew to 74,000 households in 1953, 307,000 households in 1955, 765,000 households in 1957, and 5,203,000 households in 1964. Among the members are American military personnel at Yokosuka and Fuchu as well as followers in the United States itself and South Korea. Since the total number of

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eligible voters in Japan, as announced by the Home Affairs Ministry on July 1, is 61,672,742, it follows that one-sixth of the voters are members of Soka Gakkai. Moreover, if 70 percent of those eligible actually vote, nearly one-fourth of the eligible votes would be cast by Soka Gakkai members, since it is said that among members abstention is almost non-existent.

In the 1962 Upper House election, Soka Gakkai succeeded in electing all of its nine candidates. In the local elections held in 1963, it put up 971 candidates, of whom 97 percent were elected. In the Upper House election this past July, 80 percent of Komeito's 14 candidates were elected, thus raising the number of seats held in the house to 20, including the nine members not up for reëlection. It thus becomes the third largest group in the Upper House, after the Liberal Democratic and Socialist Parties. In the July elections for the 120 members of the Tokyo Municipal Assembly, Komeito elected all its 23 candidates.

What is the secret behind such a surprising development? Among the Soka Gakkai members are bar hostesses, clerks, taxi drivers, employees of medium and small enterprises, and laborers in coal mines, which now face depression. Soka Gakkai could thus be said to have grasped the dissatisfaction and sense of instability among the unorganized workers and classes not participating in the present Japanese prosperity. Also, it could be said that the feeling of danger—of distrust of politics—that grips so many of our youth has found an outlet in the aggressive ideology of Soka Gakkai.

If this is so, it must be said that the progress made by Soka Gakkai indicates the need for deep "self-reflection" in the existing political parties, especially the Liberal Democratic Party. Although its rate of increase is said to have slackened somewhat recently, we should not take the simple view that the organization, made up as it is chiefly of people in the lower classes of society, will disappear once they come to share in the current prosperity.

However, the splendid development of Soka Gakkai itself must be judged on a different basis from the policies of Komeito. Frankly speaking, the ideals and policies of Komeito as a political party are extremely vague. Distrust toward existing parties and politicians is strongly voiced in its platform and in the writings of Daisaku Ikeda, the current president of Soka Gakkai. There is no denying that these have been drawn up hurriedly and show signs of immaturity. For one thing, the words used are extremely

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novel, such as "global racial principle," "human socialism" or "Buddhist democracy," expressions which have not until now been found in the Japanese language.

Komeito's advocacy that "the Japan-U.S. security setup should naturally be erased" means, according to Takehisa Tsuji, its chairman, that "efforts will be made to realize an international environment not necessitating a Japan-U.S. security setup." This cannot be called a policy. The politicians of the world are worried day and night by the problem of how to establish an international environment which will make unnecessary measures such as the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty or NATO.

Komeito makes a similar mistake in connection with revision of the Constitution. It defines its basic policy of opposition as "not aimed to protect the Constitution in order to institute a socialist Constitution as advocated by the Socialist Party. But we strongly oppose the revision planned by the Liberal Democratic Party which would be forced upon the people in order to foster rearmament and oppress human rights." Since the aims of the Liberal Democratic Party do not include rearmament or oppression of human rights, Komeito's policy is clearly dogmatic, self-complacent and immature.

It is said that Komeito plans to put forward 35 to 40 candidates in the next general election. At the recent Upper House election, three of the five Komeito candidates who ran from local constituencies were defeated, probably indicating that the foundation of the established parties remains strong and that the public is critical of religious organizations that enter the political world. Accordingly, it is doubtful whether in a general election the rate of Komeito voters will be as high as heretofore.

Komeito says: "We are not a conservative party or a socialist party. The value of our party is to play the role of a stimulant and a watchdog so that the two other parties will free themselves from corruption and conduct sound politics."

The prospects are that Komeito in the future will act in parliament as a critical and pressure party. We can make no guess as to whether it will become a second conservative party or will incline toward radical authoritarianism. The gifted and astute president of Soka Gakkai, Daisaku Ikeda, professes not to consider the latter possibility a threat. The Chairman of Komeito claims that "the Komeito is a bulwark against Communism." Doubtless that is so, but so long as its policies are so immature,

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it will have to be careful not to conduct its political activities just to suit the occasion.

The political situation in Japan will probably develop in the direction of making Japan a bridge between Asia and Europe and the United States. The basic condition for this will be that the world's free forces have overwhelming superiority over the Communist forces. In Cuba, the Congo and elsewhere, it has been the military superiority of the free world, especially that of the United States, which has prevented war from occurring. If the military gap between the free world and the Communist world should narrow as a result of dissolution of the Japan-United States Security Treaty, the danger of war will be increased. The present situation should be maintained as a necessary factor in maintaining the absolute superiority of the free world.

Communism, which is opposed to human nature, will either change from the inside or collapse if it is obliged to coëxist long enough alongside a free society. Japan's interest is to add to the enduring solidarity and strength of the free world; and its duty, as a nation of Asia, is by its own example to carry the conviction to the Afro-Asian peoples that the ideals of freedom and democracy will without fail win over Communism. Japan should be the show-window in Asia of freedom and democracy.

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THE NATURE OF MODERNIZATION

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

By William R. Polk

IN the coming decade, the countries of the Middle East and North Africa will unquestionably remain the scene of turmoil, with an ebb and flow of crises and with strained relations with the outside world. However, we should not allow the staccato of crises to obscure the major structural changes which will profoundly alter the area and our relationships with it. Revolution from below, political upheaval and violence are common enough. Occasionally outsiders forget that these are not linked solely to Soviet intrusion but have their roots in the nineteenth century, in the great trauma associated with "the impact of the West." Change has been speeded by the cold war and the willingness of both the Soviet Union and the United States to provide the means. But, domestically, the revolution is fostered, indeed often more effectively fostered, by régimes which are politically conservative than by those which think of themselves as socialist or revolutionary. In the Middle East and North Africa, there is no régime which does not put a considerable part of its effort into creating the potential of revolution. It is universally accepted that no government can survive which does not espouse the cause of modernization.

What are the key aspects of this social transformation?

Probably the most important factor from the point of view of Americans and American interest is that there is a shift in the nature of power in the area as it moves toward the creation of a modern industrial society. Traditionally, power was exercised in very small units and then, often, only sporadically. Large-scale political units were usually theoretical. The reach of government was short. Financially, commercially, politically and even militarily men were largely autarchic and undifferentiated. Traditionally, power derived from ownership of land, leadership of tribesmen, the number of one's kinsmen or membership in brotherhoods.

Today power is derived from machines, impersonal civil and military bureaucracies and propaganda. As the functions of managing power have become more differentiated and as the tools of modern industry and communications have been created, men

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have achieved the capability to control their natural resources to a larger degree than ever before and to create new forms of power. Industry, financial institutions, the apparatus of public security, the means of communications and transportation facilities have tended to knit together widely scattered and mutually hostile units of the society into cohesive national organizations.

Second, as the nature of power has changed, so has the identity, leadership and outlook of those who wield it. Traditionally, the "power élite" was a relatively static group whose leadership was determined by birth and whose outlook was schooled in elaborate, traditional scholastic patterns of the religious establishment or molded by the self-perpetuating bureaucracy. Today, as real power grows outside the traditional establishment, the identity of the power élite has become obscure socially as it has become precise intellectually; the new power élite is composed of those men who have mastered the technical skills demanded by a modern society. As they have lost respect for the traditional establishment, they have transferred their loyalties to such abstract concepts as the nation-state or ideologies such as Arab socialism or to individuals whose control over mass media and whose words have made them appear to personify these concepts. Educational opportunities have so dramatically altered their outlook as to alienate them from their fathers and to make them demand, now, the fruits of a modern, industrial society. They are, in fact, the "new men" of their societies.

Third, the traditional isolation of Middle Eastern society is dissolving. The barriers that previously separated the Middle East and held it culturally and educationally apart from the rest of the world have been progressively breaking down. While this process can be said to be in its second century in some countries, it is only in the last generation that the balance of power between the traditionalist and the modernizer has swung decisively. Even in the early years after World War II, it was possible for a man to be "modern" and "westernized" in his public life but to retire to a "traditional" and "oriental" life in his own home. Today, there are few in the Middle East whose houses are not penetrated by radio and television. In this process, messages generated by modernization have extended into every bedroom in the Middle East. Consequently, few established norms have gone unchallenged; the inevitability of change and the capability of men to control their future are everywhere accepted.

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Fourth, the relationship of society and the state is being altered. Something roughly comparable to the division of Church and State in the West is the division in the Middle East between Society and the State. The function of the state was narrow and involved primarily military defense and occasional provision of public security. Society, which included religious and legal institutions, performed such other functions as the individual demanded. The wise man was one who managed to elude all contact with the state. The wise ruler was one who managed to collect taxes economically.

Today, the state seeks, for the first time, to garner the active support of the ruled. The difference between the "good" and the "bad" ruler is that the one uses the power of the state to modernize, for the ultimate benefit of the people, and the other for personal power alone.

Perhaps more important, the role of the state has been dramatically altered. Today, the state is the entrepreneur which begins new industry; the state is the merchant which negotiates and manages major international trade agreements; the state is the teacher through its radio, television, newspaper, school and military functions; the state is the policeman, the soldier; and, finally, the state is the ideologue which points the way toward a chosen future.

Etatisme is as accepted in what we think of as the conservative states of the Middle East as in the more revolutionary. The traditional weakness of governments in the Middle East did not result, as in Western Europe, in the growth of private activity and resultant private wealth, but in stagnant and poor societies. Today, as society has come to demand more, it is not the individual who has filled the breach; rather, it is the state or foreigners. With oil controlled by foreign companies, there is no scope for an Arab Rockefeller; with arms largely the product of foreign industries and introduced by alien states, there is no place for an Arab Nobel or an Arab DuPont. And with steel and other industries nationalized and largely uneconomic, there is no environment for a Guggenheim, Carnegie or Ford. Consequently, there is no state in the Middle East where the concept of private activity has reached the stage we consider normal in the West. Even in such non-socialist countries as Iran, the public sector is growing not only absolutely but also proportionately larger than the private sector.

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Politically, this has prevented the growth of restraints on governments which we associate with middle-class enterprise and gentry self-government. But, while private economic activity and private property have not created effective restraints, the spread of education, the modernization of armies and industrialization have generated new social forces, with new vested interests and ambitions with which governments must contend for the first time. Thus, while the Middle East is not moving toward our notions of representative government and individual rights, it does seem to be moving away from arbitrary dictatorship into what might be termed totalitarian democracy and, in faintly perceivable outline, toward some form of representative government.

Sixth, in traditional Middle Eastern society, the politically active groups have come from a narrow range. The ruling class paid little attention to the middle and lower classes except to collect taxes and rents as agents of the state. As education and commerce became more diffused throughout society in the early years of this century, the traditional upper class gradually had to share some aspects of political life with the traditional middle class. Had this development continued, it is possible that gradually the traditional lower class might have come to participate also. Indeed, the signs pointed in this direction in Egypt after World War II, when the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wafd Party both began to cater to the lower-class vote.

But this development has been overtaken by a new kind of change—the transformation in the nature of power brought about by modernization. In several ways, it has affected all classes. Today, the traditional upper class, whose sole justification for privilege derived from its relationship to the state—not, as in the West, in the creation of new wealth—has been crippled by land reform and nationalization. The traditional middle class has lost much of its newly won and insecure prestige and wealth as its skills were rendered obsolete. And the traditional lower class, while today for the first time in history the recipient of sympathy and some succor, remains politically irrelevant.

If societies were to be modernized, the equipment of modern industrial society had to be created; and to be created and operated, men with the proper skills had also to be produced. A whole new society—with its own lower class of workers, middle class of technicians, foremen and engineers, and upper class of managers and officers—was called into being. It is this group to

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which prestige and wealth have flowed, for these people are the effective citizens of modern states.

The economic and military effectives—the "new men"—of the Middle Eastern societies now form only a small proportion of the whole. As the vast majority of these are members of the new lower class (factory and construction workers and soldiers), the political effectives form only a minute part of society; but their proportional growth is extraordinary.

Take Egypt as an example of how the process works. Whereas in 1952 Egypt had a new middle class which probably could be counted in the hundreds, by 1975 it will number in the hundreds of thousands; whereas it had a "new man" society of some tens of thousands in 1952, by 1975 this group will probably number close to three million.

Essentially, Egypt has used two methods to accomplish this transition. The first is slow, costly but ultimately the most productive: education. In 1945, approximately 900,000 Egyptians attended school. By 1960, this number had been more than trebled and by 1970 it will reach nearly 6,000,000. Technical education was virtually a product of the 1952 revolution. Prior to that time, very little attention had been given to technical studies in Egyptian universities; by 1961 nearly 40,000 Egyptians had graduated from Egyptian universities in the natural sciences and technology and nearly 120,000 were in vocational training.

The second method of creating "new men" has been compulsory military service. Today, in addition to its roles as "vanguard of the revolution" and defender of the country, the army is a school to impart modern skills, a hospital to cure the ills of society and a source of discipline. Each year approximately 20,000 Egyptians are inducted for three-year terms. Upon their release, they possess rudimentary technical skills, a sense of discipline and a far higher standard of health and motivation than their village cousins. All of these are rare and prized possessions in a backward, poor but modernizing society.

It is this group for which the development plans exist and on whose performance the future of the Middle East depends. One way or another, they will make a profound impact upon Middle Eastern politics.

Seventh, modernization in the form of improved health standards, better food distribution and an end of major epidemics has dramatically increased the size of populations. Several coun-

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tries of the Middle East will double in population in the next generation. Since cultivated land available has remained virtually static, this has impelled an increasingly large number of people toward the cities' bright lights.

Indeed, it is probable that a mass migration into urban areas would have taken place even without an increase in the size of the population, for the advantages of living in a city are almost incalculable. Only in the city can a man aspire to modern education or hope for curative medical aid. Thus, the cities of the Middle East are ringed by slums, the *bidonvilles* or *sarifas,* inhabited by émigré villagers. However much their lives may have changed in other respects, politically these people are still rural. It has not been possible for the established political parties to activate them. Perhaps the nearest to success was the effort of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo, but the Communists failed in Baghdad in 1959. In the 1965 Casablanca riots, the organized political parties scarcely figured. But real urbanization is now taking place—often with the radio and television as the schools—and dissatisfaction is becoming more articulate. The modest rise of Gross National Product is not creating jobs fast enough to maintain even the present unsatisfactory levels. This, over the coming decade, may provide a new layer of society for political action. Ten years from now, true mass political parties may be possible. If so, they will probably not be led by the Western-oriented moderates or, perhaps, even by the "Arab-socialist" technocrats, but by more radical forces.

II

The central question posed by the modernization process is the means of effecting a new political synthesis. Politics now reaches far deeper into the society of every Middle Eastern and North African state than at any previous time in history, partly because the command of the skills which make modern power are not the monopoly of a small upper class. And, as power has become diffused, those who control it insist upon recognition.

Iraq offers an example of the most dangerous and destructive way a new synthesis can be sought, even if not achieved. From 1950 to 1958, a traditional government effectively and efficiently destroyed the balance of powers it represented. Devoting a large proportion of the massive oil revenues to the Development Board, the Government of Iraq began to create a new Iraq and

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a new Iraqi alongside of the old Iraq and the traditional Iraqi. By sending thousands of students abroad to study in Western universities, it fostered the growth of a modern component of society, just as by building dams, highways, factories and service facilities it created a modern component of the economy. In fact, it created new forms of power and new men to use them. In this process, obviously, it altered the balance of power among the various sections of the society: the landowner and the tribal chief lost real power relative to the engineer and the entrepreneur. However, the régime refused to allow these "new men" a responsible and satisfying voice in government. The better the government's efforts for the society, the more isolated the government became from society. Ultimately, in 1958, the army, as the representative of the modern component of society, seized power and destroyed the traditional government. In the destruction of the government, however, the revolutionaries also destroyed the accepted concept of legitimacy. Consequently, since 1958 no Iraqi government has been able to drop its guard to get on with the process of development.

Afghanistan may offer—it is too soon to tell—an example of a peaceful transition. There the Western educated "new men" were invited into responsible government positions and encouraged to use their energies peacefully to create a new political synthesis. Under royal patronage and within the framework of the existing political structure, the modernizers are carrying forward tasks of what has been called "nation building" with what appears to be a satisfactory level of participation in responsibility. Traditional forces remain very powerful and the modernizers are remarkably few. It is, consequently, a fragile development and almost entirely dependent upon the good will and farsightedness of the king. To their credit, the modernizers have recognized this situation and have worked within narrow limits and with great care. However, their efforts to modernize and reform gradually have now reached a point of development at which they can attempt to codify their achievement in legal and political institutions. If they are successful, they may have brought off the most impressive democratic achievement in the area in this decade. From our point of view, the key points are that the change has come constructively and has not involved the loss of legitimacy.

One way or another, the shift has already been made in the

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U.A.R., Iraq, Turkey, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria and Afghanistan. Unless modernization can be stopped—and this does not appear possible—a political transition will have to be made, whether peacefully or violently, in Iran, Libya, Morocco and Saudi Arabia. The issue is probably most urgent in Iran and Morocco. But it may also be posed in Libya and Saudi Arabia before the end of the decade. The significant factor is that all four of these governments support programs in education, industrialization and militarization which increase the likelihood of political change. Ironically, the more efficient and public-spirited the government, the more urgent will become the demands for political change. The meaningful questions are not if but *when,* not whether but *how.* If the transformation is violent, on the Iraqi model, there will be dangerous oscillations between political extremes while economic development is postponed. If the change is peaceful, a new impetus will be given to the development of representative government and modernization.

Not only is the power balance among the component parts of each society changing but that between the several states is also shifting. Turkey is probably the sole exception to this shift, for it will remain the most powerful Middle Eastern state into the foreseeable future; but its relative superiority over the other states will be eroded. Among the other states, there are at least three standards other than military strength by which we can measure the changing power balance: change in G.N.P., actual and potential use of resources, and potential and actual population effectiveness.

Iran is the only Middle Eastern state which has the potential to move rapidly toward a Western standard of living. Oil revenues may approach $1 billion by 1975. Iran now has a G.N.P. of $4.7 billion and in 1962 the population was approximately 22.5 million. Relative to the rest of the Middle East, Iran has vast natural resources to be developed, and heavy investment is taking place under the current Third Plan. If Iran can solve its political problems, it should emerge as the richest country in the area.

Among the Arabs, Egypt will have become vastly more powerful at the end of the decade. Egypt's G.N.P. of $3.5 billion is about half that of all the other Arab states together, and is rising at 4 to 5 percent annually. But the G.N.P. figure alone is deceptive, in terms of the projection of power, since such states as Kuwait (G.N.P. $1 billion), Saudi Arabia ($1 billion), Yemen

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($0.35 billion) and Lebanon ($0.8 billion) cannot rival Egypt in other respects. Egypt alone among the Arab states has the potential for industrialization on a large scale. Only Iraq, with one-fourth the population of Egypt, can compete in G.N.P. or economic potential and it lags far, and further, behind in other crucial aspects of power.

In the Israeli-Egyptian equation the balance is likely to shift in favor of the Arabs. In 1963, Israel's 2,400,000 people had a G.N.P. of $2.6 billion; population was increasing at 4 percent and G.N.P. at almost 11 percent. From this point of view, Israel was increasing the lead it already had over Egypt in almost every field. Yet there is reason to believe that the long-run trend will be otherwise. This is most clearly revealed in the development of human potential.

As with land, so with people. About 3 percent of the land of Egypt is arable; the rest, in terms of economics, is mostly waste. To the degree that the desert can be reclaimed and put to work, Egypt's wealth increases. Similarly, only about 3 percent of the population is effective in terms of modern industrial power. Graphically put, Egypt is like a ship with 30 men at the oars, only one of whom is really rowing. The rest represent a dead weight in the present—which accounts for a very low G.N.P. per capita—but a future potential.

Today, the effective adult population of the U.A.R. is somewhat less than 1,000,000, whereas Israel's may be estimated at 1,250,000. This shows up clearly in stark military terms: in 48 hours, Israel can field a force of 250,000 and the Egyptians 150–170,000. (For comparison, Turkey, with roughly the same population as Egypt, has a standing army of more than half a million.) But the spread of education, the growth of technical competence, improvement in health and the abundance of human raw material in Egypt will reverse these figures over the coming decade. By 1975, Egypt will have upwards of 3,000,000 "effectives" while Israel will hardly have gained in numbers. Thus, although Israel will maintain a qualitative superiority in most fields, the edge will have narrowed.

The role played by foreign affairs and by foreign powers in the Middle East may also change over the coming decade.

Foreign issues will continue to lure the leaders and the newly educated of the post-revolutionary Arab countries—and this for a variety of reasons including the stature to be gained by active

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participation in world affairs and emotional identification with the Afro-Asian poor and newly liberated peoples. On the other hand, the violent rejection of foreign participation in their economic life, which was perhaps an inevitable aspect of the coming of independence and the overthrow of traditional governments, may subside. While the traditional form of foreign investment may be difficult or impossible in most areas in the coming decade, new forms of participation in management and marketing may become more possible and attractive. In any event, the present generation of technically qualified young men and women of the Middle East is not so marked with the scars of inferiority as their fathers and, consequently, can approach the world more realistically and coolly.

In the post-revolutionary countries, energies have been released to spread revolution externally and to spread modernization internally. The "post-revolutionary" régimes usually describe themselves as socialist and neutralist. What they seek is the respectability and power of modern industrial societies. But, in putting their emphasis on industrialization they are handicapped by balance-of-payments problems, lack of skills and the weakness of their markets. Distracted by arms races, they depend upon the Soviet bloc for almost all of their military equipment. And seeing the West as a barrier to their original ambitions and in opposition to their emotional commitments, they often support Soviet foreign policies. This is particularly the case when such an arms race as that between Israel and the U.A.R., or Morocco and Algeria, increases the value of Soviet friendship and when such crises as that engendered by the Congo war bring a sudden confrontation of the United States with the more radical new régimes. Then, Soviet diplomatic encouragement and military and economic aid acquire great value. At minimum, this is a foot-in-the-door policy which will give the Soviets some leverage but will not, probably, give them any significant degree of control. The determination of newly independent peoples to control their own affairs, the cultural attitudes of their peoples, the energies released by their own revolutions and the power balance of the cold war have probably given them relative immunity to Soviet subversion for the coming decade. Perhaps in partial recognition of this, the Soviet Union has recently accepted the modernizing "socialist" movements of some of the Middle Eastern countries virtually as fraternal parties.

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Perhaps the main thrust of Soviet strategy will be aimed at attaining a position of influence among the opposition groups in the "pre-revolutionary" countries. In the past, the best opportunity offered to the Communists was in Iraq in 1958–59, following a period of rapid modernization and political repression under a régime with which the United States was identified. In the coming decade, Morocco and Iran may offer major opportunities. If either of these countries followed the violent road of Iraq in 1958–59, one result could be a dramatic change in the East-West balance in Asia and the Middle East. If this is indeed a Soviet goal, the best tactic for the Russians may be to sit tight while the mechanics of social modernization and political repression are allowed to work to create a proper atmosphere for future Soviet activity. This is probably what Khrushchev meant by his analogy of Iran falling like ripe fruit into the Russian grasp.

Like the area itself, American interests in the Middle East are dynamic and must be subjected to constant review. Obviously our interest in preventing Soviet intrusion remains. Indeed, it may confront us more urgently, if less directly, a decade hence if change comes violently in Iran and Morocco. Our need for bases will diminish, but our need for overflight rights in certain parts of the Middle East may increase. While the threshold of American tolerance of violence in the area will probably rise, the arms race, particularly between the U.A.R. and Israel, will command increasing attention. Prevention of the introduction of nuclear weapons is crucial not only to the well-being of the people in the area but to American national interests.

As education is spread even more widely, a meaningful basis will be created for workable representative government—though probably not liberal democracy. This will offer the only practical means of controlling more violent and dangerous aspects of Middle Eastern and North African politics. This tendency may not produce pro-American sentiments but will be of great value to the United States. And, as more of their people become "effectives," it seems likely that all the régimes will have to cater increasingly to aspirations which will require more rational and constructive use of power. If so, a decade hence there may be less foreign adventurism, particularly in those régimes where a new political synthesis has been achieved, and a more professional approach to economic problems than in the past decade.

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LOST GOALS IN AFRICA

By Arnold Rivkin

UNITED STATES policy in Africa has lost much of its credibility for a large part of the African continent. We have held out hope for more than we have, in the event, been able or willing to deliver. Often the promise of brave words was extravagant and unwise; but what is noticed is that it has not been matched by congruent acts. We have seemed to say one thing and do another. For example, to most of Africa the unqualified and warmly welcomed pronouncement of the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs—"The United States stands for self-determination in Africa"—appears to have been disregarded, even repudiated, in practice, with respect to what in African eyes is the acid test of our *bona fides*, the "white redoubts" in southern Africa. Again, in promising major and growing American aid for a "decade of development" we declared it to be "a primary necessity, opportunity and responsibility of the United States" to help make "a historic demonstration that economic growth and political democracy can go hand in hand" in building "free, stable, and self-reliant countries." This hope has now been substantially dissipated by the evolution of the U.S. aid syndrome in Africa—initial good intentions, objective standards, policies of rewarding merit, yielding to the pressures of the moment, the putting out of fires, the special concern for "bad boys," "problem children" and the crisis-prone, the needs of "containment," the special interest of allies, the U.S. dollar drain, etc.

So too, our promise of uncritical support for African aspirations and goals—as if all of Africa shared the same set of aspirations and goals: "What we want for Africa," said the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, "is what the Africans want for themselves." Its naïveté was exposed when it came up against the shattering realities of African diversity and division in the renewed Congo crisis. The inability of the Organization of African Unity to cope with the crisis only served to emphasize the lack of agreement in Africa on aspirations and goals. The aftermath of the Congolese "rescue operation" in November 1964 brought this message home to the United States. One part of Africa responded with what Ambassador Stevenson called an unprece-

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dented "torrent of abuse," "verbal violence," "hatred" and "malign accusations" against the United States. Another part silently acquiesced or openly approved the Belgian-American action.

There is a prevalent feeling among Africans that after a brief encounter the United States has lost interest and is having second thoughts about Africa. Have we and are we?

Africa more than any other area of the world was to assume a new importance under the Kennedy Administration; Africa was to be a "new frontier" for U.S. foreign policy. This was the promise of the President's unprecedented action in choosing for his very first appointment to the State Department a prominent political personality to be the Assistant Secretary dealing with African affairs, and of the accompanying announcement that in his Administration the new post would be "second to none" in importance. This initial promise was quickly reinforced.

First, the United States repudiated its apparent acquiescence to the Portuguese position that its African territories are constitutionally integral parts of Portugal, and substituted a policy looking toward self-determination for Angola. Ambassador Stevenson's warm support of the resolution calling for a U.N. investigation of conditions in Angola moved the Liberian representative on the Security Council to declare that Stevenson's words would "reverberate throughout Africa."

Then the President, in his first foreign-aid message to Congress, called for a new aid agency, with a mandate to mobilize U.S. and other free-world resources for a "decade of development" in the underdeveloped southern half of the globe. Significantly, from the point of view of Africa's new importance, within months of his message and before Congress could enact new legislation, President Kennedy dispatched a special mission to Nigeria to study its economy and its new development plan to determine the country's eligibility for a long-term U.S. aid commitment under the new criteria—long-term planning, absorptive capacity, self-help and social justice. The Nigerian mission, the first anywhere in the world under the new criteria, was soon followed by another to Tunisia. Two unprecedented long-term commitments resulted: $225 million for Nigeria's Six Year Plan and $180 million for Tunisia's Three Year Plan.

The "revolution of rising expectations" generated in Africa by these new departures in American policy was relatively short-

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lived. Early in 1963, the Chairman of the State Department's Advisory Council on African Affairs wrote: "By 1962 numerous African leaders who had welcomed Assistant Secretary Williams's visit in 1961 as a portent of great things to come were beginning to wonder whether the New Frontier was all public relations and no real help."[1]

Disillusion followed disappointment when the Administration seemed to contradict its dramatic new policy—self-determination for the people of Angola—by continuing to supply arms to Portugal. Similar feelings were aroused when the Administration seemed to hold back from applying its publicly stated policy of "self-determination in Africa" to the Republic of South Africa, even though the circumstances were different and even though it did eventually support a voluntary prohibition on shipment of arms to South Africa. Disillusion also resulted from the apparent acceptance by the Administration of the finding of the President's committee on U.S. foreign aid, the Clay Committee, that, notwithstanding our proclaimed policy of support for the revolutionary transformation under way in Africa from colonial dependency to national independence, Africa was an area of primary interest for the outgoing colonial powers and not for the United States. The Nigerian Ambassador to the United Nations, concerned about the implications of the Committee's finding for his own country and for Africa generally, hurried to Washington seeking assurances that Africa was indeed still a new frontier in U.S. foreign policy. He received assurance only that the Administration would continue honoring its pledge of support for Nigeria's Six Year Plan; nothing more could be said about future aid.

Nothing has since occurred under the Johnson Administration to reverse the downward spiral of African importance in American policy. In Washington, Africa now has the lowest priority of any area. This has always been more or less State Department practice in making foreign-policy decisions; now it has become a matter of national policy.

II

Africa has come to be an area of residual interest for the United States. It is not merely that former colonial powers are recognized as having the primary Western interest and responsibility; in

[1] Vernon McKay, "Africa in World Politics." New York: Harper and Row, 1963, p. 360.

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principle, this may be a quite defensible position. But in practice the principle has been pushed to extremes. It has meant that the interest of the United States comes into play only as "the court of last resort," when there are no acceptable alternatives available. Thus, it is only where the decolonization process has gone wrong, as in the cases of the Congo (Leopoldville) and Guinea, or where there have been special situations, such as those arising out of the abrupt liquidation of Italy's African Empire, or where there has been no colonial relationship, as in Liberia and Ethiopia, or where the needs were obviously beyond the capacity of the outgoing colonial power, as in Nigeria—it is only then that the United States has stepped in to play a major role. As circumstances have permitted, we have encouraged the former colonial power to remain or to come back into the picture.

In short, with the exceptions of Nigeria and Tunisia, where independent assessments of their importance and potential for development were made, the United States has allowed the quirks of history and the policies of other Western powers to impose a crazy quilt of special relations in Africa. As a matter of chance, some of these may coincide with a sound U.S. policy for Africa; others seem highly dubious. The incongruity of our position in Africa has been heightened by our attenuated relations with the many other African states which, not being "special cases," are not thrust into the orbit of active U.S. interest.

In the remaining colonial territories, inevitably and quite naturally, the United States has deferred to the colonial powers, the United Kingdom and Portugal. The problem, however, has become one of limits. At what juncture do these territories of "free-world nations" become a matter of direct concern, even responsibility, for the leading free-world nation? American policy has been equivocal.

In State Department practice as well as policy, the notion of residual interest operates. For the most part, major decisions of African policy are determined, not in the African Bureau of the State Department, but in the European Bureau and, in so far as the United Arab Republic is concerned, in the Near Eastern and South Asian Bureau. Certainly this is true of U.S. policy toward Portuguese Africa and Rhodesia. But more surprising, policies toward independent African states are also shaped in the European Bureau. The sensitivities of President de Gaulle, as judged by the European Bureau, rather than an independent assessment

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of the U.S. national interest in various French-speaking countries, is likely to be the decisive factor. Thus, for some three years the United States severely limited its relationship with Guinea, even though Guinea had broken with France in achieving its independence. Notwithstanding the existence of the very situation which should have triggered active U.S. interest in Guinea, our respect for French primacy and de Gaulle's wishes prevented our taking action. Only after Guinea withdrew from the tightening Soviet embrace in 1962 did we take an active interest there, partly because the containment policy demanded that we take preëmptive action to forestall the elements in the *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* which were seeking a rapprochement with the Soviet Union or an expanding relationship with Communist China, and partly because de Gaulle had relented enough in his attitude toward Guinea to allow the United States to enter the scene.

The policy of containment of the Soviet Union and Communist China is indeed a principal reason for retaining even a residual interest in Africa, so as to avoid the possibility of a "dangerous vacuum" where a colonial power has failed to make a reasonable accommodation with a former colony. The desire to deny, in very different circumstances, the Congo, Guinea and Somalia to Soviet or Communist Chinese hegemony has certainly been a prime consideration in our policy toward these three countries. Similarly, fear that failure of the colonial power to take adequate steps to avoid crisis situations which the Communist powers could exploit has influenced us to go as far as we have in our policies toward Rhodesia and Portuguese Africa.

As with any policy depending on the actions of others, the United States has found itself on the horns of more than one dilemma. For example, the policy of residual interest has thrust the United States into support of Ethiopia, and the policies of residual interest and containment into support of Somalia, while the two states are engaged in an undeclared but none the less violent war. Similarly, the policy of containment has led us to provide large-scale agricultural commodity assistance to the United Arab Republic, and the policies of residual interest and containment have led to our principal commitment in Africa, support of the Congo—where the U.A.R. has long been engaged in attempting to overthrow the central government by one means or another. I cite these cases not because our action in either of them was necessarily wrong, but to underscore the difficulties of

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relying too much on the policies of third countries in determining our own.

The expansion of the policy of containment by word and action in Viet Nam and the Dominican Republic has far-reaching implications for Africa. Thus, Castroite Cuba's role in the Zanzibar revolution of January 1964 not only illustrates the varied character of the Communist drive to export revolution to Africa, but also suggests the scope of the "containment" that may be required in Africa. So, too, the abortive but nearly successful Communist attempt in the Sudan to capture control of the revolution which ousted the Abboud military government. If the tougher policies we have been following elsewhere mean that we cannot accept a Communist takeover in Africa either, then we can hardly afford to avoid involvement until the last moment. By an act of self-abnegation, we cannot remain aloof from Africa, except as determined by the actions of other powers, and at the same time be on call to put out fires on a continent where political instability is endemic.

Our unwillingness to take more initiative in Africa is all the more remarkable because it is the one area of the world in which the United States has more freedom of action and fewer constraints on its foreign policy-making than in any other. The Administration seems to have accepted as applicable to Africa the Kennan-Lippmann thesis on the limitations of U.S. capacity to influence the direction of affairs in distant areas of the world. Yet, remote as it is from Communist China and the Soviet Union, Africa does not present the geopolitical difficulties we find in dealing with crises in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. We are not limited by regional (and related bilateral) military alliances comparable to NATO, CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS and the O.A.S. defense systems. In Africa, also, we should be comparatively free from pressures arising out of commercial interests; Africa accounts for less than 5 percent of our total foreign trade and investment.

One result of our policy of self-abnegation is that the desire of the newly independent states to widen their relations and dilute the influence of their former colonial masters is being ignored, and the conditions for their continuing dependency are being nurtured. This promotes the image of neo-colonialism and African "stooge governments" ripe for "national liberation," as propagated by Communist China and radical nationalist

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African states such as Ghana. The fewer alternatives the new states are offered to diversify their political and economic relations within the free world, the more they are forced either to preserve old patterns of dependency or to "swing to the Left" into Communist orbits. Our experience in Latin America provides some apposite lessons on what can happen when an outworn relationship is persisted in too long.

In conflict with our traditional policies, we are also contributing to the resurrection of the outmoded concept of great-power spheres. Walter Lippmann advanced the view that the French interest in Gabon is comparable to the "vital interest" hegemony which he concedes to Communist China in Southeast Asia and to the United States in Latin America. Interestingly enough, President de Gaulle, while apparently accepting the idea of French and Communist Chinese spheres of influence, does not, judging from his tour of South America and his condemnation of U. S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, seem to accept our sphere in Latin America.

Our overall attitude toward Africa has also limited our relationship with many of the African states whose foreign policies have most often coincided with our own, particularly on the recurring Congo crisis, but also on other issues of special importance to us, such as the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. Ever since France's recognition of Communist China, a number of French-speaking African states (Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey, Senegal, the Central African Republic and Mauritania), which we have recognized as remaining in the French sphere of influence, have also been reversing their position on that issue. Now, with half the population of India, Africa has almost one-third of the membership of the United Nations. Reasonable or not, this means that Africa can significantly influence the balance of world political power. In fact, the U.N. vote, which for the last several years has pivoted on the ballots of the African states, will probably go against us this year or next if this new French-inspired trend continues. Only Communist China's ineptitude so far in her relations with the new African states has stemmed the turning tide.

III

What could be done to restore the promise and the credibility of U. S. policy in Africa? The point of departure must be to do

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away with the principal causes for past contradictions and inconsistencies. First, the United States should abandon the policy of having a merely residual interest in Africa and recognize that with 36 independent states (excluding South Africa) in existence and another three or four in the offing, the continent can no longer be viewed as of only derivative interest to the United States. We should make it clear that we have a coherent African policy, and not simply improvised positions deriving from our NATO relationships and our cold-war involvement.

This means that we must cease to pose African policy questions in terms of a dilemma: pleasing African states or pleasing our NATO allies. Each must be considered, but neither exclusively or even preponderantly. Our NATO allies are no more homogeneous in their policies and interests than are the African states. On a few issues, however, such as independence for the Portuguese territories, there is a consensus among African states. Because the issues on which Africans agree are so few, those issues take on added importance. The question then becomes one of means. If in keeping with our policy of self-determination for Africa we think it right to support steps in that direction in Portuguese Africa, how can we take effective steps with the least damaging effects for Portugal and NATO? Certainly, several of our NATO allies have time and again taken positions and followed policies in conflict with our own with respect to Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Viet Nam, Communist China, the test-ban treaty, trade with the Soviet bloc, etc., without the United States pulling the NATO house down. So too, in Africa, we have long supported self-determination for African colonies without the United Kingdom, France or Belgium tearing the alliance apart. Portugal may react differently. That would seem to be the risk we must run—but it is certainly a lesser one than compromising our policy of support for self-determination and alienating much of Africa. In any event, NATO's present disarray, centering as it does on France, is so basic that, although any further dissension in the alliance would be undesirable, the disaffection of Portugal would hardly seem crucial to the alliance's future.

Third, the United States must recognize that on a continent "ripe for revolution" in the judgment of the world's leading practitioner, the policy of active containment is neither appropriate nor feasible. Intervention of the type practiced in

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Viet Nam and the Dominican Republic to forestall Communist-inspired "wars of national liberation" is obviously out of the question. Yet this is what the containment policy suggests, if France, the United Kingdom or Belgium should falter in their determination or capacity to preclude Soviet or Communist Chinese penetration and takeovers. Our posture in the Congo has not been too far removed from active intervention, and if the situation should deteriorate again, what then?

Africa now has a momentum of its own in world affairs which cannot be disregarded. Withdrawal and then sudden thrust by the United States in response to one crisis or another has all the disadvantages of both policies. Our sudden bursts of energy to counter Communist initiatives simply distort our basic interest in the development of the African states themselves by exaggerating cold-war considerations. They also put in question the credibility of our oft-stated interest in the development of politically independent and economically viable states, free to determine their own external policies.

Thus, it is to the positive aspects of policy that we must address ourselves. How can we help the new states to consolidate their independence? This is the best sort of containment and, as a practical matter, the only sort conceivable for most of Africa.

For all new African countries, the achievement of formal international sovereignty is but the beginning of their travail. They all have to build states, nations, market economies and modern societies. In the words of the Assistant AID Administrator for Africa: "The newly independent countries of Africa are today at a critical stage of development. The courses of action taken now by the United States may profoundly influence their political, economic and social structures for generations to come. It is clearly in our interest to seize the opportunity to help the relatively new and emerging nations of Africa to develop along constructive lines."[2] The alternative is unacceptable—endemic instability, bush-league arms races, brush-fire wars, Latin American-style militarism, despotism, declining living standards and an ever greater gulf between the developed Western and the underdeveloped African states.

In the broad political arena, we should reassert the basic U.S. interest in the emergence and development of stable and viable

[2] E. C. Hutchinson, "U.S. Economic Aid to Africa, 1960–1964," in *Africa Report*, December 1964, p. 8.

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independent states in all of Africa, and affirm our intention to help in the process. The United States must also redeem its unqualified pledge of support for self-determination in Africa, making it clear that we do not draw a line at the Zambezi or Limpopo Rivers so as to exclude from this pledge the white-dominated areas in southern Africa. Failure to find an orderly and peaceful route to independence for the remaining colonial territories in Africa, and the inevitably ensuing violence, would be—in fact already is being—attributed to U.S. policy, or lack of it.

Finally, the most intractable problem of all—the Republic of South Africa. Here, a determined white government, with the considerable economic and military resources of a rapidly developing country, has committed itself to a policy which despite its rationale of separate development for Africans does in fact deny the non-white majority the right of self-determination. The United States can rescind its pledge of support for self-determination as inapplicable in the context of an already independent country. Lenin's ambivalence on the nationality question, favoring self-determination in Russia and elsewhere in Europe but denying its applicability once a "socialist" government comes to power, offers a precedent. Such a tactic on the part of the United States would be viewed as skeptically in Africa as Lenin's reversal is in the United States.

Having condemned apartheid and voluntarily imposed a ban on arms shipment to South Africa, the United States has accepted the need to bring pressure to bear to induce South Africa to change its policy. The basic decision of principle having been taken, what remains is to find that combination of persuasion, inducement and coercion which would be both effective and acceptable. This will not be an easy or quick task. An opportunity for action may be offered by the World Court in the case now before it, where South Africa is charged with violation of its League of Nations mandate over South West Africa in applying apartheid to the mandated territory. In the event of an adverse ruling, South Africa may be confronted with the dilemma of accepting the decision, with all that would entail for the practice of apartheid in South Africa itself, or defying the Court and laying a new basis for the U.N. to assume jurisdiction and take action. This would leave the United States and other Western countries with considerably less discretion about what their response should be to African pressures for applying sanctions.

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Another problem of concern to the United States is the mounting overt and covert flow of arms, munitions and military missions to Africa—for national armed forces as well as for "liberation forces." Means must be found to achieve "preventive disarmament" in Africa, not only to increase its internal security but to avoid the increasing diversion of local resources from development to military purposes. In practice, much of the flow of arms for "liberation forces" has been diverted to other destinations and other ends. The recent incidents in Kenya involving Chinese Communist arms are illustrative. On two occasions large shipments of arms theoretically destined for Congolese and Mozambique rebel forces were transshipped from Tanzania and found hidden or intercepted in suspicious circumstances in western Kenya. These discoveries carried the unmistakable implication of a threat by disaffected internal factions to overthrow the Kenyan government with outside support. As a result of Kenya's suspicion that her two partners in the East African common market, Tanzania and Uganda, were involved in such a plot, the prospects of maintaining the common market and expanding it into an East African federation, something which the United States greatly favors, is vastly diminished. In another case, the Sudan's willingness to serve as a corridor for Communist arms shipments to rebel forces in neighboring countries came to a sudden halt because too many shipments were falling into the hands of disaffected Sudanese elements, particularly in the rebellious southern provinces.

The increased flow of arms for national forces also presents a danger. Soviet support of a substantial build-up of Somali armed forces has had a direct impact on the two neighboring states with which Somalia has intermittently been warring—Ethiopia, which receives its arms primarily from the United States, and Kenya, which receives its arms primarily from the United Kingdom. Raising the capacity of the three states to make war can only enlarge the already dangerous threat to African peace, drag in cold-war issues and divert scarce resources of three of the poorest African states.

Would not Africa be a good place to start arms-control and disarmament agreements? It took six years for the military régime in the Sudan to be replaced, and then only by extra-constitutional means. The aftermath has been disorder, violence and political instability reminiscent of the very situation that General

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Abboud set out to erase with his military coup in 1958. Does Africa have to repeat the Latin American pattern of successive military coups to effect political change?

It seems clear by now that the independent African states are not going to be in a position to "liberate" by force of arms the Republic of South Africa or Mozambique and Angola. It is also apparent that the Western powers cannot supply even limited kinds of arms to South Africa and Portugal which would not be useful for internal repressive purposes. Simple realism suggests the need for an explicit moratorium on arms for Africa and the effective policing of it by agreement with the African states. Failure to come to grips with this critical issue makes nonsense of so much external economic aid, which in practice is either directly or indirectly diverted to military ends. Unnecessary arms expenditure also undercuts whatever added political stability might be hoped for as a result of economic development. Moreover, in the context of Africa-wide arms control, a total ban on arms and munitions to South Africa and Portugal would become more acceptable. In view of African insistence on declaring the continent a "denuclearized zone" and urging disarmament on the major powers, it would seem appropriate for the African states themselves to initiate steps toward achieving a moratorium on arms shipments to Africa, and by doing so to lend credence to their other disarmament policies. This would put pressure on the Western powers to agree and considerable leverage could then be brought to bear on the Communist powers.

Whatever relevancy schemes for peace-keeping by small nations or regional organizations may have in some areas of the world, it seems clear that in this decade such proposals are largely irrelevant for Africa. Individual African states do not have the capacity in being and it seems of doubtful wisdom deliberately to create it. In any event, whenever the question has arisen, the African states have been unable to agree on the desirability of creating a regional peace-keeping force. Some fear it would mean interference in their internal affairs; others that it would mean support of the status quo and the preclusion of change; and still others that it would mean domination by larger or more aggressive states. And so far, African states have preferred to look elsewhere than to one another for assistance in putting down rebellions—in East Africa, to the United Kingdom, and, in French-speaking Africa, to France.

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The Organization of African Unity is structurally incapable of playing such a role at present or in the foreseeable future. With its members deeply divided on fundamental principles, such as the sanctity of inherited boundaries and non-interference in one another's internal affairs, the organization has not been in a position to play any military role at all. In the Congo affair, ever since the withdrawal of the U.N. forces, the O.A.U. has not only been unable to carry out a peace-keeping role; it has also been unable to prevent its minority faction of radical nationalist states and their sometime associates from providing active support and bases for rebel groups. Equally, the O.A.U. has been unable to face up to the problems of guerrilla warfare in the southern Sudan, the Watusi refugees and émigrés and their periodic incursions into Rwanda, the continuing quarrels and intermittent violence between Dahomey and Niger, Ghana and Upper Volta, Ghana and Togo, Somalia and Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya, etc. To wish upon the O.A.U. tasks it is not yet ready to assume is merely to impair further its limited effectiveness. Our expectations for it have been unrealistic—as we should have known from our experience with peace-keeping in Latin America.

IV

In the economic field no less than in the political arena we must do away with the incongruities which have characterized our economic assistance programs in Africa if these are to play a consistent and effective role in support of U.S. policies. At the outset, we need to reassess the size and composition of our economic assistance to Africa. As the continent receiving the smallest segment of our aid (less than 10 percent), Africa deserves more if we are to give credence to our policy of support for African development. A higher proportion of aid for economic development (as opposed to "political" purposes) needs to be coupled with a renewed attempt to apply the Kennedy aid concepts, including the conscious provision and programming of technical assistance so as to enlarge the capacity of the African states to absorb external aid effectively.

We should also renew our attempts to achieve the mobilization and coördination of aid to Africa from the free world, to make such aid more effective, increase its availability and improve the terms on which it is made available. Free-world aid to Africa, hav-

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ing reached a plateau, has in the last two years actually started to decline. Our own economic aid (excluding surplus food) reflects this downward trend. The appropriation requested by the President for the fiscal year 1966 is almost $100 million less than was obligated in 1962, the high-water mark of U.S. aid to Africa.

The decline has set in just as Africa has begun to move forward and to increase its capacity to absorb capital. There are signs, too, of growing African interest in rationalizing and coordinating the flow of external aid. At the meeting of the Economic Commission for Africa late in 1964, Mr. Robert Gardiner, the Executive Secretary, called for "a Marshall Plan, Colombo Plan or Alliance for Progress" for Africa, and suggested the possibility of the founding of an African Council for Economic Cooperation. The new African Development Bank, which came into operation this year with a nominal capitalization of $250,000,000, will also undoubtedly be seeking outside resources. In view of our contributions to the Inter-American Development Bank and our proffered offers to the proposed Asian Development Bank, it is difficult to see how we can refrain from making significant contributions to the African Development Bank.

It would be in the interest of both the United States and Europe if the heavy dependence of their respective "client states" in Latin America and Africa could be progressively diversified and shared. Then, a change in the relationship to a former colonial power would not be felt as a wrenching divorce but as a tolerable if regrettable separation.

We also need to rationalize our aid programs and to adhere to objective criteria, thus eliminating the anomalies which make us seem to reward the trouble-makers and take friends for granted. If aid is to flow to the U.A.R., Algeria, Guinea and others in the form of surplus agricultural commodities, "supporting assistance" and "emergency aid"—without reference to their economic performance and heavy allocation of resources to non-development purposes—then provision should be made to compensate the states deserving of aid by objective economic standards, and to reward, or at any rate not discriminate against, those which are pro-Western in their "non-alignment" rather than pro-Soviet or pro-Communist Chinese.

From the receiving country's point of view, all American aid, regardless of the particular pocket it comes from, has the effect of enlarging that country's total resources. If a country needs

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food, it makes little difference whether it receives food or "development dollars" which enable it to buy food—or, if in budgetary straits, it receives "supporting assistance" or "development dollars." It can always shift its resources around as economic (and political) conditions require. Africans have not been slow to grasp this point. Nigeria, which is frequently cited by American officials as the largest African recipient of U.S. economic aid, has felt compelled to point out that, measured in either aggregate or per capita terms, any number of African countries have received greater assistance if contributions emanating from all U.S. aid pockets are taken into account.

Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria and the U.A.R., all radical nationalist states whose economic performance leaves much to be desired and who are prone to allocate resources to non-productive prestige purposes and questionable foreign adventures, have each received disproportionately more economic aid than Nigeria, the country we have singled out as one of the two most deserving African countries under the Kennedy economic development criteria. During U.S. fiscal years 1960–1964, Ghana, Algeria and the U.A.R., with populations of 7.4 million, 10.8 million and 28.7 million respectively, each received as much or more U.S. economic aid (without regard for which U.S. aid pocket it came from) than Nigeria, whose population of 55.5 million is larger than the combined population of the three. During the same period, Guinea and Mali, with a combined population of 8 million, received about one-half as much economic assistance as Nigeria. In addition, such special cases as Morocco, Ethiopia, Liberia and the Congo, with a combined population considerably smaller than Nigeria's, have each received as much or more U.S. economic aid (to say nothing of military) than Nigeria. Yet none of these states has been singled out by the United States as specially deserving of "development" aid.

The U.A.R. has received its large share of our economic assistance to Africa in the face of the U.S. Government's own judgment that that country "has followed a number of political policies which are not to our liking and contrary to our interests": for example, diverting its resources to aid the Congolese rebels, maintaining 50,000 troops in Yemen, conducting campaigns to coerce Libya into ousting the U.S. airbase, and evidencing hostility toward Tunisia for proposing negotiations in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

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In contrast, the 13 original members of The Common Organization of African and Malagasy States (O.C.A.M.), which have on the whole been most vigorous in their support of the O.A.U. principle of non-interference and most articulate in condemning external interference in their internal affairs by Ghana "and other states," have received considerably less economic aid than the five most interventionist states. Indeed, since 1960 Ghana alone has received more U.S. aid than the combined total going to all 13 O.C.A.M. states. Guinea has received more during this period than the combined total going to the two most important O.C.A.M. states, the Ivory Coast and Senegal. And almost as if to add insult to injury, the United States over the last two years has withdrawn its aid missions from the O.C.A.M. states and administers aid to them, such as it is, from Washington.

In sum, then, the United States must redress the imbalance in its foreign policies by refocusing its view of American interests in Africa, not by downgrading our traditional interest in Europe or by denying the reality of the cold war, but rather by upgrading the importance of Africa, formulating policies responsive to African realities and striking a reasonable balance among our multiple national interests. The United States also needs to rationalize its political and economic policies in Africa, to make them consistent and credible and thus responsive to our national interest in the development of stable and viable African states.

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SPAIN AND THE E.E.C.

By Laureano López Rodó

THE European Economic Community now has such a considerable importance in world affairs that its activities are watched everywhere with great interest. Its decisions have repercussions that affect practically all nations, and Spain is no exception. Until recently, she had remained a little aloof from the rest of Europe, but now has decided to recognize her European destiny even though she knows that this will entail no small effort and sacrifice.

As part of this effort, conversations have been started in Brussels, on the initiative of the Spanish Government, in order to study the problems faced by the Spanish economy as a result of the operation of the Common Market. On February 9 last, the E.E.C. authorities presented a questionnaire to the Spanish Government asking specifically about important aspects of the relations between the Six and Spain which had been studied in a Spanish report of December 9, 1964. The Spanish Government's answer to the questionnaire was handed to the E.E.C. in June.

This development has encouraged me to comment on the positions which will determine the outcome of the dialogue between Spain and the E.E.C. Spain, of course, would receive a boost for the accelerated economic development in which she is now engaged; and the E.E.C. would also receive some advantages. In any case, it would seem to me unrealistic for the E.E.C. to reject Spain's petitions and proceed with a commercial and agricultural policy which completely ignored the problems it poses for the Spanish economy.[1]

It is no secret that life in Spain is undergoing a real transformation, especially since 1959. I believe that year will be a milestone in Spanish history. Nor have the changes occurring in the world, and especially in Europe, been less important or slower. The most visible manifestation of them has perhaps been the desire to unite, to integrate, as a means of solving increasingly numerous and complex problems of general policy.

[1] One example of such a damaging policy was the agreement of the Council of Ministers of the Common Market last December, proposing modifications to the regulations covering fruits and vegetables which would apply certain fees on imports from third countries. Since Spanish exports of fruits and vegetables to the E.E.C. are over 70 and 60 percent respectively of Spain's total exports of those commodities, the harm caused is obvious.

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Spain is enthusiastically readying herself to face this reality. She sees that the idea of European integration represents a formidable challenge for her as well as a gamut of rich possibilities.

It is a challenge in as much as life in relationship to countries with a more advanced economic structure will require Spain to make a greater effort than has been normal in the past and to modify substantially the somewhat closed-in mentality that has dominated our economic decision-making. In fact, here lies the most basic problem faced by the Spanish economy in the process of its integration into wider geographic areas. Since the end of the 19th century, the Spanish economic structure has been taking shape without connection with other economies. Production was aimed almost exclusively at the domestic market. Moreover, this was not very large owing to the low per capita income, which was not sufficient for industries to benefit extensively from the economies of large-scale production and from foreign sales. Further, the sources of industrial finance were also insufficient.

All of this, together with other reasons which need not be discussed here, determined a level of productivity and costs which was in many cases very different from that in advanced countries, especially in the United States and Western Europe.

To adjust the whole structure of Spanish production to the degree of competitiveness that exists in the E.E.C. is going to require a process of intensive capitalization. This will in turn pose the problem of eliminating some industries and will require a new approach to our production policy in that it will probably imply a change in the priorities among various sectors. The opportunities opened up by the larger markets and the need to face tougher competition will give new life to industries which could not previously exist, but will weaken others whose modernization would involve greater efforts than are worthwhile.

Consequently, it will be logical for the Spanish authorities who are carrying on conversations with the Common Market to suggest special conditions. The details of these conditions will be determined as the talks go along. For the same reason, also, the Development Plan Agency in its first four-year plan pays particular attention to integration. The best way to do so is to foster the development of those sectors in the Spanish economy which could enjoy a comparative advantage, or those others

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that can have the greatest impact on the general level of costs and productivity, such as education and public utilities. In other words, anything that tends toward increasing the competitive ability of the Spanish economy (through a reduction of costs and an increase of productivity), and giving it a higher degree of flexibility, will work in favor of a possible association in the future. Spanish economic policy must always take account of the fact that a progressive lowering of tariffs and liberalization of commerce, a joint agricultural policy, and a gradual unification of fiscal, monetary and social policies, can be effected only by making the economy more competitive—in other words, by reducing the general level of costs.

But integration also presents our economy with rich possibilities in the sense that, according to strict economic reasoning, the development which started in a coördinated and formal way at the beginning of 1964 will benefit highly from coöperation with the E.E.C. countries. Interdependence between the Spanish economy and that of the E.E.C. countries exists to an important degree. Spain can benefit from it, but the E.E.C. should not disdain it either.[2]

The series of measures adopted by the Spanish Government in 1959 amounted to a sharp turn in Spanish traditional economic policy in that they passed beyond considering domestic markets and forces as the basis for growth and looked to the outside world. An end was put to deficit financing, which had traditionally been an important cause of inflationary tensions. The rate of exchange was made more realistic (60 pesetas to the dollar). Above all, the doors were opened to a free inflow of foreign products and capital. Along with this liberalization toward the outside world there came a full domestic liberalization, and together they gave the economic system the necessary flexibility for an adequate distribution of resources and for bringing prices and costs closer to potential supply and demand

[2] This seems to me to be the way the average Spaniard feels. It is also the way I feel personally as Minister Without Portfolio in charge of the Development Plan and as a citizen wholly responsible for his own opinions in the political and economic fields. I emphasize this in order to make clear (contrary to observations in an article by Hugh Thomas in *Foreign Affairs* of October 1962) that the fact that I am a member of the Catholic association *Opus Dei* does not in any way imply that I have to accept directives in those fields or, indeed, of any other kind. *Opus Dei* as a purely religious association is devoid of any preoccupation other than to perfect Christian life among its members, who belong to all races, nations, social classes, and professional activities, and who remain totally free in their personal opinions and decisions.

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in the country. At present, 3,114 items in our customs lists have been freed of quotas, and in 1964 over 60 percent of our total imports came from the freed list. True, the degree of liberalization of the Spanish economy is not as high as we might wish it to be; however, it is not the absolute situation which is most important but rather the accelerated rate of liberalization over the last few years. The latest list of liberalized commodities, published last May, includes 76 tariff items freed of quotas.

These measures, plus others of minor importance, helped by some extraneous factors such as tourism, the emigration of Spanish workers to Europe and the generally quite prosperous situation of almost all the European countries, have determined high rates of growth for our G.N.P. (10.5 percent in 1961, 8.8 percent in 1962, 13.1 percent in 1963, and 7.1 percent in 1964, at constant prices). There has also been a considerable increase in investment, from 20 percent of the G.N.P. in 1961 to 24 percent in 1964. Our balance of payments has developed satisfactorily, with a balance in our favor of $303,500,000 in 1964. As a result, our gold and foreign exchange reserves in May of this year were $1,287,900,000 (including our gold-reserve position at the International Monetary Fund). Finally, an important increase of productivity—6.7 percent per active person—has taken place in the economy as a whole.

These favorable developments (from a quantitative as well as a qualitative point of view) have prepared a solid basis on which to plan economic development according to the current mentality and ideology in the Western World. The First Economic and Social Development Plan for Spain was inaugurated on January 1, 1964, to cover a period of four years.

The new Spanish policy of economic development sets "progressive integration into the world economy" as one of its fundamental objectives, and serious study has been—and is being—given to the problems that will have to be faced and their solutions. This progressive integration, and especially the closer economic relations with the E.E.C., will imply coexistence with other economies in which the national income is substantially higher. In order to narrow this difference of incomes we have to achieve a rate of growth higher than theirs and this will require structural adjustments. Higher rates of growth and adjustments of structure are two aspects of a single problem (the increase of productivity), since an improvement in the latter will mean

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automatically achieving the former. And achieving a higher rate of growth will facilitate the adjustments.

Concerning the rates of growth, if we take the figures given in the E.E.C. study, "Perspectives of Economic Development in the E.E.C. from 1960 to 1970," we find the G.N.P. will rise faster in Spain than in the average Common Market country. The Spanish Development Plan foresees an annual cumulative rise in G.N.P. of 6 percent (this goal has been surpassed in 1964) while the most favorable projections made by the E.E.C. are higher than 5 percent only in the case of Italy. For the rest of the countries it varies between 4 and 5 percent. However, in 1964 Italy's development suffered a slowdown, with a rate of increase of only 2.5 percent.

On the other hand, the inclusion of the Spanish economy in the E.E.C. will most certainly facilitate many of these developments because the productive factors on the two sides are to a certain degree complementary. While the E.E.C. has excess capital, which can be profitably invested in our country, and a high level of know-how, Spain is deficient in these two factors of production, at least in the measure necessary to achieve the best possible rate of growth.

Moreover, there is a labor shortage in the E.E.C. countries and a relative abundance in Spain. Salaries in Europe have risen sharply as a result, increasing the gap between salaries in our country and in the E.E.C. This has produced a strong emigration of Spanish laborers during the last few years. Part of this emigration would probably have stayed in our country had we had the necessary volume of capital to give them better opportunities and more security and, as a result of higher productivity, bigger wages.

The fact that production factors are complementary makes it possible for us to talk about a commercial exchange rather than a commercial interdependency. In the first place, the balance of payments between our country and the Common Market results in a substantial deficit for us: in 1964, our imports amounted to $811,841,000 from that area and our exports, $371,432,000. In 1963, we imported $656,523,000 from the Six and exported $278,758,000. In the second place, the percentage of trade with the Common Market in our total foreign trade is very high. In the years 1961, 1962, 1963 and 1964, the Common Market absorbed 37.7, 37.5, 37.9 and 38.9 percent respectively

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of our exports. The Six were the origin of 26.1, 29.8, 33.5 and 35.9 percent of our imports for the same four years. In the third place, while those imports are essential for our economy, our exports are much less important for the E.E.C. countries.

Finally, our exports not only have to pass the common tariff applicable to all external imports into the E.E.C. area, but also because there are countries in a special position—that is, associated with the E.E.C. or having a commercial agreement with it (Greece, Turkey, Algeria, Tunisia, Israel, etc.)—some of our competitors enjoy special privileges when they export to the Common Market the same products which we export. With the progressive and unavoidable adjustment of our tariffs, many sectors of our economy will face serious problems.

It is important, however, to stress a few aspects which the E.E.C. should take into consideration in its own interest. The Spanish economy, with very good prospects of expansion, is a valuable client for the E.E.C. countries, not in the sense that their exports to us are an important percentage of their total exports, but because our total purchases abroad are growing and European firms find here an expanding and safe market. This is a fact that cannot be ignored. It should be noted that while our total imports grew at the rate of 51.43, 43.66 and 24.57 percent for the periods 1960–61, 1961–62, and 1962–63 respectively, and 15.5 percent in 1964, imports from the E.E.C. countries grew at the rates of 56.93, 63.95 and 40.33 percent respectively for the same periods, and 23.7 percent in 1964. This proves we are an expanding market, helped by our policies of liberalization and development, and are becoming a good outlet for Common Market products.

It nevertheless will be difficult for us to increase the quantity or quality of our exports unless we achieve certain minimum levels of capital formation. Capital is relatively abundant in the E.E.C., and scarce in Spain. The provisions of the first Spanish Economic Development Plan (1964–1967) project a high rate of growth in gross capital formation. The volume will be $3,916,000 in 1967, or 24.4 percent of the G.N.P. (in 1962 it was $2,833,000, and 22 percent of the G.N.P.). The financing of planned investments will require a volume of capital that will be difficult to obtain entirely from our savings. For that reason, the Plan counts on a net foreign capital contribution rising gradually from $280,000,000 in 1964 to $387,000,000 in 1967 (this is in addition

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to the transfers, composed mostly of remittances from Spanish emigrants in the E.E.C. countries).

Foreign capital, especially from the Common Market countries, has traditionally played an important role in our economic history. Various French, Belgian, German and other European firms have long been established in Spain. Those firms would, no doubt, welcome a closer relation with the Common Market, since they could widen their activities as well as serve as a source of contact and encouragement for other firms wishing to expand their markets. The liberalizing measures adopted since 1959 have already prompted a rising trend of incoming investment; thus the net inflow of long-term private capital into Spain was $249,750,000 in 1962, $236,110,000 in 1963, and $299,000,000 in 1964.

Such, broadly speaking, are the prospects for closer relations between the Spanish economy and the E.E.C. It is true, of course, that Spain would be the one to benefit most from this association. But it is equally true that the E.E.C. would not be damaged. It is not surprising, then, that Spanish economic policy should be oriented more and more toward producing the circumstances which, without detriment to our own evolution, will make possible the coöperation we all desire.

The first Spanish Plan for Economic and Social Development emphasizes the efforts to achieve the greatest economic expansion while maintaining stability. It also encourages a fair distribution of income and strives to achieve more flexibility in our economic system and its integration into the world economy. In order to reach these aims, the structure of our production will be modified; investments will be increased, selected and coördinated; exports will be expanded; a flexible and competitive market will be promoted; productivity will be increased; the financial system will be improved; and regional development will be promoted.

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THE COMING CRISIS IN IRAN

By Hossein Mahdavy

THREE years ago, the Iranian Government declared that the country would undergo a White Revolution, the purpose of which would be to modernize Iran and render any revolution from below unnecessary. Of the revolutionary measures proclaimed, land reform figured as the most important.

To appreciate the significance of land reform and the circumstances that led to this abrupt change of posture on the part of the régime in Iran, we must look back briefly on the last decade or so. When the Shah decided to participate in the overthrow of the national government of Dr. Mohammed Mosaddeq in 1953, he could hardly have underestimated the risks involved in challenging the most popular government Iran had known in its recent history. The underlying malaise, characteristic of the period of the Shah's personal rule which followed, stems from the difficulty of "normalizing" a political situation which does not originate in the consent of the majority of the governed and whose legitimacy is being continuously challenged by the nationalist forces loyal to Mosaddeq.

The opposition forces so far have been concentrated mainly in cities and towns, which comprise about 30 percent of Iran's 22,000,000 people. A small ruling oligarchy, which had supported the Shah in the overthrow of Mosaddeq, had to rely heavily on the army and the security police (*Savak*) to control a rapidly increasing middle- and lower-class urban population. Merchants, shopkeepers, civil servants, intellectuals, students and workers comprise the bulk of those who, under the leadership of the National Front,[1] have presented and continue to present a formidable opposition to the régime.

The real significance of land reform in Iran must be appraised as a political measure on the part of the government to gain the allegiance of the "neutral" and still inarticulate peasantry to offset the growing opposition in urban areas. At the time of the reform, Iran was not faced with any particular agricultural

[1] The National Front is not a unified political party, but an alliance of a number of political parties and groups with separate organizations and platforms. The eclectic and complex nature of this vast but often suppressed political movement has sometimes led foreign observers to believe that the Front itself is an independent political party which is poorly organized and lacks social and economic doctrines.

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difficulties, nor had the inherent peasant problem come into the open. In fact the government's Third Five Year Development Plan, which began in September 1962, had not envisaged a land-reform program even in the remote future, much less allocated any resources for its implementation. The pace of land reform in Iran was dictated mainly by the social and political upheavals following the economic crisis of 1960–1961, which left the Iranian economy in a depression till the end of 1964.

Between 1953 and 1960, while all political activity by the opposition was being suppressed, the government declared economic development to be the cure-all for every major problem that Iran faced. There was some ground for optimism. Oil revenues were increasing at a rapid rate: from $18.5 million in 1954 to nearly $290 million in 1960. The régime had also received during the same period more than $900 million worth of U. S. military and economic grants. The total outstanding external debt of Iran had also increased from $10 million in 1955 to about $500 million in 1960, with the United States as the major lender (about $250 million). In addition, the banking system had been allowed to expand credit to the public sector at the average rate of 32 percent per annum between 1955 and 1960.

While the short-lived glut of resources lasted, a race to increase all categories of expenditures by various public agencies rapidly gained momentum. The private sector too, taking its lead from the government, increased its investment, especially in construction and industry. Amid a great deal of waste, corruption and mismanagement that is usually associated with such economic bonanzas, the economy grew at a rate of perhaps 5 to 6 percent per annum.

By 1958, however, inflation and balance-of-payments difficulties were beginning to create serious problems. Except for a 40 percent reduction in some of the more essential development programs, no severe measures were taken to check the oncoming crisis. By mid-1960, when it became clear that danger was imminent, the government, rather than check its own spending spree, turned to the U. S. Government, the International Monetary Fund and other international agencies for help. But none of these potential lenders was prepared to assist unless Iran adopted a program of economic stabilization.

The Economic Stabilization Program which went into operation in the fall of 1960 called for drastic reductions in the rate of

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expansion of internal borrowing, non-essential imports and current government expenditures. The brakes, not having been applied moderately during the previous years, now had to be applied with full force. The effect of the crisis on the growth of the economy during the subsequent three years was considerable: the annual growth rate fell to 2 or 3 percent while the population continued to increase at an estimated rate of 2.6 percent, leaving the average annual per capita income of $180 almost stationary.

The economic crisis of 1961 undermined the external creditworthiness of the government (the Central Bank of Iran was only two months away from the possibility of default on some of its external obligations), shook the confidence of the régime and increased the doubts of those who were already in opposition or indifferent to it. Unemployment and the higher cost of living were causing discontent in urban centers.

The government's economic setbacks thus helped to bring about a political crisis. The opposition, which had been operating mainly as a semi-underground resistance movement, reorganized the National Front and openly challenged the government's controlled elections of 1960. In 1961 the government of Sharif-Imami was brought down by a teachers' strike for higher salaries, in which the demonstrators and the police clashed, and a secondary school teacher was killed. The Shah then called on Dr. Ali Amini to form a new government.

Dr. Amini came to power with all the appearances of determination to effect reforms. He made immediate concessions to popular demands. Parliament was dissolved, the Economic Stabilization Program was vigorously implemented, a number of corrupt government officials and military officers were prosecuted and a land reform was promised. Thus the government seemed to be concerned not only with the economic crisis, but also with the basic social and political problems threatening the country. In fact, many people believed that Amini could bring the opposition forces into a coalition government and pave the way for a return to constitutional and democratic rule in Iran. However, with Amini's increasing reluctance to hold elections, it soon became apparent that, caught between the National Front and the Shah, and unable to bring the two together in a compromise solution, he had chosen to side with the Shah, whose control of the armed forces was essential to the survival of his

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government. Thus, virtually barred from short-run activity in the political arena, Amini could only concentrate on the social and economic spheres.

Land reform to him as well as the Shah was of special significance. Not only could some of the opposition's thunder thus be stolen, but it also provided an ingenious argument for not holding elections. The National Front had chosen as its slogans, "The Establishment of Constitutional Government" and "Free Elections." Amini and the Shah now maintained that free elections would only result in the election to parliament of landlords who would oppose land reform. The argument was basically fallacious, for elections had always been carefully controlled by the régime itself. However, to those not aware of Iranian political conditions, the argument seemed attractive. Thus land reform became the central program of Amini's government; indeed, he considered land reform as that "injection" which might finally save the régime from total collapse.

Land reform was also desired as a means of gaining prestige abroad. Most of Iran's neighbors had carried out land reform, and the absence of any such measures in Iran seemed only too conspicuous. The need for conformity was strengthened by the need for foreign assistance. The chances of obtaining loans and grants were greater with a dramatic reform program—especially from the United States where the Kennedy Administration was insisting on self-help as a precondition of U.S. financial assistance. In this way, it was hoped that land reform would regain for the régime much of the confidence lost during the crisis of 1960–61 and perhaps also solve some of Iran's basic social and political problems.

II

Iran's land reform program was conceived as a two-stage operation. During the first stage (1962–64) all landholdings of over "one village" were to be transferred to the government for resale to the peasants. In the remaining villages, the peasants were to have security of tenure and the landlord's share of the crop was to be reduced by 10 percent in dry-farmed land, 5 percent in irrigated areas.

The second stage, which started in mid-1964, was to deal with those landowners who own less than one village. Landlords may retain a maximum of 30 to 150 hectares of land (depending on

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the region) and must dispose of the rest of their land in any number of ways described in the law. The choice of the "village" as a standard of maximum landholding was dictated by the administrative difficulty of applying other criteria which might have involved extensive cadastral surveys and/or land evaluations for which the government was not equipped.

Out of 48,592 villages in Iran, 13,904 were estimated to be partially or totally affected by the first stage of the land distribution program. Originally, only the head of a family was allowed to keep a village. However, political pressure from landlords forced the government to allow wives and children of the landlords also to keep one village each, provided they owned the villages before the law went into effect. If the original version of the law had been carried out, the effect would have been considerably more stringent.

Of the 13,904 villages affected by the land distribution program, less than 9,000, as of summer 1964, had actually been bought by the government and resold to the peasants. Since the majority of the villages affected by the law are only partly distributed, the total number of villages sold to the peasants can safely be estimated to be equivalent to about five thousand complete villages, or 10 percent of the total number of villages in Iran. After making allowance for later distributions, the first stage of land reform will still leave undistributed over three-quarters of the villages controlled by the landlords.

The land is bought from the landlords at a price between 100 to 180 times the annual taxes paid to the government. Since landlords often underpaid their taxes, the prices they received for their land were generally well below the grossly inflated market prices. The land distribution program itself does not impose a heavy financial burden on the government, for the peasants have to bear the full load of the 15-year redemption payments, which begin one year after the land is distributed.

The overall objective of the second stage, which got off the ground only recently after a number of postponements, seems to be the difficult task of "regulating" the present explosive peasant-landlord relationship brought about by the intensive propaganda campaigns of the first stage. The problem consists of satisfying an angry mass of peasantry, spread over some 40,000 villages, who demand immediate and total land distribution, and a few thousand landowners whose political support the régime cannot

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afford to lose. The solution, which has been termed "mild" and "reasonable," favors the landlords.[2]

To begin with, the landlords may opt to sell their land to the government under the procedures of the first stage. They then have the advantage of receiving a lump sum and the highest possible price. If they do not wish to sell, they are allowed to rent their villages to the peasants on the basis of the net income of their villages during the preceding three years. The lease is for 30 years and the amount of rent is subject to revision every five years.

There are also some provisions in the second stage which allow the landlords, with the consent of the peasants, either to sell to the tenants or to partition the land with them, or to form a joint stock company with them for the exploitation of the village lands. Of the five courses of action open to the landlords, the majority of landlords are most likely to lease out their villages rather than sell or distribute the land. In the regulations governing the second stage, extensive protection is given to landlords who wish to engage in mechanized farming. Apart from the maximum landholding, they can keep up to 500 hectares of mechanized land.

The *vagf*, or religious endowment lands, are to be rented on 99-year leases to the peasants who work them, with rentals again subject to revision every five years. State-owned lands have already been transferred to the Land Reform Agency for distribution, while crown lands, which were supposed to have been transferred during the first stage, remain largely undistributed.

III

The government's sharp policy reversal, from the glowing "revolutionary" promises of the first stage to the almost counter-revolutionary solutions of the second stage, leaves somewhat hazy the picture of the agrarian system which is likely to emerge from land reform. At the end of the second stage, about 60 percent of the Iranian villages will still be owned by the so-called small landlords. As one peasant in Kurdestan pointed out to the author, it makes no difference to the peasant whether his land-

[2] Dr. Hassan Arsanjani, the Minister of Agriculture in the successive governments of Amini and Alam and the main architect of the land-reform program, resigned in 1963, leaving the impresssion that he may have favored a more vigorous second stage. Dr. Amini himself had already resigned in mid-1962 over the control of the armed-forces budget.

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lord owns one village or 600 villages; he will still have to pay rent and be at the landlord's mercy as before.

Nor is the land-distribution program less fraught with problems when it concerns the various sub-classes of the peasantry. According to the law, the pattern of land allotment in any distributed or undistributed village must not change: the peasants can only own or farm the same plots they cultivated before. Since a richer minority who had the favor of the landlords usually had better and larger plots of land, they benefited most from this arrangement. These groups belong to village bourgeoisie and are likely to gain most from land reform. The choice of this form of land distribution, which endorses the status quo, was again dictated by administrative considerations. The legalization of the existing tenures has naturally solidified the traditional and inefficient system of landholding.

Nor does the Iranian program recognize the status of the agricultural laborer or sharecropper who does not own any oxen. Consequently, not all peasants living in the distributed villages have received land. These people are generally the poorest of all. Their number is also considerable. In fact, nearly two-thirds of the rural population belong to those classes that either have no land at their disposal or have less than four hectares to cultivate. This is at the root of Iran's agrarian problem, irrespective of the system of land ownership. The land-reform program has left this basic problem untouched.

It was hoped that the land hunger of the Iranian peasantry would be at least partly satiated by the distribution of virgin lands. New land that might be brought under cultivation without large-scale investment is limited to 4.1 million hectares. This is 36 percent of the total area under cultivation in 1960, and less than the area left fallow each year. It is not clear whether the use of more capital on the existing lands may not, in the long run, offer higher yields than the use of marginal lands. And in any case, it is now certain that these lands will be given mainly to large farmer-investors who are willing and able to use some degree of mechanization.

Perhaps the weakest part of land reform in Iran has been its failure to change technological and organizational aspects of agricultural production. In 1960, on 83.2 percent of the area under cultivation of annual crops, no fertilizer of any kind was used. Double cropping was practiced on only 0.4 percent of the

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cultivated land. Cultivation of grass and clover for feeding livestock was not generally practiced, with the doubly negative result for the peasants of weaker draught animals and heavy livestock losses during winter months. Only 3.8 percent of farm units regularly used a tractor for plowing.

The land-reform program at first toyed with the idea of helping the peasants to overcome their technological backwardness. Some steps in this direction were taken, but the magnitude of the task and the stagnation of agricultural production during the past few years seem to have strengthened the government's conviction that it must rely on the growth of modern capitalist farming to carry through Iran's agricultural revolution.

Thus the government's supporting programs for land reform are as yet insignificant. By September 1963, there were only 927 coöperatives working in some 2 percent of Iranian villages. These coöperatives were only credit coöperatives; their loans were not supervised and the peasants generally used the funds for consumption purposes. By mid-1964, of the 640 extension agents at work in all Iran, 44 percent were transferred to the Land Reform Agency for clerical work and thus the extension service, most needed for any serious reform, was reduced to almost complete inaction. Only the Literacy Corps has so far made real progress: 9,000 to 10,000 teachers have been provided for the rural areas, but some 40,000 more are required if the 65 percent of the rural children not attending school are to receive some form of education.

From a social point of view, land reform has had the effect of shaking the foundations of feudalism in Iran. This was particularly so during the first year, when the peasants literally took events into their own hands. For the past year or so, however, the sharp reversal of government policy in favor of the landlords has changed the picture. With their influence still untouched in the towns and within the government, the landlords are hopeful that the "return to the villages" may be much nearer than they had ever hoped.

If the present trend in government policy continues, it can be safely predicted that small landlordism will take the place of big, feudal landlordism, without substantially changing the fate of the mass of the peasantry. The shift from big landlordism to small landlordism has already had one major effect: it has extended the power and influence of government and petty officials

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in the rural areas. This suggests that, although the peasants may not be ruled directly by the new class of landlords, they will be just as powerless vis-à-vis the government officials, who do not owe their office to the peasants' votes. The manner in which the peasants were forced to vote for government candidates during the elections of 1963 left no doubt that the peasants are not to be masters of their own villages.

The removal of the feudal landlord as a buffer between the government and the peasantry is also likely to intensify the peasant's hatred of the government. Now there will be no one except the government to blame for the mismanagement of rural affairs. This alone could change the land-reform program from an essentially technical or economic matter to a highly political concern of both the government and the opposition.

IV

Land reform, by virtue of the changes, dislocations, hopes and fears that it causes in almost every sector of society, may create such problems, release such energies and generate such forces as to set in motion movements far more powerful than were anticipated by its initiators. In Iran, although the more basic shortcomings of the reform are likely to have costly and long-lasting effects, the social and political results of the program are already causing basic structural changes in Iranian society.

For one thing, the composition and the loyalty of the forces lending support to the régime will never be the same. Land reform has weakened and alienated a considerable part of the Shah's traditional allies: the landlords. The régime has also lost the confidence of the industrialists, mainly through an over-publicized profit-sharing "reform" measure which has remained almost a dead letter. The religious leaders were also forced into active opposition when their protests against the Shah's government-by-decree—in such matters as granting women the right to vote, albeit without holding free elections—were branded as "Black Reaction" and brutally suppressed.

Changing the image of a traditional Middle Eastern despotism into that of a modern reformist dictatorship has thus cost the régime dearly in the short run. The long-run costs do not appear less awesome. The administrative and financial resources of the government have already been spread thin, with decreasing returns. The disillusioned peasants will probably continue to put

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the government's security apparatus to severe tests. Although the government is trying hard to make the peasants accept the provisions of the second stage as the "final" settlement of Iran's agrarian problems, it would be naïve to think that the end of this story has been heard. Land hunger is hard to quell, and underlying economic problems plus the growing rural population are likely to intensify it. The landless and the agricultural workers have yet to be heard from.

The lingering economic crisis is also likely to lead to an increase in urban unemployment, as the poorer classes of peasantry, facing the problem of sheer subsistence, move off the land. When the inevitable exodus to the towns gains greater momentum, these masses could constitute a revolutionary force of some consequence. Lack of employment opportunities in towns, owing to the effects of the economic crisis of the past four years and the low priority given to industrialization in the Third Plan, makes the solution of the rural problems all the more difficult.

The economic crisis, which during the past year has shown signs of shifting from a deflationary to an inflationary situation, stems more from a crisis of confidence on the part of the owners of capital than from lack of financial resources on the part of the government. In fact, oil revenues, which now account for over 50 percent of the development and non-development budgets of the government, have increased from $290 million in 1961–62 to $550 million in the current year. During the last few months, the government has also received a bonus payment of about $230 million for new offshore oil concessions in the Persian Gulf. Thus the government's oil revenues for 1965–66 should amount to $780 million, or about 18 percent of Iran's national income.

The rapid increase in oil revenues has enabled the government to finance its way out of such immediate difficulties as the crop failure of 1963. The ordinary budget of the government has increased, from $573 million in 1962–63 to $793 million in 1965–66. The development expenditure (mainly for infrastructural and not directly productive purposes) has shown an even more remarkable rise: from $246 million in 1963–64 to $600 million in 1965–66. This 143 percent increase in development expenditure over a two-year period is bound to generate price increases and balance-of-payments problems. Retail prices went up by about 4.3 percent from early 1964 to 1965 and the balance-of-payments deficit in 1964–65, without the bonus payments from the new

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oil agreements, would have been near $100 million—about a third of Iran's foreign-exchange reserves.

Should another economic crisis develop in Iran during the coming months, the repercussions and disturbances are not likely to be limited to the urban areas; an awakened and dissatisfied peasantry will be part of the picture. The future politicalization of the peasantry and an end to the traditional insulation of this class from involvement in economic and political disturbances seem inevitable. Not only is the extension of educational facilities and a network of feeder roads bringing the rural population into closer contact with the townspeople, but the spread of rural disorders and the massive purchase of transistor radio sets have also created considerable class consciousness among the peasantry. The transistor radio may finally bring to the Iranian village the badly needed political education which the existing parties have been unable to provide through other channels. However, this gives a powerful weapon to the Communists, who alone have broadcasting facilities (in East Germany, the Soviet Union and China). By suppressing all political parties within Iran while this important channel is unavoidably open to the Communists, the régime is, ironically enough, playing into the hands of those whom it fears most.

The régime is not altogether unaware of the dangers, but is relying on the efficiency of its security forces rather than any political process to check the threat. This policy was demonstrated during the June uprising of 1963 when the "shoot-to-kill" order was issued by the Shah to the armed forces and some 3,000 persons were estimated to have been killed or wounded in various cities in Iran. The government quells such revolts in the name of the peasantry and the "people's revolution." But it has shrewdly avoided free elections to test its real strength. During the elections of 1963, not a single member of the National Front was allowed to stand as a candidate, let alone be elected.

The opposition forces, faced with the régime's new mixed policy of carrots and sticks, reforms and intensified suppression, are undertaking a thorough reappraisal of their policies, organization and non-violent tactics of demonstrating in the streets, where the masses are made easy targets for the régime's well-equipped security forces. On the political level, the slogan "Land Reform Yes, Dictatorship No," coined by Tehran University students at the time of the Shah's "referendum," has been widely adopted,

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though some intellectuals are reluctant to admit that any reform has taken place. The organizational and tactical problems are posing more serious dilemmas for the opposition. The futility of open political demonstration against a régime determined to suppress any opposition by force has been amply shown. The alternative, however, is fraught with uncertainties and entails drastic changes in the nature of the present opposition forces.

The National Front so far has resisted the temptation of advocating violence or accepting the invitation of the Communists to form a unified National Liberation Movement. But the assassination of Premier Mansour in early 1965, followed soon afterward by an attempt on the Shah's life by a member of his own select Imperial Guard, may indicate the form of resistance to the régime that is developing, irrespective of the National Front's approval. Should the Communists decide—as indeed they seem to have already decided—to launch a campaign of subversion, even unilaterally, in support of the nationalist forces, the situation in Iran could become much like that in Iraq after 1958 or in South Viet Nam today. The dilemma facing the National Front is to determine how far it can follow its present tactics without losing to the Communists the leadership of the masses.

The identification of the régime with the West, and especially with the United States, has helped to make the concept of a war of national liberation more appealing. Professor T. Cuyler Young wrote in *Foreign Affairs* (January 1962): "During the last decade, . . . the United States has furnished Iran more than a billion dollars in economic and military aid. Like it or not, justly or unjustly, this has served to identify the United States with the Shah's régime, together with responsibility for what that régime has done, or failed to do. . . . For this reason the United States is distrusted, if not indeed thoroughly disliked, by all those who have come to distrust the Shah and oppose his policies." Since then, this distrust has been intensified, especially after the United States applied pressure and obtained from the régime in 1964 a status-of-forces agreement granting American military personnel in Iran diplomatic immunity. Not only all Iranian nationalists vehemently opposed this measure, but when Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran's most prominent religious leader, voiced concern and was summarily exiled to Turkey, the sentiments of the religious masses also turned sharply against the

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United States. It is probable that the American position in Iran will continue to deteriorate along with the growing unpopularity of the Shah's régime and that the United States will replace Britain as the prime target of nationalist attacks. The urge for political freedom, which has already proved stronger than the attraction of recent social and economic reforms, is likely to be reinforced by an attempt to free Iran from all foreign domination.

Theoretically, it is not inconceivable that a peaceful political settlement could be arrived at to check the present trends and lead Iran to the path of constitutional government and self-determination. In fact, Dr. Amini is presently believed to be engaged in an attempt to form a national coalition government along these lines. However, given the present course of policy and the pattern of the régime's international commitments, success is unlikely. Opposition forces are moving toward accepting violence as the only way to bring about a solution to Iran's ills; hope for a peaceful political solution has been all but abandoned. While domestic political forces are moving in the direction of violent means, external forces still continue to play an important role. Contending United States, Soviet and now Chinese Communist foreign policies are factors that could either intensify the processes already under way, or modify them.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Howard Linton, Asia; Richard H. Nolte, Middle East, North Africa; Joseph A. Ellis, Latin America; Pamela Day, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

AFTER 20 YEARS: ALTERNATIVES TO THE COLD WAR IN EUROPE. By Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin. New York: Random House, 1965, 243 p. $5.95.

The two authors, formerly in government service, argue that the effort to "build an Atlantic Community" and to "win the arms race" is both obsolete and dangerous. The core of the book is, as the subtitle indicates, a search for alternatives.

STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD: THE COLD WAR: 1917–1965. By Desmond Donnelly. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965, 511 p. $7.95.

A journalist and Labor M.P. here writes, and occasionally over-writes, the history of the cold war and the shifts in the international scene in the last decade.

DÉTENTE: COLD WAR STRATEGIES IN TRANSITION. Edited by Eleanor Lansing Dulles and Robert Dickson Crane. New York: Praeger (for the Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University), 1965, 307 p. $5.95.

A symposium dealing with the prospects for an international détente and some of the strategic implications for both the Communist and Western powers.

DER PROVISORISCHE FRIEDEN. By Max Hagemann. Erlenbach-Zurich: Rentsch, 1964, 744 p. Swiss Fr. 45.

A massive analysis by a Swiss scholar of the problems of international order and organization confronting the world since 1945.

FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SIXTIES. Edited by Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965, 299 p. $6.95.

These essays in honor of Arnold Wolfers are directed toward three main themes —the contemporary international arena, the instrumentalities of foreign policy and the moral issues in statecraft.

THE ELEPHANTS AND THE GRASS: A STUDY OF NONALIGNMENT. By Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. New York: Praeger, 1965, 237 p. $5.50 (Paper, $1.95).

Arguing that most Western views of nonalignment or neutralism are prejudiced or cliché-ridden, the author makes a sympathetic study of the neutralist credo. The title is explained by the African proverb: When two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.

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LA COMMUNAUTÉ INTERNATIONALE FACE AUX JEUNES ÉTATS. Under the Direction of Jean-Baptiste Duroselle and Jean Meyriat. Paris: Colin, 1964, 417 p. Fr. 22.

POLITIQUES NATIONALES ENVERS LES JEUNES ÉTATS. Under the Direction of Jean-Baptiste Duroselle and Jean Meyriat. Paris: Colin, 1964, 347 p. Fr. 22.

Two volumes of essays from symposia sponsored by the Centre d'Étude des Relations Internationales.

HERRSCHER VON MORGEN? MACHT UND OHNMACHT DER BLOCKFREIEN WELT. By Peter Grubbe. Düsseldorf: Econ-Verlag, 1964, 411 p. DM. 19.80.

A German correspondent's report on and appraisal of the peoples and nations of the "third world."

FIFTY SHIPS THAT SAVED THE WORLD: THE FOUNDATION OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE. By Philip Goodhart. Garden City: Doubleday, 1965, 267 p. $4.95.

A concise but absorbing account of the transfer of 50 American destroyers to Great Britain in 1940, an action which, in the author's view, was one of the "principal foundation stones of the Anglo-American alliance."

NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM: ESSAYS 1946–1963. By Hugh Seton-Watson. New York: Praeger, 1964, 253 p. $7.50.

A collection of Professor Seton-Watson's essays and articles on the themes of nationalism, Eastern Europe, Communism and international affairs.

IMPERIALISM: THE STORY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF A POLITICAL WORD, 1840–1960. By Richard Koebner and Helmut Dan Schmidt. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1964, 432 p. $12.50.

Working from the late Professor Koebner's notes and excerpts on the theme, Mr. Schmidt has followed his mentor's "semantic approach" in tracing the meaning of imperialism since the mid-nineteenth century.

FOUR WAYS OF POLITICS: STATE AND NATION IN ITALY, SOMALIA, ISRAEL, IRAN. By E. A. Bayne. New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1965, 320 p. $7.50.

Although the author grants the disparateness of the four countries discussed, he would argue that there are relevant comparabilities, especially in the continuing tension between tradition and modernization.

LAW, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER. Edited by Salo Engel with the Coöperation of Rudolf A. Métall. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1964, 365 p. $10.00.

A Festschrift of 28 essays honoring Hans Kelsen.

THE MYSTERY OF MORAL RE-ARMAMENT. By Tom Driberg. New York: Knopf, 1965, 317 p. $5.95.

An extremely critical appraisal, by a British Labor M.P. and journalist, of the late Frank Buchman and his movement.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

CONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. By Otto Heilbrunn. New York: Praeger, 1965, 164 p. $5.75.

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A very thoughtful and penetrating discussion of the problems of conventional warfare, chiefly in the European setting, under the shadow of nuclear power. Includes discussion of partisan warfare and operations in the enemy's rear.

U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE SIXTIES. By Colonel Robert N. Ginsburgh. New York: Norton, 1965, 160 p. $4.00.

Modestly described as a "primer," this is a concise and lucid discussion of strategy and of contemporary strategic policies and problems.

NUCLEAR WAR: THE IMPENDING STRATEGIC DEADLOCK. By Neville Brown. New York: Praeger, 1965, 238 p. $6.50.

A British writer on military affairs assesses the current strategic balance between East and West and looks forward to a reasonably stable stalemate.

THE DEFENCE MECHANISM OF THE MODERN STATE. By Nagendra Singh. New York: Asia Publishing House (for the Indian Council of World Affairs), 1964, 479 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $23.50.)

A comparative, but quite technical study of the Chiefs of Staff Committee as the "link between the political and the military wheels of the State" in the major military powers.

GENERAL GRIVAS ON GUERRILLA WARFARE. By George Grivas. New York: Praeger, 1965, 109 p. $3.95.

Drawing on his experience as leader of the Cyprus liberation campaign, the General discusses guerrilla warfare as an unorthodox but increasingly important form of combat. An English edition appeared under the title "Guerrilla Warfare and EOKA's Struggle" (London: Longmans, 1964, 30/).

SECURITY IN DISARMAMENT. Edited by Richard J. Barnet and Richard A. Falk. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the Princeton Center of International Studies), 1965, 441 p. $10.00.

A symposium on three general themes: inspection, the protection of states in the course of disarmament and the question of security in circumstances of total disarmament.

ISTORIIA VELIKOI OTECHESTVENNOI VOINY SOVETSKOGO SOIUZA 1941–1945. Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony Soiuza SSR, 1962–65, 3 v.

These three volumes complete the massive and official Soviet history of the Second World War. Volume IV covers the year 1944; Volume V deals with the final victories over Germany and Japan; Volume VI, a summary, provides a general interpretation of the significance of the war and the role of the U.S.S.R. plus a fairly extensive discussion of the historiography of the war, both Soviet and foreign.

GRAND STRATEGY. VOLUME III: JUNE 1941–AUGUST 1942. By J. M. A. Gwyer (Part I) and J. R. M. Butler (Part II). London: H.M.S.O., 1964, 2 parts, 84/. (New York: British Information Services, $16.80.)

This volume, in two parts, in the official U.K. history of World War II, is part of a six-volume sequence dealing with high strategy and planning. It covers the crucial period June 1941–August 1942.

KRIEGSTAGEBUCH DES OBERKOMMANDOS DER WEHRMACHT, 1940–1945. Edited by Percy Ernst Schramm and Others. Frankfurt/Main: Bernard und Graefe, 1961–65, 4 v. in 7 parts, DM. 696.

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The appearance in 1965 of Volume I, covering the years 1940–1941, completes the publication of this very important source for the German conduct of the Second World War. It presents the records and logs of the High Command of the *Wehrmacht,* together with valuable introductions and commentaries by the editor and his associates, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Andreas Hillgruber and Walther Hubatsch.

HEXENKESSEL OSTFRONT: VON SMOLENSK NACH BRESLAU. By Wolf van Aaken. Rastatt/Baden: Pabel, 1964, 223 p. DM. 17.80.

A rather impressionistic account of critical episodes in the German-Soviet war.

IS PARIS BURNING? By Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965, 376 p. $6.95.

An American and a French journalist tell the dramatic story of the narrow margin by which Paris avoided being destroyed by Hitler at the time of the Nazi withdrawal in August 1944.

General: Economic and Social

MONETARY REFORM FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY. By Robert V. Roosa. New York: Harper and Row (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1965, 173 p. $3.95 (Paper, $1.95).

An important book that is the first full statement of Mr. Roosa's views, as a private citizen, about issues with which he was prominently connected for four years as Under Secretary of the Treasury. The lectures lay out the conditions for a proper international monetary order, appraise the many schemes for reform that have been advanced in the last few years and set forth the author's own proposals.

ECONOMIC AID AND INTERNATIONAL COST SHARING. By John Pincus. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965, 221 p. $6.50.

A first-rate study that asks interesting questions about the real cost of aid and the extent to which there are burdens to be shared in trade policy.

REFORMING THE WORLD'S MONEY. By Roy Harrod. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965, 181 p. $5.95.

An eminent British economist believes that a major increase in liquidity will be needed. It could be obtained by reform of the International Monetary Fund and failing that he would raise the price of gold.

FOREIGN DOLLAR LOANS IN EUROPE. By Paul Einzig. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965, 159 p. $7.50.

In his unflagging pursuit of the newest practices in world money markets, the British journalist has some interesting things to say about the practice of issuing loans in Europe denominated in dollars.

INCOME AND WEALTH: SERIES X. INCOME REDISTRIBUTION AND THE STATISTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC POLICY. Edited by Colin Clark and Geer Stuvel. New Haven: International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, 1964, 353 p. $9.00.

National accounts in policy-making and domestic redistribution of incomes in various countries are the main subjects of these papers.

TRANSPORT INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. Edited by Gary Fromm. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1965, 314 p. $6.75.

A number of authors tackle different aspects of a difficult problem.

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STRATEGY FOR MOBILITY. By Wilfred Owen. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1964, 249 p. $5.00.

Initial study of the special problems transportation poses in working out a strategy for investment for development.

THE ECONOMICS OF SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTURE. By Colin Clark and Margaret Haswell. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964, 218 p. $6.00.

Interesting data on the conditions of life and production of a large part of the world's farmers.

MANPOWER AND EDUCATION. By Frederick Harbison and Charles A. Myers. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965, 343 p. $9.00.

Experience and problems of some dozen countries are examined in papers that supplement the authors' "Education, Manpower, and Economic Growth" (reviewed here January 1965).

WORKERS COUNCILS: A STUDY OF WORKPLACE ORGANIZATION ON BOTH SIDES OF THE IRON CURTAIN. By Adolf Sturmthal. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964, 217 p. $5.00.

A comparative study of workers councils in France, Germany, Poland and Jugoslavia.

The United States

THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1964. By Theodore H. White. New York: Atheneum, 1965, 431 p. $6.95.

While the present book is a chronological sequel to Mr. White's report on the 1960 presidential campaign, its flavor is quite different, partly because of the difference in the campaigns, partly because the author views 1964 less as a contest than as a part of the turbulent procession of American history.

THE ROAD TO THE WHITE HOUSE. Edited by Harold Faber. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965, 305 p. $6.95.

A substantial account of the 1964 election campaign, "a team effort of members of the staff of *The New York Times*."

PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP OF PUBLIC OPINION. By Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965, 370 p. $6.95.

An able and interesting study of the means and techniques used by Presidents since Theodore Roosevelt to guide and influence public opinion from the "bully pulpit" of the White House.

DULLES ON DIPLOMACY. By Andrew H. Berding. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1965, 184 p. $4.95.

The former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs made extensive shorthand notes of conversations with the late Secretary Dulles. These notes are the basis for this informal but informative presentation of Dulles' views on his tasks as a diplomat.

RACE AND RADICALISM: THE NAACP AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN CONFLICT. By Wilson Record. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964, 237 p. $5.95.

A history of the efforts of the Communist Party to influence, penetrate or wreck the N.A.A.C.P. and other Negro rights organizations. A volume in the excellent series, "Communism in American Life."

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THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. By Samuel Eliot Morison. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 1,150 p. $12.50.

This history by an outstanding professional historian is also a document with much personal flavor. An excellent one-volume interpretation of the American past and present.

AMERICAN ASPECTS. By D. W. Brogan. New York: Harper and Row, 1964, 195 p. $4.00.

A selection of 15 of the author's more recent essays on American life and culture.

THE SOUTHERNER AND WORLD AFFAIRS. By Alfred O. Hero, Jr. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965, 676 p. $12.00.

An interesting study "of the behavior of Southerners and their Congressmen toward world affairs since the mid-1930's." A concluding section suggests means for stimulating more responsible thought on the subject in this region.

The Western Hemisphere

LATIN AMERICA: MYTH AND REALITY. By Peter Nehemkis. New York: Knopf, 1964, 286 p. $5.95.

A perceptive and thoughtful examination of contemporary Latin America—its institutional, economic and political image and its reality. The author, an institutional lawyer long experienced in Latin American affairs, provides reasoned insights along with practical suggestions for bettering a deteriorating hemispheric situation; of particular interest are those pertaining to foreign capital and its role in the economy of Latin America.

CASTROISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE. By Theodore Draper. New York: Praeger, 1965, 263 p. $5.95 (Paper, $1.95).

As with the author's earlier volume on the Castro revolution, this concise analytical study on the nature of Castro's Cuba and its peculiar relationship to the Communist movement is essential reading for the serious student of Latin American affairs. Written with perception and understanding, Draper's important book is a serious, studied synthesis—placed in a historical perspective—of the phenomenon of Castroism; as such, the book provides a welcome relief from the plethora of journalistic ramblings on Castro and Cuba.

THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND LATIN AMERICA. By Boris Goldenberg. New York: Praeger, 1965, 376 p. $8.00.

Translated and updated from the German edition of 1963, this book is a cogent, analytical assessment of the Cuban revolution and its impact upon Latin America. The author, formerly a resident of Cuba and a naturalized Cuban citizen, notes that "even evolutionary change has revolutionary implications and will hardly occur without popular struggles and constant pressure on those who will have to give up privileges and power."

CENTRAL AMERICA. By Mario Rodríguez. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965, 178 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

In this survey of Central American history the author optimistically assesses those political and economic factors binding the nations together, while warning that present U. S. policy, in emphasizing military solutions, can only undermine "the moderate democratic elements, and force them into the neutralist camp."

COMMUNISM IN MEXICO: A STUDY IN POLITICAL FRUSTRATION. By Karl M. Schmitt. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965, 290 p. $6.00.

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In this factual, somewhat drily written account of the failings of Communism in Mexico, the author concludes that the Communist movement has been unable to offer "substantial and meaningful opposition to the government party and the basic power structure of Mexico."

THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE MEXICAN CASE. By Robert L. Bennett. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965, 210 p. $6.95.

A statistical examination of Mexico's financial institutions and their role in the country's period of industrial growth following World War II.

FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN COLOMBIA: LAWS AND POLICIES. By Seymour W. Wurfel. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965, 563 p. $10.00.

This detailed, analytical study, in examining contemporary attitudes and existing governmental programs, stresses those legal institutions affecting foreign capital and its opportunities for investment in the developing Colombian economy.

DIAGNOSTICO DE LA ECONOMIA VENEZOLANA. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1964, 176 p.

Compiled by a study group from an association of Venezuelan university economists, this statistical analysis of the Venezuelan economy covers the years 1955 through 1961.

INTERNATIONAL ENTERPRISE IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY: A STUDY OF U.S. BUSINESS IN BRAZIL. By Claude McMillan, Jr. and Richard F. Gonzalez. East Lansing: Michigan State University, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, 1964, 247 p. $7.00.

Based essentially on questionnaires and interviews of U.S. executives in Brazil, this study examines the nature, organization and beneficial impact of North American corporate enterprise upon the Brazilian economy.

L'ÉCONOMIE BRÉSILIENNE. By Gaston Willoquet. Paris: Nouvelles Éditions Latines, 1965, 156 p. Fr. 7.50.

A brief, optimistic primer on the nature and present state of the Brazilian economy.

LE PÉRONISME. By Pierre Lux-Wurm. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1965, 273 p. Fr. 36.90.

A pedestrian account of the Peronista movement—its origins, content and structure—with a brief appendage updating Argentinian political events to 1962.

HANDBOOK OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, NO. 26: HUMANITIES. Edited by Earl J. Pariseau. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1964, 259 p. $17.50.

The most recent volume of this basic, annotated bibliographical series prepared in the Hispanic Foundation, Library of Congress, marks a change in format and organization. The "Handbook" has been divided into two parts: social sciences and humanities, each of which will be published separately in alternate years. This volume—on the humanities—covers art, history, language, literature, music and philosophy.

Western Europe

FRANCE, GERMANY, AND THE NEW EUROPE 1945–1963. By F. Roy Willis. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965, 397 p. $8.75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A short, lucid history of the partial unification of Europe as achieved through the rapprochement of two former enemies. By an American historian who has closely followed recent Franco-German relations.

LES CONSEILS DE MINISTRES DES COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPÉENNES. By P.-H. J. M. Houben. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1964, 259 p. Gldrs. 27.90.

An examination of the juridical structure and functioning of the Councils of Ministers of the three European Communities, Coal and Steel, Atomic Energy and Common Market. By a young member of the Dutch Foreign Office, trained in the law and specializing in problems of European integration.

EUROPAS NEUE GRENZEN. ERSTER BAND: DER GEMEINSAME MARKT. By Hans Apel. Cologne: Kiepenheuer, 1964, 218 p. DM. 9.80.

An official of the European Parliament sets forth his own clear views on the state of the Community.

RESTRICTIVE TRADING AGREEMENTS IN THE COMMON MARKET. By Alan Campbell. South Hackensack (N.J.): Rothman, 1964, 228 p. $6.50.

Texts and commentaries of the Rome Treaty and action taken under it.

THE UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET. By Sergio Barzanti. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, 437 p. $10.00.

Primarily about southern Italy and some areas of France.

WINSTON CHURCHILL: AN INTIMATE PORTRAIT. By Violet Bonham Carter. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965, 413 p. $8.50.

The daughter of Prime Minister Asquith has written moving and perspicacious recollections of a friend and admired genius, whom she first met in 1906. This volume ends with Churchill's involuntary exile from the government in 1916. It is a judicious tribute to Churchill and affords a nice glimpse of a great age; it has all the advantages and only a few of the liabilities of having been written by an intimate.

THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN OPPOSITION, 1945–51. By J. D. Hoffman. London: MacGibbon, 1964, 288 p. 42/.

A Canadian political scientist examines the ways in which Britain's Conservative Party responded to its great defeat of 1945 and how through the reorganization of party and platform and the pursuit of parliamentary opposition it prepared its return to power.

THE MANAGEMENT OF THE BRITISH ECONOMY, 1945–60. By J. C. R. Dow. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1964, 443 p. $11.50.

A major critical study of governmental policies and measures.

BRITAIN AND ATOMIC ENERGY: 1939–1945. By Margaret Gowing. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964, 464 p. $12.50.

The first volume of the official history of Britain's efforts in the nuclear field. Based on official records and well written, this work is of absorbing interest.

BAUDOUIN Ier ET LA BELGIQUE. By Marie-Madeleine Martin. Paris: Flammarion, 1964, 248 p. Fr. 14.

A pleasant little book that tries to describe Baudouin I and the history of Belgium and does neither very persuasively.

THE FRENCH SOCIALISTS AND TRIPARTISME 1944–1947. By B. D. Graham. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965, 299 p. $6.75.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A penetrating analysis of French socialism and its short-lived hope after the war to govern together with Communists and liberal Catholics. The author, a native New Zealander and currently a political scientist in England, stresses the importance of this story for the development of postwar European society and of French politics.

LE RÉGIME POLITIQUE DE LA V^e^ RÉPUBLIQUE. By Pierre Avril. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1964, 398 p. Fr. 44.40.

A clear and critical analysis of the elusive form of government which de Gaulle has given France.

LE SUFFRAGE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE. By Jean-Paul Charnay. Paris: Mouton, 1965, 832 p. Fr. 95.

A study of the history of French elections, with particular attention to the incidence of contested and invalid results.

MIRAGES ET RÉALITÉS: L'ARME NUCLÉAIRE FRANÇAISE. By Marc de Lacoste Lareymondie. Paris: Éditions de la S.E.R.P., 1964, 215 p. Fr. 13.50.

A judicious and informative critique of French nuclear policy, by a St. Cyr graduate who for 13 years was involved in atomic studies and policies.

ZONE FRANC ET DÉCOLONISATION. By Michèle Saint Marc. Paris: Société d'Édition d'Enseignement Supérieur, 1964, 259 p. Fr. 20.

Past monetary and budgetary experience; prospects for continued coöperation.

DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY. By Fritz Erler. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, 139 p. $3.75.

Fritz Erler, deputy chairman of the German Social Democratic Party, delivered these lectures, in briefer form, at Harvard in 1964. They provide a thoughtful and on the whole reassuring assessment of the current German scene, by an authoritative and appealing representative of the new democratic régime. "Demokratie in Deutschland" was published in Stuttgart by Seewald (1965, 194 p. DM. 14.80).

REPUBLIC IN SUSPENSE: POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PERSONALITIES IN POSTWAR GERMANY. By Klaus Bölling. New York: Praeger, 1964, 276 p. $6.50.

A useful, informative and sometimes critical review of political forces in West Germany since the war, by a German journalist.

DEUTSCHLAND ZWISCHEN DEMOKRATIE UND DIKTATUR. By Karl Dietrich Bracher. Berne: Scherz, 1964, 415 p. Swiss Fr. 28.

A collection of excellent essays on various aspects of German politics of the last 50 years, by a foremost student of the period. Particular attention is paid to the causes of the collapse of Weimar and the rise of National Socialism, to the German resistance and to contemporary politics.

ULBRICHT: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. By Carola Stern. New York: Praeger, 1965, 231 p. $5.95.

An informative biography, designed for the general reader, from Ulbricht's beginnings as a young Marxist to his present role as old Stalinist. The author, a West German journalist who had escaped from Ulbricht's rule, sees him neither as a demon nor a hero, but a "politically dangerous, spiritually crippled and therefore pitiable, petty-bourgeois."

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DEUTSCHLAND UND DIE TÜRKEI IM ZWEITEN WELTKRIEG. By Lothar Krecker. Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1964, 293 p. DM. 30.

A monograph on German-Turkish relations, based chiefly on German published and unpublished sources.

STAATSKUNST UND KRIEGSHANDWERK. DRITTER BAND: DIE TRAGÖDIE DER STAATSKUNST. BETHMANN HOLLWEG ALS KRIEGSKANZLER (1914–1917). By Gerhard Ritter. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1964, 707 p. DM. 48.

This third volume in a projected four-volume work on German statecraft and militarism is a reinterpretation of German politics from the outbreak of the First World War to the dismissal of Bethmann-Hollweg in 1917. Ritter, an outstanding, conservative historian, sees Bethmann-Hollweg in a more traditional and favorable light than did Fischer in his well-known work, "Griff nach der Weltmacht," with which Ritter takes vigorous issue.

BERLINER WIRTSCHAFT UND DEUTSCHE POLITIK. By Karl Schiller. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1964, 204 p. DM. 16.80.

A collection of important essays and speeches, written over the last four years, by the present senator for economics in West Berlin and chief economic adviser to the S.P.D., as well as a professor of economics at Hamburg. An intelligent and informative commentary on the contemporary problems of West Berlin, particularly in the economic realm.

GERMAN AID: A SURVEY OF THE SOURCES, POLICY AND STRUCTURE OF GERMAN AID. By John White. London: Overseas Development Institute, 1965, 221 p. 20/.

Detailed description plus an appraisal that emphasizes the sharp focus on economic objectives and the consequent characteristics that distinguish German aid from that of other countries.

GERMANY'S ECONOMIC DILEMMA: INFLATION AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. By Patrick M. Boarman. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964, 344 p. $7.50.

The reasons for the surplus in the German balance of payments, its internal effects and proposals for changing the situation are carefully examined from a point of view sympathetic to the Erhard policies.

DIE WIRTSCHAFTSVERFASSUNG DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND: ENTWICKLUNG UND ORDNUNGSPOLITISCHE GRUNDLAGEN. By Gernot Gutmann and Others. Stuttgart: G. Fischer, 1964, 453 p. DM. 26.

Structural, institutional and legal exposition.

DEUTSCHE GELD- UND KREDITPOLITIK, 1914 BIS 1963. By Rudolf Stucken. Tübingen: Mohr, 1964, 341 p. DM. 21.

An established work is now brought down to 1963.

ZUR TRANSFORMATION EINER ZENTRALVERWALTUNGSWIRTSCHAFT SOWJETISCHEN TYPS IN EINE MARKTWIRTSCHAFT. By Peter Dietrich Propp. Berlin: Duncker (for Osteuropa-Institut an der Freien Universität Berlin), 1964, 300 p. DM. 35.60.

An effort to think through the problems of transforming the Soviet Zone of Germany into a market economy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHERN ITALY, 1950–1960. By Joseph A. Martellaro. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1965, 123 p. $4.95.

An assessment of what has been done in the Mezzogiorno.

WIRTSCHAFTSENTWICKLUNG SPANIENS UNTER DEM EINFLUSS DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION. By Santiago García-Echevarría. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964, 186 p. DM. 33.50.

Spain's recent economic growth, the problems and prospects of its trade with the Common Market and EFTA.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE: THE CHOICES AHEAD. By John C. Campbell. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1965, 136 p. $4.50.

Essentially a background paper, analyzing the situation in Communist Eastern Europe and the alternative policies that may be open to the United States.

COMMUNISM, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL: EASTERN EUROPE AFTER STALIN. By H. Gordon Skilling. Toronto: University of Toronto Press (in association with the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 1964, 168 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A concise, informed appraisal of developments in Eastern Europe in the last few years, by a scholar who has traveled widely in the area.

FOREIGN CAPITAL AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY. By V. N. Bandera. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964, 155 p. Gldrs. 19.75.

Interesting effort to bring East European experience between the wars to bear on problems of underdeveloped countries.

MEMOIRS: 1921–1941. By Ilya Ehrenburg. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1964, 543 p. $6.95.

THE WAR: 1941–1945. By Ilya Ehrenburg. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1965, 198 p. $5.95.

These two volumes of the English translation of the recollections of a leading and apparently indestructible Soviet writer and journalist cover a vast sweep of Soviet history, from the end of the Civil War to the end of the Second World War. Of much intrinsic interest and a valuable source for the times.

TAGEBUCH AUS MOSKAU. By Erwin Behrens. Hamburg: Wegner, 1964, 227 p. DM. 9.80.

Reportage on Moscow and parts of the U.S.S.R. between October 1961 and January 1964.

FASSADE UND WIRKLICHKEIT DER SOWJETUNION. By Viktor Meier. Zurich: Buchverlag der Neuen Zürcher Zeitung, 1965, 190 p. Swiss Fr. 9.

Able reporting on the Soviet scene in 1964 by a correspondent for the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*.

THE GREAT PURGE TRIAL. Edited by Robert C. Tucker and Stephen F. Cohen. New York: Grosset, 1965, 725 p. $5.95.

The text of the Soviet translation of the 1938 purge trial of Bukharin and others, together with annotations, explanatory notes, and an introductory essay by Professor Tucker.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOVIET RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: ITS ORGANIZATION, PERSONNEL, AND FUNDS. By Alexander G. Korol. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965, 375 p. $11.00.

A serious effort to ascertain the magnitude and distribution of the national resources devoted to scientific research and development in the Soviet Union. A valuable contribution. (A study sponsored by the Office of Economic and Manpower Studies, National Science Foundation.)

KHRUSHCHEV AND THE ARTS: THE POLITICS OF SOVIET CULTURE, 1962–1964. Edited by Priscilla Johnson and Leopold Labedz. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965, 300 p. $7.50.

A selection of Soviet documents, with an extensive introductory essay by Miss Johnson.

THE SOVIET YOUTH PROGRAM: REGIMENTATION AND REBELLION. By Allen Kassof. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, 206 p. $5.50.

An able analysis by a sociologist of the purposes, methods, and consequences and prospects of the vast Soviet effort to mould and direct its youth. A volume in the series of the Harvard Russian Research Center.

A HISTORY OF FINLAND. By John H. Wuorinen. New York: Columbia University Press (for the American-Scandinavian Foundation), 1965, 548 p. $10.00.

A broad-gauge history of Finland and its people by a leading American student of the country. About three-fifths of the volume deals with Finnish history since independence.

LITHUANIA UNDER THE SOVIETS: PORTRAIT OF A NATION, 1940–65. Edited by V. Stanley Vardys. New York: Praeger, 1965, 299 p. $7.00.

Eight authors contribute to this account of Lithuania's vicissitudes since 1940.

POLISH NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT IN 1954, 1955, AND 1956. By Thad Paul Alton and Others. New York: Columbia University Press, 1965, 252 p. $6.00.

This volume in a series of studies on the national income of countries in East Central Europe provides "a cross-section view of economic activity as it is summarized in the gross national product."

LOGIQUE DE L'ÉCONOMIE CENTRALISÉE. UN EXEMPLE: LA HONGRIE. By Peter Kende. Paris: Société d'Édition d'Enseignement Supérieur, 1964, 516 p. Fr. 38.

Examination of Hungarian postwar planning and development of a thesis about rationality and central control.

RUMANIA: RUSSIA'S DISSIDENT ALLY. By David Floyd. New York: Praeger, 1965, 144 p. $4.50.

A writer for the London *Daily Telegraph* briefly reviews the steps by which the Rumanian Communist régime has, since 1962, gained a considerable measure of diplomatic and economic independence.

REVOLUTION AND DEFEAT. By D. George Kousoulas. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, 306 p. $7.00.

An excellent, authoritative history of the fortunes and misfortunes of the Greek Communist Party from its origins to the present. About half the volume is devoted to the years since 1941.

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The Middle East

COUNSELS IN CONTEMPORARY ISLAM. By Kenneth Cragg. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1965, 255 p. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., $4.75.)

Islam today is "between past and present, between apprehension and confidence, between the stuff of events and the dictates of the spirit." Dr. Cragg's thoughtful essays illuminate aspects of Islam's continuing effort to survive and absorb the pressures of the modern world.

THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES. By Robert W. Macdonald. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, 407 p. $8.50.

A careful examination of the founding, structure and operation of the Arab League up through 1964, with the conclusion that it has been successful as the chief instrument for asserting Arab dignity and power in the world, and ought now to become a main channel for economic and social modernization.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARAB WORLD. By William R. Polk. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965, 320 p. $5.95.

To the question, what are "the essential facts, ideas, emotions, and guesses which one needs to understand the relations between the United States and the Arab world," Dr. Polk supplies a clear and authoritative response distilled from nearly two decades of involvement with the Middle East as scholar, writer and member of the State Department's Policy Planning Council.

THE STRUGGLE FOR SYRIA: A STUDY OF POST-WAR ARAB POLITICS 1945–1958. By Patrick Seale. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1965, 344 p. $6.75.

The Observer's veteran Middle East correspondent's brilliant and uniquely valuable examination of Syria as the "head and heart" of the Arab national movement, the mirror and arbiter and often the source of inter-Arab power rivalry, and the hinge upon which the cold-war confrontation of the West and the U.S.S.R. has mainly turned.

DER ROTE PHARAO: ÄGYPTEN UND DIE ARABISCHE WIRKLICHKEIT. By Peter Meyer-Ranke. Hamburg: Wegner, 1964, 334 p. DM. 19.80.

An able German correspondent's observations, based on four years in Egypt and its Arab neighbors, of Nasser and his régime, and their drive under the banner of "Arab socialism" to build a powerful modern state.

WIRTSCHAFTLICHE ENTWICKLUNGSPLANUNG IN DER VEREINIGTEN ARABISCHEN REPUBLIK. By Dieter Weiss. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964, 315 p. DM. 49.

The Egyptian economy, U.A.R. development policy, and the ideology of "Arab socialism," a sort of third way between the economic and social systems of West and East, are given a critical examination, based on two years' experience in one of the U.A.R. planning commissions, by a German scholar.

THE COVENANT AND THE SWORD: ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS 1948–56. By Earl Berger. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965, 245 p. $5.75.

A Canadian scholar-journalist's brisk and illuminating narrative of events from the armistice agreements of 1949 to the eve of Israel's invasion of Egypt in 1956. Dr. Berger's central conclusion is that the Israelis in deciding to attack saw no other way out of their growing predicament.

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HALBMOND UM DEN DAVIDSTERN: DIE ARABISCHE WELT UND ISRAEL. By Erik Verg. Berlin: Ullstein, 1964, 228 p. DM. 24.

A well-traveled journalist reports his impressions of Israel and the surrounding crescent of Arab states and his reflections on the quarrel that divides them. The book includes a number of excellent photographs by the author.

CROSS ROADS TO ISRAEL. By Christopher Sykes. London: Collins, 1965, 479 p. 42/.

The story of Britain in Palestine and the growth of the Zionist party into the state of Israel. Masterly, penetrating, absorbing, beautifully written, definitive—such adjectives hardly do justice to this superb volume.

MODERN IRAN. By Peter Avery. New York: Praeger, 1965, 527 p. $11.00.

The transformation of Persia from a quarreled-over remnant of empire into the vital and rapidly modernizing Iran of today is the theme of this perceptive study. Mr. Avery is Lecturer in Persian and Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, and has spent a number of years in Iran.

South and Southeast Asia

DOCUMENTS ON CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA (1949–1962). Edited by G. V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar. Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1964, 491 p. Rs. 30.

One hundred seventy-nine documents, in the forms of treaties, protocols, agreements, letters, memorandums, etc., faithfully selected from original sources, classified under ten sections. Scope includes, as well, the Far East (Japan, Korea, Tibet) and the Territorial Waters.

INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE BORDER DISPUTE WITH CHINA. By W. F. Van Eekelen. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964, 220 p. Gldrs. 22.50.

A Netherlands Foreign Service officer provides a chronological description of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute and then traces the origins of India's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and how they declined as an instrument of practical politics. The final chapter discusses the impact of the issue on overall Indian foreign policy.

THE EMERGING WORLD: JAWAHARLAL NEHRU MEMORIAL VOLUME. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965, 268 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $10.75).

An amazing volume which reflects the boundless range of interests of the late Indian leader, as indicated by a partial listing of contributors: Radhakrishnan, Earl Attlee, Norman Cousins, John Kenneth Galbraith, Mendès-France, Linus Pauling, Daisetz Suzuki, Arnold Toynbee and 18 others, all giving their reflections on the basic problems of our times.

NEHRU: THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS. Selected and Edited by Dorothy Norman. New York: Day, 1965, 2 v. $27.50.

Mrs. Norman, long a student of India and active in the American movement for India's independence, has painstakingly collected the most authoritative versions of Nehru's speeches and writings, issued from 1899 to 1950, which trace the development of his political thought. A valuable compilation, arranged in chronological order.

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF INDIA. By W. H. Morris-Jones. New York: Hillary House, 1964, 236 p. $3.00.

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A compact study of independent India's political institutions and how they work in practice. Professor Morris-Jones stresses deviations from their British counterparts and their own, distinctive character.

INDIA'S EX-UNTOUCHABLES. By Harold R. Isaacs. New York: Day, 1965, 188 p. $4.50.

An examination, based on a visit to India in 1963, of the position of the former "Untouchables," a caste recently officially and legally abolished in that country. The author finds that they still lack social acceptability, and uses racial struggles in the U.S. for numerous comparisons between the two minorities.

THE KASHMIR QUESTION. By A. G. Noorani. Bombay: Manaktalas, 1964, 125 p. Rs. 8.50.

A Bombay High Court lawyer and well-known political commentator, while not directly apportioning blame, makes clear his belief that the India-Pakistan-Kashmir problem will not be solved until the people of Kashmir have the opportunity to express their own views, especially through a clean and efficient government truly representative of them.

PAKISTAN PERSPECTIVE. By Mohammad Ayub Khan. Washington: Embassy of Pakistan, 1965, 110 p.

The President of Pakistan speaks out on the Pakistan-American alliance, Africa and Asia, the Kashmir dispute, India's military build-up, and various aspects of economic development in his country.

SEQUEL TO COLONIALISM: THE 1957–1960 FOUNDATIONS FOR MALAYSIA. By Willard A. Hanna. New York: American Universities Field Staff, 1965, 288 p. $7.50.

A compilation of reports, written *in situ* for the American Universities Field Staff, rearranged to provide information on political developments, key economic activities, international relations and other critical episodes of the Malaysian states, including, of course, Singapore. By a foremost Southeast Asian expert.

VIETNAM: A DIPLOMATIC TRAGEDY. By Victor Bator. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1965, 271 p. $7.50.

An international lawyer and former Hungarian diplomat, now an American citizen, contends that the U.S. position in Viet Nam stems back to the militancy (versus diplomacy) employed by Eisenhower and Dulles.

MISSION IN TORMENT: AN INTIMATE ACCOUNT OF THE U.S. ROLE IN VIETNAM. By John Mecklin. Garden City: Doubleday, 1965, 318 p. $4.95.

A newsman in Viet Nam from 1953 to 1955 and U.S.I.A.'s Public Affairs Officer from 1962 to 1964 traces an important underlying cause of U.S. failure in Viet Nam to the breakdown between American press and government officials, whereby "a major American policy was wrecked, in part, by unadorned reporting of what was going on." His book provides an honest, highly readable narrative of the history of the period, sympathetic especially to the Vietnamese people.

VIETNAM: INSIDE STORY OF THE GUERILLA WAR. By Wilfred G. Burchett. New York: International Publishers, 1965, 253 p. $4.95.

An Australian Communist journalist who traveled with the "Liberation Fighters" recounts his experiences with the guerrilla forces in the Viet Nam war. He concludes that the U.S. will never succeed in the area without the use of the H-bomb. His epilogue, dated January 15, 1965, suggests that "the best [the Americans] can do is to go home."

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THE INDO-CHINA WAR 1945-1954: A STUDY IN GUERILLA WARFARE. By Edgar O'Ballance. London: Faber, 1964, 285 p. 35/.

Major O'Ballance, long a student of guerrilla warfare and author of other works on the subject, recounts the Viet Nam war in its earlier stages, tracing its evolution as expounded in Mao Tse-tung's famous "Guerrilla Warfare." Severely criticized by the British press for its inaccuracies.

MOHAMMED, MARX, AND MARHAEN: THE ROOTS OF INDONESIAN SOCIALISM. By Jeanne S. Mintz. New York: Praeger, 1965, 246 p. $6.00.

Dr. Mintz, analyst and lecturer on Southeast Asia, writes a neatly constructed study of guided democracy and how it works in Indonesia. She sees it as a "weakly structured and poorly functioning attempt at authoritarian rule," successful only because it is in the hands of Sukarno, with whom actual power lies.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

THE CHINESE RED ARMY, 1927–1963: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY. By Edward J. M. Rhoads with Edward Friedman and Others. Cambridge: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University (Harvard University Press, distributor), 1964, 188 p. $3.25 (Paper).

Graduate students at Harvard's East Asian Research Center provide access to approximately 600 selected items, in Chinese, Japanese, English, Russian, French and German, for research into the role of the army in Communist China; extends far beyond the military to embrace economic and political developments as well.

CONFUCIAN CHINA AND ITS MODERN FATE. VOLUME THREE: THE PROBLEM OF HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE. By Joseph R. Levenson. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965, 180 p. $5.00.

The last of a three-volume study of modern China in relation to the Confucian past, investigating historical relativism, conservative and revolutionary historicism and the differing interpretations of history. An important work by a University of California professor of history using Chinese, Japanese and Western-language sources.

MINOBE TATSUKICHI: INTERPRETER OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN JAPAN. By Frank O. Miller. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965, 392 p. $7.50.

A professor of the College of Wooster, whose sources include Japanese manuscript as well as printed works, studies Minobe's early career to show Japan's lag in adopting democratic ways and institutions (from the 1890s to the 1930s) and his influence on the controversial constitutional strategy of his government during the Occupation.

CHANGING JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARD MODERNIZATION. Edited by Marius B. Jansen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, 546 p. $9.00.

Papers by leading world experts, prepared for a 1962 Bermuda seminar sponsored by the Conference on Modern Japan of the Association for Asian Studies, showing how the complexity of interrelationships between elements of "tradition" (imported and indigenous) has changed during the period of modernization.

MUTINY ON KOJE ISLAND. By Hal Vetter. Rutland: Tuttle, 1965, 223 p. $4.50.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An analysis of the elements that brought about the 1952 rioting of Red prisoners in Korea, based on interviews conducted during a year and a half's study in Korea.

BETWEEN TWO EMPIRES: THE ORDEAL OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1929–1946. By Theodore Friend. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965, 312 p. $7.50.

An account of the Philippines' relationship with the U.S. and Japan during her fight for independence. Based on documentary sources and interviews in all three countries.

A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC. By Milton Walter Meyer. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1965, 321 p. $7.00.

The origins and development of Philippine diplomacy from the founding of the Republic in 1946 to the present.

Africa

THE AFRICAN WORLD: A SURVEY OF SOCIAL RESEARCH. Edited by Robert A. Lystad. New York: Praeger, 1965, 575 p. $15.00.

Eighteen essays by prominent American and British scholars which, by their thoroughness and mastery of the interrelated areas of historical, physical and cultural disciplines, constitute an indispensable handbook. Prepared under the auspices of the African Studies Association.

A HISTORY OF POSTWAR AFRICA. By John Hatch. New York: Praeger, 1965, 432 p. $8.50 (Paper, $2.95).

The former Commonwealth officer of the British Labor Party and the author of "Africa Today—And Tomorrow" has written a critical account, by territories, of shifting colonial policies leading to the present-day "mosaic" of African independent states.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS. By Paul Fordham. Baltimore: Penguin, 1965, 244 p. $1.45 (Paper).

This concise volume, one of the Penguin African Library series, assembles geographical facts which relate to political and economic problems of those regions south of the Sahara.

TRADITION ET MODERNISME EN AFRIQUE NOIRE. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1965, 317 p. Fr. 19.50.

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